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<Epigraph on recto if possible> 
 
 
The mantle of liberalism has been discarded and the most disgusting despotism in all its nakedness is 
disclosed to the eyes of the whole world.…  It is a truth which…teaches us to recognize the 
emptiness of our patriotism and the abnormity of our state system, and makes us hide our faces in 
shame. You look at me with a smile and ask: What is gained by that? No revolution is made out of 
shame. I reply: Shame is already a revolution of a kind.… Shame is a kind of anger which is turned 
inward.  And if a whole nation really experienced a sense of shame, it would be like a lion, crouching 
ready to spring   
 








[CH] Introduction: Stigma, the Machinery of Inequality 
 
Stigma, noun. Figurative. A mark of disgrace or infamy; a sign of severe censure or 
condemnation, regarded as impressed on a person or thing; a ‘brand’.  
Oxford English Dictionary 
 
Every news bulletin seemed to be calling me scrounger, fraud, cheat or scum. I began self-
harming, carving the words ‘failure’, ‘freak’ and ‘waste of space’ into my arms, legs and 
stomach.  
Stephanie, 2019  
 
 
March 2019. I am sitting with my friend Stephanie in the corner of a bar in Lancaster, the small city 
in North West England where I live and work.1 Stephanie is a former school teacher and a single 
mum whom I have got to know through our work together on the Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth 
Commission, one of 13 such commissions currently running across the UK, which bring together 
people living in poverty with local decision makers to try to find ways to ameliorate the destitution 
which has followed in the wake of austerity – a programme of government reforms which have 
eviscerated the British welfare state since 2010. When I told Stephanie that I was writing a book 
about stigma, she asked if she could tell me her stigma story, so I could sh 
are it with others, with you, the readers of this book. She asked to meet in this bar because her 
wounds are raw and she feels a public setting will allow her to retain some composure, some dignity, 
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while she speaks. So here we are, two middle-aged women drinking coffee in a city centre bar; late 
afternoon sunlight streams in from the window behind the table where we sit, casting shadows over 
Stephanie’s face, as she explains how she reached a point where she began carving stigma words 
into her arms, stomach, thighs with a razor blade.  
‘The only way I can describe it,’ she says, ‘is if you watch a washing machine go through its 
cycle, you have worries and then they calm down, more worries, then they calm down. Then the 
machine goes into the spin cycle, and you get to that point when it feel like it’s not going to stop, 
and the only way to get that out is to attack yourself because there is nobody else left. You have to 
cut that spin cycle. It’s as harsh as pulling the plug. That’s what you are doing, but it only works for a 
little while…for seconds…then you feel even more shame for having done it.’ 
The story Stephanie tells me begins over a decade ago, when her mum was diagnosed with 
terminal cancer, the same day her husband told her that he was leaving. Stephanie and her 
daughter, Isla, moved into her mum’s house so she could care for her. After her mum died, 
Stephanie got a temporary job as a teaching assistant and started to build a better life. Not long 
afterwards, she had a serious accident at work which left her immobilised and in chronic pain. A 
cycle of medical interventions and operations began, which finally culminated in a knee 
replacement. When she was back on her feet, Stephanie secured a new teaching post, but then Isla 
became seriously ill and she had to take time off work to care for her. Stephanie’s employer lost 
patience with the periods of parental leave, and she was forced to quit her job.  
There is a familiar story here, about women’s unpaid labour, the care they provide for 
elderly relatives and children, and how this care work can make it difficult, sometimes impossible, to 
sustain waged work. During these years of difficult, if ordinary, life events, Stephanie sold her home 
at a loss to prevent repossession. Then austerity cuts to school budgets meant that the teaching 
supply work she had been getting by on dried up. Before long she had sold everything of value she 
owned.  
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‘The shame,’ Stephanie says, ‘is building’ throughout these years: ‘Every time the card was 
declined when I was shopping. I’d be standing there with £6 of shopping but it wouldn’t go through 
and everybody in the queue is…you know…every little thing that happens piles on more stigma and 
shame.’ Stephanie was really struggling now to keep a roof over her head. She was increasingly 
relying on charitable foodbanks to survive. In desperation, she took out a high interest payday loan 
and a rapid spiral into debt followed. Before long, she says, ‘We started getting letters to evict us.’ 
The dry mouth each time the phone rings. Her heart beating faster in her chest each time a letter 
drops on the door mat. The rush of anxiety that accompanies every unexpected knock at the door.  
Stephanie couldn’t see a way out of her situation, so she sought advice and was told she should 
qualify for unemployment benefit and housing benefit. She applied for the relief to which she was 
entitled, during the exact period when the British Government’s austerity programme of welfare 
reform was beginning.  
In February 2008, in the midst of the global banking crisis, the Shadow Chancellor George 
Osbourne gave a speech with the title ‘There is a Dependency Culture’ to the Conservative Party. 
This was the period leading up to 2010 general election, which would see Osbourne installed as ‘the 
austerity Chancellor’. Osbourne used this speech as an opportunity to outline the Conservative 
Party’s economic response to the financial crisis, which centred on plans to implement ‘the most far-
reaching programme [of] welfare reform for a generation’.2 There was no evidence for the claims 
Osbourne made in this speech that an overly generous system of welfare provisions was responsible 
for the national economic outlook, which he variously described as indebted, stagnant, inflexible, 
vulnerable and exposed. Yet he confidentially identified ‘millions of people’ who were ‘languishing 
on out of work benefits’ as a central challenge facing the British economy: an ‘unproductive’ 
residuum of people ‘persistently playing the system’ and deceitfully milking the rewards of what he 
termed a ‘something for nothing culture’. Osbourne announced that cuts in benefits, services and 
provisions, a deterrent welfare system spiked with conditions and sanctions, and punitive workfare 
programmes outsourced to ‘private and voluntary sectors’ was the ‘tough’ medicine required to 
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move people ‘off benefits and into work’.3 He promised that these austerity reforms would end 
what he described as a ‘shameful’  ‘dependency culture in Britain’, ‘free up supply’ (of capital and 
labour), ‘unleash billions of pounds’, ‘restore the health of the public finances’, liberate those ‘stuck 
on benefits’ and ‘transform’ the ‘life chances of millions of families’. In fact, as I examine in Chapter 
Four of this book, what followed in the wake of austerity is what can only be described as a planned 
social catastrophe.  
When the Conservative Party came to power in a coalition government in 2010, their 
programme of welfare reform began in earnest. A former job centre advisor has described how her 
job changed overnight from one of helping people to ‘the persecution of vulnerable people’.4 ‘The 
pressure was incredible’, she says, as frontline staff became subject ‘to constant and aggressive 
pressure to meet and exceed targets’ to get people off benefits by imposing conditions and 
sanctions. It was, she says, ‘like “getting brownie points” for cruelty’.5   
What Stephanie experienced when she applied for benefits was a welfare system in chaos, 
as it was being redesigned in ways which sought to deter people from making claims. As we will see, 
the stigma Stephanie encountered when interacting with frontline workers and welfare agencies 
was shocking. However, this was only one element of what she describes as an ‘overwhelmingly 
hostile environment’. For what accompanied the implementation of these welfare reforms was an 
extraordinary political and media propaganda campaign which sought to manufacture public 
consent for austerity by stigmatising those in receipt of relief.  
Stories about ‘benefits cheats’ seeped incessantly into Stephanie’s world; every time she 
turned on the radio or television or brushed past a rack of newspapers in a shop, she would come 
across ‘things like these people are stealing your taxes’, which left her ‘thinking that is me they’re 
talking about’.  This ‘welfare stigma machine’ needled Stephanie from every direction: ‘It keeps 
coming, it’s relentless, one constant cycle of judgement, like a knife being stuck repeatedly into you.’ 
This unremitting stigma slowly eroded Stephanie’s self-esteem. She began to feel that her daughter 
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would be better off without her. She started to regularly self-harm. She became suicidal: ‘I 
stockpiled tablets waiting for the right moment.’ 
In 2015, a letter arrived alleging that Stephanie had erroneously claimed income in the form 
of child tax credit to which she wasn’t entitled, and that this benefit was being stopped while an 
investigation took place.6  This stream of regular income (circa £250 a month) was essential to 
service the interest on her debts. When Stephanie read this letter, she broke down: ‘I was in a state. 
I completely lost it. I was absolutely distraught. I was hitting myself with things. I was scraping my 
skin off.’  
That same day she was supposed to attend an appointment at the job centre, so she rang 
and explained to them that she was ‘in terrible distress’, but they told her that a failure to attend 
would be taken as evidence she was unwilling to work, and that she would be sanctioned, 
potentially losing her right to claim benefits for up to three years. ‘So, I just got in the car. I parked 
illegally in the middle of the street outside the job centre. I was hysterical. I was bleeding. The 
security guard looked at me and said I couldn’t go inside. Eventually the man I was supposed to be 
signing on with came outside of the building with the form’.  
The job coach didn’t speak to Stephanie; he simply handed her a pen, and she signed on in 
the street. ‘As I signed it, blood dripped all over the paper. I will never forget it.’ Nobody expressed 
concern or worry for Stephanie as she stood outside the job centre with blood dripping from her 
wrists and arms. Nobody attempted to sooth her, to calm her. Nobody called for medical assistance. 
When I ask her why nobody did any of these things, she says, ‘Nobody cared.’ She says: ‘You end up 
not feeling human, like you don’t have the right to be part of that society.’ In the end, you are ‘so 
dehumanised’ that you begin to perceive yourself as an object, a thing, ‘just scum’.  
While Stephanie is describing this to me, her voice is breaking and her body is shaking. I stop 
her and say, ‘I’m worried that recalling this trauma is repeating the harm.’   
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She replies, ‘At one point a psychotherapist said to me that sometimes it helps to write 
down negative thoughts rather than keep them in your head, so what I ended up doing was writing a 
list of descriptors of myself’; and she recalls them:  
 






waste of oxygen… 
A whole list of negative things.  
 
She continues: ‘Then one day I started to cut the words from the list into my body. I’d think to 
myself, I’ll do this one this time. I was writing on myself to say to the rest of the world, who you 
perceive as looking at you like that: “I know, you don’t have to tell me, I already know. I know what 
you’re thinking, but don’t think I don’t know that as well. Look.”’  
When I arrived home after my conversation with Stephanie, I lay down on my bed and wept 
for a long time.  
 
[A] A vigorous and relentless assault upon human dignity  
 
In the foreword to the 2016/2017 Amnesty International Report on the state of the world’s human 
rights, Amnesty’s Secretary General Salil Shetty warned that we are witnessing ‘a global trend 
towards angrier and more divisive politics’ in which ‘the idea of human dignity’ is ‘under vigorous 
and relentless assault from powerful narratives of blame, fear and scapegoating, propagated by 
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those who sought to take or cling on to power’.7  ‘Across the world’, he writes, ‘leaders and 
politicians wagered their future power on narratives of fear and disunity, pinning blame on the 
“other” for the real or manufactured grievances of the electorate.’8 
It is the thesis of Stigma that in order to counter the ‘vigorous and relentless assault’ upon 
human dignity that is a major characteristic of current global authoritarian turn, we require a better 
understanding of how stigma is propagated as a governmental technology of division and 
dehumanisation. We need to track the role played by ‘stigma politics’ in producing the toxic climate 
of fear and hatred that is enveloping and dividing societies and communities. We need to examine 
how ‘stigma power’ is crafted and cultivated as a means of levearing political capital. We need a 
better understanding also of the ways in which this divisive politics gets under the skin of those it 
subjugates; how this state-cultivated stigma changes the ways in which people think about 
themselves and others – corroding compassion, crushing hope, weakening social solidarity.  
Stigma seeks to enrich sociological understandings of stigma as a concept, idea, material 
force and practice. It hopes also to enliven wider public debates about what stigma is, where stigma 
comes from, how and by whom stigma is produced and for what purposes. Stigma is concerned with 
what social scientific accounts of stigma frequently neglect, namely: an understanding of stigma as 
embedded within the social relations of capitalism, and as a form of power entangled with histories 
of capitalism, colonialism and patriarchy. Stigma stretches the frameworks within which we 
ordinarily think about stigma. It aims to dislodge stigma from the settled meanings it acquired within 
twentieth-century social sciences, and to disrupt the individualistic, ahistorical and politically 
anaesthetised conceptualisations of stigma inherited from this tradition. Stigma is concerned with 
undisciplining stigma, with decolonising stigma, and with thinking about stigma within a distinctly 
political register.  
This introduction is a précis of key themes and concepts in this book, and also a guide to the 
chapters that follow.  
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[A] What is stigma? 
 
In Historical Ontology, Ian Hacking reminds us all ‘concepts have their being in historical sites’.9 The 
word ‘stigma’, as the Oxford English Dictionary defines it, is a figurative noun that means a 
‘distinguishing mark or characteristic (of a bad or objectionable kind)’ and a ‘mark of disgrace or 
infamy; a sign of severe censure or condemnation, regarded as impressed on a person or thing’. 
Everyday uses of the word ‘stigma’ draw on both these definitions; we employ ‘stigma’ to describe 
the degrading marks that are affixed to particular bodies, people, conditions and places within 
humiliating social interactions.  
These two definitions of ‘stigma’ were composed by lexicographers at the Oxford English 
Dictionary in 1916, and they don’t reflect the ways in which the word acquired an increasingly 
psychological meaning from the mid-twentieth century onwards. As we saw in Stephanie’s story, 
when people use the term ‘stigma’ today, they also tend to use it experientially, to describe the 
debilitating psychological effects of being stigmatised, with a particular emphasis on how the shame 
induced by stigma corrodes well-being and damages your sense of self. However, psychological 
understandings of stigma often focus on individual experiences of being stigmatised in ways that 
occlude an understanding of stigma as a material force, a structural and structuring form of power. 
Stigma develops a more psycho-political understanding of stigma, reconceptualising stigma as a 
form of power that is written on the body and gets under the skin. 
The Oxford English Dictionary also defines stigma as ‘a mark made upon the skin by burning 
with a hot iron (rarely, by cutting or pricking), as a token of infamy or subjection’. This literal 
definition emphasises stigma as a material practice of bodily marking and subordination. Indeed, it is 
difficult for us to imagine activities that involve burning somebody with ‘a hot iron’, or cutting or 
pricking their skin for the purposes of indicating ‘infamy’ and ‘subjection’, as actions that aren’t 
saturated with power.  
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To illustrate this definition, the Oxford English Dictionary includes a phrase penned by the 
nineteenth-century London Times journalist William Howard in My Diary North and South (1863), a 
book composed from diary entries and letters written while he travelled in North America during the 
American Civil War. The phrase reads: ‘advertisements for runaway negroes...the description of 
the stigmata on their persons—whippings and brandings, scars and cuts’.10  This use of ‘stigmata’, to 
describe the marks left by torture on the skin of runaway slaves, furnishes stigma with a vicious and 
bloody meaning, binding the etymology of stigma to the four-hundred-year history of chattel 
slavery.  
The legal right of English people to own human beings as ‘goods and chattel’ was first 
established by English colonialists in the Barbados Slave Code: ‘An Act for Better Ordering and 
Governing of Negroes’ (1661). This Act mandated that if a slave ‘shall offer any violence to any 
Christian …he shall be severely whipped, his nose slit, and be burned in some part of his face with a 
hot iron. And being brutish slaves, [they] deserve not, for the baseness of their condition, to be tried 
by the legal trial of twelve men of their peers, as the subjects of England are.’11 It seems likely that 
the Oxford English Dictionary definition of stigma as ‘a mark made upon the skin by burning with a 
hot iron’ derives in part from these seventeenth-century legislative codes.12  Other histories of 
stigma unfurl from this submerged etymology, histories of torture and slave labour, but also 
histories of British citizenship, for in legalising torture what these slave codes legislated is that 
chattel slaves and their descendants were not citizens; indeed, they were not considered human at 
all.   
 
[A] A mark made upon the skin by burning with a hot iron 
 
In Black Reconstruction in America (1935), the sociologist W. E. B. Du Bois (1863–1963) described the 
Atlantic Slave Trade as ‘the transportation of ten million human beings out of the dark beauty of 
their mother continent into the new-found Eldorado of the West. They descended into Hell.’13 From 
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the beginning of this trade in the sixteenth century, ‘Europeans took control of slave bodies by 
branding them, burning symbols of European ownership into the flesh’, permanently stigmatising 
people as chattel.14 In 1527, Nzingna Mbemeba Affonso, then ruler of the African Kongo Kingdom, 
wrote to the King of Portugal asking him to cease the trade.15 Describing how his ‘black free subjects’ 
were being kidnapped en masse, he wrote ‘as soon as [they] are in the hands of white men they are 
branded with a red-hot iron’.16  Once stigmatised, people were stored in prison hulks, barracoons 
and factories (the terms used for the barracks and pens used to temporarily hold the enslaved) on 
the coast of West Africa, before they were shipped across the Atlantic. Those who survived the 
terrors of this factory complex, and the death ships of the Middle Passage, were often further 
branded or tattooed when they were auctioned in Caribbean and North American slave markets. 
Violent stigmatisation continued in the ‘psychopathic’ plantation regime in the Americas, where ‘the 
technology of the whip’ was employed to turn ‘sweat, blood, and flesh into gold’.17 
To understand what the literal definition of stigma adds to our understanding of the 
meaning of this word, let’s consider a fuller example of a runaway slave announcement.  The 
following is an advertisement posted in The London Gazette, seeking the return of a young woman 
called Sabinah, who has escaped the ship Hannah while it was docked in London on 6 June 1743, at 
the height of British involvement in the Atlantic Slave Trade:  
 
A Black Negro Woman, about nineteen Years old, with two Letters on her Breast and 
Shoulder, made her Escape out of the Ship Hannah, Capt. Fowler, for Jamaica, the 6th inst. 
goes by the Name of Sabinah, is suppos’d to be deluded away by some other Black about 
Whitechapel, Rag-Fair, or Rotherhith. Whoever brings her to the late Mr. Neale’s, on 
Lawrence-Pountney-Hill, shall have three Guineas Reward; or if put on board the Ship again 




This advertisement is one of 800 similar advertisements published in English and Scottish 
newspapers between 1700 and 1780, and recently collected in the Runaway Slaves in Britain 
database.19 When reading the descriptions of runaway slaves like Sabinah, branded with ‘two 
Letters on her Breast and Shoulder’, we can begin to ascertain how stigma marks functioned as a 
visual form of identification; that is, as technologies of surveillance and mechanisms of capture.20 
We might also consider the stigmatising gaze these advertisements seek to inculcate in the public 
they address. The readers of eighteenth-century London newspapers are being solicited to search 
for identifying stigmata on the bodies of those they encounter; encouraged, with the inducement of 
financial rewards, to apprehend and return this lost property. The US-based Freedom on the Move 
database has amassed over 20,000 runway advertisements, many of which are similarly ‘festooned 
with descriptions of scars, burns, mutilations, brands, and wounds’.21 Stigma is certainly not 
metaphorical in these examples: these are marks that have quite literally been impressed on people.  
 
 
[A] The coining of blood into capital  
 
In 1663, the Royal Mint in London began striking a new gold coin ‘in the name and for the use of the 
Company of Royal Adventurers of England trading with Africa’. 22 Impressed with the figure of an 
elephant, these coins were originally made of gold from Guinea in West Africa and were designed 
for use in ‘the Guinea trade’. As Sukhdev Sandhu writes, ‘Not for nothing did a coin – the guinea – 
derive its etymology from the West African region of that name, the area from which hundreds of 
thousands of indigenous people were seized against their will. For traders in 17th and 18th-century 
Britain, the stigmatised African was quite literally a unit of currency.’ 23 Slaves were an extremely 
valuable commodity. Identifying Sabinah by the letters impressed on her breast and shoulder, and 
returning her to Captain Fowler on his slave ship bound for the Jamaican market, would have netted 
you as a reward the equivalent of £260 in guineas.  
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The tattoos, brand and whip marks inscribed on the bodies of the enslaved and the 
reproduction of these stigmata in the publicity produced by slave traders reveal the extent to which 
stigma was an integral part of the machinery of ‘the Guinea trade’. As Simone Browne argues, 
‘branding was a measure of slavery, an act of making the body legible as property that was put to 
work in the production of the slave as object that could be bought, sold and traded’.24 The violence 
of stigmatisation was part of ‘the work of commodification, of “producing” slaves’.25 
An example of the branding irons used in barracoons and plantations can be seen at the 
Liverpool Museum of Slavery, while the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York has in its 
collection an 1863 photograph of a freed slave called Wilson Chinn, who is branded on his forehead with 
the letters ‘V. B. M.’, the initials of his owner, a sugar planter called Volsey B. Marmillion. This stigma 
archive reminds us of the ways in which the catastrophe of slavery was written on the skin – with 
stigmata that transformed human beings into property, into things, into commodities, and into 
guineas. A stigma practice captured in Karl Marx’s phrase ‘the coining of blood into capital’.26 
This other etymology of stigma is entangled with the history of the small city of Lancaster, in 
which I live. In 1754, a Lancaster-born slaver called Miles Barber established one of the most 
significant commercial slaving hubs in the history of British involvement in the Atlantic slave trade. 
This place of horror was called ‘Factory Island’, and was located on one of the Îles de Los, a group of 
islands off the African coast of Guinea, at the mouth of the Sierra Leone River. Over the course of 
the following decades Barber developed and managed an estimated 11 slave factories and 
barracoons along this stretch of West African coast, and by 1776, was being described by his 
contemporaries as the owner of ‘the greatest Guinea House in Europe’. 27  
In the eighteenth century, Lancaster was heavily involved in the Atlantic slave trade. It was 
the fourth largest slave-trading centre in England, and Lancaster slavers developed extensive 
commercial networks in the West Indies and Americas, importing slave-produced goods such as 
mahogany, sugar, dyes, spices, coffee and rum, and later cotton for Lancashire’s mills, from 
plantations, and exporting fine furniture, gunpowder, woollen and cotton garments. Young men 
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from Lancaster slave-trading families worked as agents and factors across the West-Indies. Over 
generations these families accumulated land and property, plantations and slaves. As Eric Williams 
details in Capitalism and Slavery (1944), slave traders and their descendants dominated local 
political life in towns such as Lancaster ‘as aldermen, mayors and councillors’. 28 Some invested their 
inherited fortunes in the development of local mills and businesses. 29 It was the profits from slavery 
that financed the industrialisation of England and the development of its civic infrastructure and 
welfare estate. The history of slavery is the history of capitalism, and it remains, as the American 
novelist and essayist James Baldwin put it, ‘literally present in all that we do’.30 
 
[A] Letters of blood and fire 
Situating stigma within the historical scenography of chattel slavery foregrounds the violence within 
the more passive conceptualisation of stigma that we have inherited from twentieth-century social 
sciences. It binds stigma to practices of bodily marking, and emphasises the role of stigmatisation in 
systems of social discipline and punishment. When we use the word stigma today we don’t tend to 
use it to mean the literal acts of inscription that this definition suggests. In supplementing the 
meaning of stigma with this other etymology, I am aware that I am already asking you to think about 
stigma from a strange perspective. You likely already associate stigma with suffering and cruelty. 
Certainly, we know from contemporary social scientific literature that stigma often has devastating 
effects on people’s health and well-being. You might even imagine stigma as a form of subjection 
which is socially embroidered, pressed and needled upon people through hurtful words or degrading 
looks. However, we don’t ordinarily associate stigma with physical violence, use the word stigma to 
describe physical wounds or scars, relate stigma to the branding iron, or associate it with the 
‘whipping-machines’ of plantation labour. 31 
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If we imagine stigma as a form of violence at all, we tend to think of it as a more nuanced 
form of persecution. For example, in 1970 the sociologist Robert Pinker argued that what 
distinguishes stigma from other forms of violence, is that it is often ‘slow’ and ‘unobtrusive’: ‘a 
highly-sophisticated form of violence which can best be compared to those forms of psychological 
torture in which the victim is broken psychically and physically but left to all outward appearances 
unmarked’.32 Pinker is correct: in liberal democratic societies the violence of stigma is often 
symbolic, diffuse, slow and indirect – but not always. Stigma argues that recoupling the concept of 
stigma to economic and materialist histories of bodily marking deepens our understanding of the 
social, political and economic function of stigmatisation. As Michel Foucault suggests, even when 
systems of government ‘do not make use of violent or bloody punishment, even when they use 
“lenient” methods involving confinement or correction, it is always the body that is at issue – the 
body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission’.33 Stigma 
marks people out: ‘it is intended either by the scar it leaves on the body, or by the spectacle that 
accompanies it, to brand the victim with infamy’.34   
Of the source materials drawn on by the lexicographers at the Oxford English Dictionary to 
build a definitional picture of stigma, the use of the term ‘stigmata’ to describe the marks on the 
bodies of runaway chattel slaves, is the most instructive for understanding the ‘historical being’ of 
the concept of stigma. Critically, this other etymology emphasises the ways in which stigma is bound 
to ‘the voraciousness of capital, the capitalization of human misery, and the profits of 
immiseration’.35 
In Chapter One ‘The Penal Tattoo’, I examine in more detail the harrowing practices that 
unfold from histories of stigma. As you will discover, we cannot disentangle stigma power from 
histories of slavery, colonialism, Empire, capitalism, the history of enclosures, the industrial 
revolution, and the formation of the liberal democratic state. The history of stigma ‘is written in the 
annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire’.36 
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[A] Stigma power 
What is ‘stigma power’? Robert Pinker argued that ‘stigma is the commonest form of violence used 
within democratic societies’, and yet it is rarely theorised either as a violent practice, or as a form of 
power. 37  Indeed, scholarly research on stigma has, until recently, remained largely impervious to 
what Stuart Hall termed ‘the radical expansion of the notion of power’ in the wake of the mass social 
upheavals and freedom movements of the mid-twentieth century. 38 It is this gap in our 
understanding of how stigma functions as a form of power that this book seeks to address. In short, 
Stigma seeks to make it impossible to think of stigma separately from power. In this endeavour, this 
book builds on a new body of social scientific research.  
Over the last decade there has been a growing recognition of the constraints of the existing 
‘excessively individualistic focus’ of twentieth-century social scientific research on stigma.39 This has 
led to attempts to ‘expand and reorient stigma's theoretical lens to focus on meso and macro socio-
cultural structures’.40 Most significant for this book is Bruce Link and Jo Phelan’s concept of ‘stigma 
power’, a term they coined to describe the role played by stigma in the ‘exploitation, control or 
exclusion of others’. 41 There is an important recognition in this term that ‘stigma arises and 
stigmatisation takes shape in specific contexts of culture and power’, and in particular that sigma is 
deployed in ways that seek to amplify ‘existing inequalities of class, race, gender and sexuality’. 42 
This recent focus on ‘stigma power’ suggests an emergent cross-disciplinary social scientific 
consensus on the pivotal significance of stigma in the reproduction and distribution of social 
inequalities. Stigma extends this work, but also departs from some of its disciplinary constraints – 
for example, I draw more on history than social science in reconceptualising stigma as power in this 
book.  
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Stigmatisation, as I reconceptualise it, is a practice that, while experienced intimately 
through stigmatising looks, comments, slights, remarks made in face-to-face or digitally mediated 
encounters, is always enmeshed with wider capitalist structures of expropriation, domination, 
discipline and social control. Stigma is a more productive form of power than that currently 
understood in the contemporary social scientific literature.   
I opened the introduction with the stigma Stephanie carved into her skin, as her scars testify 
to the entangled relationship between stigma as experience and the governmental exercise of 
stigma power, the consideration of which lies at the heart of this book. Indeed, when listening to 
people’s ‘stigma stories’, I grew increasingly frustrated with the weak understanding of stigma that 
underpins much social scientific writing on stigma – particularly research in which stigma is 
conceived of as being a social problem that can be ameliorated through education, by changing 
individual attitudes, and/or by teaching the stigmatised how to better manage the stigma pinned on 
them (see Chapter Two). I grew tired of hearing the claim – frequently made in charitable anti-
stigma campaigns - that challenging the stigma associated with particular conditions – from poverty 
to mental ill health – can overcome ‘barriers to help-seeking’, without an acknowledgement of the 
ways in which stigma is deliberately designed into systems of social provision in ways that make 
help-seeking a desperate task (see Conclusion).  
In short, much existing research on stigma, and social action around stigma, brackets off 
from consideration the ways in which stigma is purposefully crafted as a strategy of government, in 
ways that often deliberately seek to foment and accentuate inequalities and injustices. While people 
like my friend Stephanie might not always be able to successfully defend themselves against the 
cycles of stigma and shame in which they become ensnarled, they understand that the crushing 
stigma they endure is not simply an unfortunate outcome of illiberal social interactions. That is, 
people who are stigmatised are cognisant of the ways in which the ‘stigma machines’ in which they 
find themselves entangled have been engineered.  
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When we begin with an understanding of stigma as power, we can also begin to perceive 
stigma as site of intensive social and political struggle – and to track often occluded histories of anti-
stigma resistance. Indeed, people’s experiences of being stigmatised are a critical source of 
‘sociological imagination’ (see Chapter Six) and a vital resource in collective struggles against the 
capture of human lives in the exploitative dehumanising machineries of capitalism. 
 
[A] Neoliberal stigma power – looking up 
 
Stigma: The Machinery of Inequality is a sister project to my book Revolting Subjects: Social 
Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal Britain (2013), which developed a theoretical account of 
‘social abjection’ as a means of critically engaging with the politics of disposability that characterises 
neoliberalism. In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, and the fracturing of neoliberal 
hegemony this precipitated, many national governments have tipped increasingly towards 
authoritarian rule.43 As neoliberal capitalism bars its authoritarian teeth, the practices of social 
abjection I tracked in Revolting Subjects have accelerated. We are currently witnessing the 
intensification of what the criminologist David Garland describes as a ‘new punitiveness’ 
characterised by ‘disproportionate punishments’ and ‘brutalizing and wasteful’ forms of social 
control.44  This ‘new punitiveness’ is evident in a vast range of social practices and phenomena, such 
as rising prison and migrant detention populations, the intensification of discriminatory policing and 
surveillance measures, the design of ever-more exclusionary citizenship and deportation regimes, 
and the workfare and sanctions meted out to discipline welfare claimants.  
Drawing on research in the US judicial system, Mona Lynch describes this as ‘waste 
management’ government that transforms people ‘from sociologically and psychologically rich 
human beings into a kind of untouchable toxic waste that need only be securely contained until its 
final disposal’.45 At the twilight of neoliberal capitalism, practices of ‘waste management’ 
government are accelerating, and borders, cages, camps and walls are proliferating across the face 
 28 
of the earth.46 One argument of this book is that the exercise of stigma power is an integral 
component of this punitive authoritarian shift.  
Stigma builds on a small body of research that has tracked empirical links between the 
amplification of social stigma and extractive forms of neoliberal capitalism, in processes as diverse as 
welfare retrenchment, labour precarity, eviction, displacement, social cleansing and gentrification, 
anti-migrant politics and punitive citizenship regimes, the proliferation of internal borders and 
violent bordering practices. For example, Graham Scambler argues that governmental 
‘weaponizations of stigma’ cannot be disentangled from the imperatives of financial capitalism; 
while Kirsteen Paton urges us to ‘gaze up’ and examine the ‘processes of power and profit’ that 
motivate the manufacture of stigma.47  ‘Looking up’ allows us to ascertain how stigma is designed, 
crafted and activated to govern populations on multiple scales, as state-led stigma campaigns and 
cultural stigma production cascade into our everyday interactions with each other.  
 
[A] Genealogies of stigma power – looking back 
The governmental exercise of stigma power is entangled with histories of oppression, and with the 
forms of inequality required by different modalities of capitalist exploitation and economic 
discipline.  What I mean by this, is that institutional, economic and social policies intent on the 
production of grotesque inequalities require diverse, state-sanctioned stigma strategies that often 
involve the reactivation of stigma along historical lines. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot argues: ‘tracking 
power requires a richer view of historical production than most theorists acknowledge’.48  In short, 
to understand the intensification of stigma power in the current conjuncture we need to both ‘look 
up’ and ‘look back’. To these ends, the chapters in Stigma cut a series of historical slices through 
stigma power, tracing the ways in which stigma has been exercised in the past to govern populations 
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through degrading forms of marking. As Foucault puts it, bodies manifest ‘the stigmata of past 
experience’, the task is to expose how bodies are ‘totally imprinted by history’.49   
The feminist theorist Donna Haraway describes her genealogical methods as akin to 
untangling a ball of yarn.50  She notes: ‘I think of these balls of yarn as gravity wells, as points of 
intense implosion or as knots. They lead out to worlds, you can explode them, you can untangle 
them, you can somehow loosen them up.’ 51 In Stigma my approach involves unravelling particular 
constellations of stigma power, tracing threads of connection, examining how and why particular 
stigma figures emerge in specific historical and geopolitical contexts, and in the process making 
tangible relations between often seemingly unrelated forms and practices of stigmatisation.  
Genealogy is not about comparison; rather, as William Walter argues, it is a method of ‘re-
serialisation’ which is concerned with ‘the retrieval of forgotten struggles and subjugated 
knowledges’.52 It is an interdisciplinary method that seeks to lessen our ‘perspectival captivity’ in the 
present.53 Genealogical methods allow for new insights into the increased velocity of stigma as a 
modality of governance in the current moment of authoritarian neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, it is 
the argument of Stigma that the knowledge garnered through histories of stigma power is critical for 
understanding how inequalities are reproduced and, further, that histories of stigma power and anti-
stigma struggles might inform resistance to the authoritarian turn that characterises the current 
conjuncture.   
This genealogical approach is also inspired by the recent work of scholars such as Jenna Loyd 
and Anne Bonds, whose research on the territorial stigmatisation of particular black neighbourhoods 
in the US (their study focuses on Milwaukee) reminds us that practices of stigmatisation are always 
enmeshed with much longer histories and spatial geographies of ‘racial capitalism’, and the research 
of scholars such as Joe Feagin and Zinobia Bennefield, whose research on the systematic structural 
racism of US healthcare details how ‘centuries of slavery, segregation, and contemporary white 
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oppression severely limit and restrict access of many Americans of color to adequate socioeconomic 
resources–and to adequate health care and health outcomes’.54 
 
 [A] Stigma and Racism 
Stigma is one of the foundational concepts of twentieth-century sociology and the wider social 
sciences. This introductory chapter has already strayed some distance from the conventional 
understandings of stigma inherited from this tradition. In Chapter Three, ‘From Stigma Power to 
Black Power’, I will attend in greater detail to more familiar understandings of the stigma. In the 
social sciences, stigma is most often associated with the work of the North American sociologist 
Erving Goffman (1922–1982). One of the most widely read and cited sociologists in history, Goffman 
was already famous when his short book Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity 
(1963) was published in 1963.  His previous books The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956), 
and Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (1961) were best-
selling titles, an unusual achievement for academic texts. Goffman’s Stigma alone has sold an 
astonishing 800,000 copies in the fifty years since its publication. Indeed, my reason for returning to 
Goffman is that despite many refinements of his account, his book is widely considered the 
foundational text on stigma, and his definition of stigma continues to buttress contemporary 
understandings.   
In the opening pages of Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity, Goffman 
notes that his study was motivated by the fact that there has been ‘little effort to describe the 
structural preconditions of stigma, or even provide a definition of the concept itself’.55 Despite this 
concern with ‘structural preconditions’, one of the striking features of Goffman’s account is that he 
unplugs the concept of stigma from power: both the power-inflected micro-aggressions of the 
everyday social interactions that he was ostensibly interested in, and the larger structural and 
structuring power relations which shape the societies in which we live. In order to address this 
strange absence of power, Chapter Three resituates Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled 
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Identity within the historical context of the explosive political movements against the ‘humiliations 
of racial discrimination’ taking place while Goffman wrote his book. Indeed, it is the contention of 
this chapter that the 1960s US civil rights and black power movement invites critical revision of 
Goffman’s decidedly apolitical account of stigma.56 
This chapter reads Goffman’s stigma concept through the lens of black sociology, a field of 
knowledge which here designates not only formal sociological scholarship, but political manifestos, 
journalism, creative writing, oral histories and memoirs. As we shall see, the contrast between 
Goffman’s powerless stigma-concept, and the account of racial stigma which emerged out of black 
activist and sociological writing in the same period couldn’t be more striking. This black stigma 
archive offers a radically alternative theory of stigma as power, allowing for a reconceptualisation of 
the social and political function of stigma as a governmental technology of racial capitalism.  
The liberal and normative understanding of stigma inherited from twentieth century social sciences 
has significantly contracted the purchase of stigma as an analytic concept. Stigma: the Machinery of 
Inequality insists that bringing racism to the front and centre of our understandings of stigma 
transforms a weak concept into a power-full one.  
 
[A] Decolonising stigma 
This historical revision of Goffman’s stigma-concept builds on a growing body of research on ‘the 
relationship between race, segregation and the epistemology of sociology’.57 Satnam Virdee, 
Professor of Sociology at the University of Glasgow, argues that sociology is replete with origin 
myths about its own radical, critical and leftist orientations, myths that obscure the ‘Social 
Darwinian, cultural evolutionary and eugenicist perspectives’ of many of this discipline’s founding 
thinkers and practitioners. 58 This is particularly evident, he writes, when we consider the ways in 
which ‘the liberal white gatekeepers of the discipline actively marginalized that contraflow of 
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emancipatory African American thought emergent within the discipline’. 59 For example, despite the 
sophisticated understanding of racial stigma (racism and racialisation) developed over a hundred 
years of black sociological thought, the conceptualisation of stigma within the white sociological 
canon has largely ignored or marginalised this body of knowledge.  
Stigma: the Machinery of Inequality responds to Gurminder Bhambra’s call for what she 
terms ‘connected sociologies’ which challenge and reconstruct ‘the historical narratives that inform 
sociological conceptions of the contemporary world’. 60 This requires developing a ‘deep historical 
consciousness’, a commitment to ‘unlearning’ the epistemological foundations of disciplinary 
knowledges, and a candid examination of ‘the myriad of effects and consequences’ of the concepts, 
vocabularies and methods that have shaped the discourses and practices of sociology since its 
invention as a science in the mid-nineteenth century. 61  
Stigma contributes to this decolonising project by reconceptualising stigma through existing 
‘minority knowledges of stigma’ within the black sociological tradition, critical race scholarship, 
social history, postcolonial histories and decolonial theory, feminist and disability studies. These 
other epistemologies of stigma are particularly instructive because they emerge out of long and 
collective struggles against stigma; that is, they are concerned with challenging the oppressive and 
restrictive social norms and ideals which stigma proscribes, and stigma power inculcates. My hope is 
that the understanding of stigma that emerges out of these rich submerged seams of stigma 
knowledge might be used by others to unsettle permanently the individualistic, ahistorical and 
apolitical understandings of this concept. Together, the chapters in this book seek to demonstrate 
that stigmatisation is a technology of government, which is embedded in the history of racial 
capitalism.   
 
[A] Borders, Walls and Fences 
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Stigma: the Machinery of Inequality is particularly concerned with stigma as a form of statecraft, 
including the role of stigma politics in fomenting ethno-nationalist hatreds, and legitimating punitive 
regimes of citizenship and violent practices of deportation and detention.62 In Chapter Three, ‘The 
Stigma Machine of the Border’, I examine this through the lens of the epidemic of state racism that 
followed in the wake of the 2015 so-called refugee crisis in Europe. This chapter focuses on events in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and the responses of the Czech and Hungarian governments to the 
arrival of refugees at their borders. It examines how the humanitarian crisis triggered by refugee 
arrivals mutated into a ‘racist crisis’ as migrants were made the focal point for anxieties about 
national identity and security. This racist crisis splintered liberal tolerance and social solidarity across 
the region on a scale unprecedented since the 1930s. 
One argument of Chapter Three is that the current authoritarian re-turn requires a better 
understanding of the historical relationship between statecraft and what Barbara Fields and Karen 
Fields term racecraft.63 To this end, this chapter examines how racist understandings of human 
difference forged in twentieth-century practices of European colonialism in Africa and Nazi-era 
colonial fascism re-emerged and converged in public responses to the 2015 refugee crisis, as the 
racially stigmatised bodies of refugees were employed, both literally (through their incarceration in 
camps) and metaphorically (in political propaganda and public speech), to mark out the borders of 
the white nation. 
Stigma is the fuel that lubricates far-right nationalist politics; it shapes the propaganda that 
characterises neoliberal authoritarian forms of rule; it legitimates what the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman 
terms ‘human waste-production’ within states and at their borders.64 In short, the propagation of divisive 
stigma politics is corroding what remains of the progressive egalitarian and internationalist 
democratic consensus forged within (and between) twentieth-century freedom movements (see 
Conclusion). 
Alongside the global growth of profitable carceral, policing and ‘welfare’ industries designed 
to silo waste populations – from refugees caged at borders (Chapter Two) to disabled people 
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entrapped in their homes (see Chapter Four) – the punitive and dehumanising character of late 
neoliberalism has become ever more culturally entrenched. Throughout, Stigma seeks to capture 
some of the cultural practices that characterise the intensification of stigma politics in the current 
conjuncture, including the ascendance of stigmatising media and cultural genres: ‘stigmatainments’ 
in which the public are called upon to perform roles as angry and outraged citizens.  
 
 [A] The political economy of stigma 
We are currently living through a period of capitalist enclosure and extraction, of dispossession and 
displacement, as turbulent as that which accompanied the world transition to capitalism some five 
hundred years ago – a period with which, as we shall see, the current conjuncture shares some 
significant features. As Silvia Federici writes, ‘A return of the most violent aspects of primitive 
accumulation has accompanied every phase of capitalist globalization, including the present one, 
and is realized with the maximum of violence and state intervention.’65  
Stigma is concerned with what I term ‘the political economy of stigma’ in this process, 
namely the role played by stigma power in the distribution of material resources and the 
transformation of cultural values, the crafting of stigma in the service of governmental and 
corporate policy goals, and the cultivation of stigma to extract political and economic capital. 
Indeed, stigma production from above accelerates in periods of political and economic turmoil, as a 
means of initiating a new round of capitalist accumulation and as a means of containing class 
struggles. 
Stigma is a form of classificatory violence ‘from above’ which devalues people, places and 
communities. Devaluation creates new opportunities for capital – a process David Harvey terms 
‘accumulation by dispossession’.66 As Jessica Perera details in her study of the mass clearances of 
‘low value’ people from London, capitalism accumulates value ‘through dispossessing the poor of 
 35 
public (state-owned) assets, land and wealth which are sold off to private ownership’.67 Indeed, ‘the 
corporatization, commodification, and privatization of hitherto public assets’ has been a signal 
feature of the neoliberal project, which has sought ‘to open up new fields for capital accumulation in 
domains formerly regarded off-limits to the calculus of profitability’.68 Stigma is concerned with the 
role of stigma in opening up new fields of capital accumulation. What I mean by this is that when we 
begin to theorise stigma as a form of power embedded within political economies, we can begin to 
understand how stigma functions to devalue entire groups of people with the purpose both of 
fortifying existing social hierarchies, and creating new opportunities for the redistribution of wealth 
upwards.69 The intensification of stigma production, and the ‘degradation ceremonies’ this involves, 
services capital accumulation.70 We might usefully think of this as akin to the shorting practices 
employed by stock brokers to devalue stock and destabilise markets deliberately, in order to create 
conditions for profiteering.71 What stigma devalues is people and the places where they live. What 
stigma destabilises are local communities and social bonds. What stigma shortens is lives.  
In Chapter Four, ‘The Stigma Machine of Austerity’, I draw on my experiences of working as 
part of the Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth Commission as a guide for thinking the break that 
austerity signals from welfare to post-welfare capitalism in the British state. ‘Force’, as Marx reminds 
us, ‘is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power.’ 72 In 
the case of the welfare state, stigma is the force that is driving the break from the old to the new.  
This chapter is a case study in the political economy of stigma. It examines how austerity 
was implemented through state-crafted stigma, a ‘welfare stigma machine’ that churned a corrosive 
path through society, settling in institutional forms, embedded in the design of social policies, and 
infecting the culture, practices and attitudes of welfare workers. It considers how welfare stigma has 
changed the ways in which the public made evaluative judgements about inequality, welfare, 
poverty and need. That is, how stigma was crafted to tutor the public into believing that people 
living in poverty had chosen their fates, and how the disenfranchisement and distress which have 
followed in the wake of cuts to social provision were deserved: a consequence of people’s poor 
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behaviours, indiscipline and shamelessness. It argues that this ‘stigma-optics’ is altering ways of 
seeing poverty, hardening people’s feelings to the suffering of those around them – those queuing 
outside the foodbanks now installed in every British town and city, for instance, and the homeless 
gathering on street corners and in doorways. Social movements from below, such as the Poverty 
Truth Movement, are fiercely contesting the stigma politics of austerity, and this chapter considers 
both the limits and possibilities of resistance.   
Understanding stigma as entangled with economic forms of de/valuation and movements of 
capitalist movements of enclosure and extraction, enables us to draw parallels between neoliberal 
projects, such as austerity, in the global North and the kinds of fiscal discipline and structural 
adjustment programmes long imposed upon the global South by Western governments and global 
institutions of financial capitalism in the wake of decolonisation.73 As Silvia Federici reminds us, 
every phase of capitalist crisis resembles the next, in as much as it is the web of sexual and racial 
inequalities built within global capitalism itself that enables it reproduce itself. The difference today 
is that ‘the conquistadors are the officers of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’.74 
 
[A] Fighting shame 
The overarching aim of Stigma is to deepen the understanding of stigma as a governmental 
technology of exploitation; to draw new lines of connection between people’s dehumanising 
experiences of stigmatisation and the socio-political machining of stigma in service of extractive 
forms of capitalism. In recalibrating our understanding of stigma as an exploitative apparatus, this 
book seeks to make stigma into a more useful concept: a device for thinking more deeply about how 
power etches itself into us and ‘take up residence within us’.75 While stigma is a disabling force, a 
form of power that is inscribed in bodies, places and communities in ways that often leave profound 
and permanent scars, understanding the wounds of stigma as social and political injuries can assist 
in the forging of networks of care and solidarity. As the women from Leeds Poverty Commission put 
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it in Fighting Shame (2019), their film about living with the stigma of poverty in austerity Britain: ‘It’s 
important that people hear about the shame. It’s about living the shame, feeling it, living on, 
inspiring people through that shame.’76  Stigma has always been resisted by those it is pressed upon.  
It is the argument of Stigma that the knowledge garnered through histories of struggle 
against stigma ‘has important implications for emancipatory politics’, informing strategies of 
resistance to authoritarian forms of government today and improving our capacity to understand 
and resist the divisions which stigma politics are designed to cultivate.77 This is a task to which we 
urgently need to attend, with all the imagination and tools at our disposal.  
Reconceptualising stigma has involved the development of a new lexicon of stigma, a 
grammar with which to prise open the different modalities and operations of stigma power. 
Alongside deepening the concept of ‘stigma power’, this book experiments with minor concepts 
such as ‘stigma politics’, ‘stigma machines’, ‘stigmaoptics’ and ‘stigmacraft’. My hope is that some of 
these concepts are useful, have traction and take flight, and that you, the readers of this book, 
become students also of stigma power, adding your own vocabulary to the language of stigma 




[CH] 1. The Penal Tattoo 
 
‘Every power, including the power of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects. … 
The law constantly writes itself on bodies. It engraves itself on parchments made from the 
skin of its subjects.…It makes its book out of them.’  
 
Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life78   
 
 ‘Even after two decades, the sound of a needle gun painfully scribbling Jeb Katri on my 
forehead is something that still haunts me and wakes me up in the middle of the night’.  
Parmeshri Devi, a Sansi woman tortured by the Punjabi police79 
 
On 8 December 1993, five women were arrested near the Harmandir Sahib (the Golden Temple) in 
the city of Amritsar, Punjab, India. They were accused of a stealing a purse. 80 The women, Gurdev 
Kaur, Parmeshri Devi, Mohinder Kaur, Hamir Kaur and Surjit Kaur, were imprisoned for eight days 
before being released on bail. A few days later Surjit was picked up again, and police garlanded her 
with shoes and paraded her through a local market.81 After Surjit had been publicly shamed in the 
marketplace, she and the other four women were taken to a police station in the Rambagh area of 
Amirtsar where they were physically restrained by being tied to chairs. The police then sent for ‘a 
handheld needle gun, meant for marking utensils’ and proceeded to engrave the words Jeb Katri 
(pickpocket) on their foreheads.82 As Parmeshri recalls ‘as we writhed in pain, there was a power 
cut’, so the police chief ‘ordered his men to bring the battery of their official Gypsy [a police SUV 
vehicle], which they used to turn the machine back on and complete the permanent marking’.83   
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The penal tattooing of the women came to light when they were presented in court some 
days later on charges of theft. The police brought the women into the courtroom with their 
foreheads covered with dupattas (head scarves), but Parmeshri Devi defiantly unveiled her penal 
tattoo in front of the Judge. At the time, nobody in the court seemed concerned by Devi’s revelation, 
however a newspaper report on the case in the Punjabi paper Ajit – crucially accompanied by a 
photograph of three of the women outside the court – later made the pages of two national 
newspapers.84  
The women petitioned the Punjab and Haryana High Court for compensation for the torture 
and humiliation they had suffered and for plastic surgery to remove the tattoos.  Responding to the 
newspaper coverage of the case, the Indian National Human Rights Commission of India intervened 
and in 1994 the court awarded costs for the removal of the tattoos.85 However, the treatment 
offered to the women at a local hospital didn’t involve the removal of the tattoos but only their 
over-writing. In desperation, the five resorted to borrowing money for a course of laser treatment at 
a private clinic. One of the women, Hamir, died before her tattoo had been fully removed.86  
 
The police officers denied that they had tattooed the women, blaming others in the local 
community ‘fed up by their habit of pickpocketing’ who desired to ‘publicly shame them’.87 
However, the surviving women continued in their struggle to bring the perpetrators to justice, and 
after a staggering 23 years an investigation by India’s Central Bureau of Investigation eventually led 
to some prosecutions. In October 2016, three of the policemen involved received prison sentences 
for forcibly tattooing the words Jeb Katri on the women’s foreheads. 
Interviewed by journalists after the conviction of the police, the women and their families 
explained how they had suffered years of police harassment: ‘the police slapped many cases on all 
of us to pressurise us to not to give statement in court’.88 Mohinder Kaur’s son Pappu described how 
he had been taunted at school as a consequence of his mother’s tattoo: schoolmates would stick 
paper notes with the words Mein jeb katri da beta han [I am the son of a pickpocket] on his back.89 
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Parmeshri Devi’s son committed suicide by self-immolation, a consequence, she vehemently 
believes, of the social stigma and years of police harassment provoked by the case.  
In Hindi, the closest word to the English word stigma is godna – a word meaning ‘to prick, 
puncture, to dot, to mark the skin with dots, to tattoo’ and ‘to wound or lacerate a person’s 
feelings’. 90 This dual meaning of godna as designating psychological and/or bodily inscription 
resonates in the women’s accounts of their torture at the hand of the police. As Devi told a 
journalist: ‘we had to undergo torture for the past 23 years’. 91   
 
[A] Stigma as inscription 
In The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau reminds us that every power ‘is written on the 
backs of its subjects’, and that this inscription involves mediating instruments. As he writes: 
 
In order for the law to be written on bodies, an apparatus is required that can mediate the 
relation between the former and the latter. From the instruments of scarification, tattooing, 
and primitive initiation to those of penal justice, tools work on the body. Formerly the tool 
was a flint knife or a needle. Today the instruments range from the police-man's billyclub to 
handcuffs and the box reserved for the accused in the courtroom. These tools compose a 
series of objects whose purpose is to inscribe the force of the law on its subject, to tattoo 
him in order to make him demonstrate the rule, to produce a "copy" that makes the norm 
legible.92 
  
As de Certeau suggests, power is inscribed on bodies in ways that demonstrate the force of law – be 
that within more formal judicial contexts, or in broader social and cultural contexts of policing, 
discipline and control.  
It is the argument of Stigma that the historical name for practices which describe these 
impressions of power is stigmatisation. Further, when we think of stigmata as literal inscriptions of 
 41 
power on the body, our attention is immediately drawn to the writing implements, to who is doing 
the marking, and for what purpose. The instruments used to impress stigma on the other extend 
from bloody implements of state violence to more symbolic forms of public shaming, including 
stigmatising visual and textual representations in popular media. This chapter draws on the long 
history of the penal tattoo, and associated violent practices of marking and public shaming to add 
depth to an understanding of stigma as a form of power written on the body. What emerges is an 
incredibly rich and expansive history of stigma as an inscriptive form of power.  
 
[A] The ancient penal history of stigma 
 
The modern word ‘stigma’ originates in a clutch of Ancient Greek words, derived from the root stig-, 
meaning to prick or to puncture.93 In the essays ‘Stigma: Tattooing and Branding in Graeco-Roman 
Antiquity’ (1984) and ‘Stigma and Tattoo’ (2000), classics scholar Christopher Jones transformed 
received understanding of the meaning of stigma in the Graeco-Roman world.  Through meticulous 
research, Jones uncovered that in Ancient Greece the verb stizo was used to describe ink tattooing 
with needles or other sharp implements on human skin, and stigma described the resulting mark. In 
short, a stigma was an ink tattoo, an involuntary tattoo, pricked into human skin for ‘penal and 
property purposes’.94  As Jones and other classics scholars have revealed, penal stigmatisation was 
‘routine’ and ‘entrenched’ in these Ancient Empires.  
One of the first recorded uses of the word ‘stigma’ appears in a fragment of sixth-century BC 
poetry written by Asius of Samos, who uses the word stigmatias to describe ‘a marked slave’; and 
slaves are henceforth regularly and scornfully referred to with words such as literati (lettered), 
stigmatici (tattooed), inscripti (inscribed), and graptoi (written upon). Indeed, in the Graeco-Roman 
world, penal tattooing was a punishment reserved exclusively for non-citizens: slaves, indentured 
labourers, prisoners of war, other resident aliens or religious minorities. As Plato wrote in The Laws, 
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a dialogue on the ethics of government, 'if anyone is caught committing sacrilege, if he be a slave or 
a stranger, let his offence be written on his face and his hands'. 95   
Penal tattooing involved the inscription of words, symbols, and sometimes full sentences 
into the skin. These tattoos ‘usually consisted of the name of a crime’ inked into the face.96 Records 
of common stigmas include ‘Thief’ or ‘Stop me, I'm a runaway’, tattooed on the forehead.97 If you 
survived the torture of being tattooed (without antiseptic) you would never be free of the stigma, 
the ‘disgrace, humiliation and exclusion’ remaining ‘indelibly written on one’s face for all to see’.98 
As Mark Gustafson reflects, ‘the effects of a penal tattoo forcibly applied to the face’ must have 
been ‘deeply felt, devastating even’.99 Certainly, a tattoo on the face would have been difficult to 
conceal: ‘the gaze of the onlooker is virtually inescapable; there is little defence against it’.100 
Penal stigmatisation was intentionally visible, a public form of inscription designed to 
humiliate and inculcate shame. The Greek philosopher Bion (c. 325 – c. 250 BC) described how his 
father had ‘in place of his face … a document [syngraphen] on his face, the mark of his master’s 
harshness’.101 The Byzantine chronicler Zonaras records a case from the 8th century of two brothers, 
Christian monks, whose religious worship of icons led to them having twelve lines of ‘execrable 
poetry’ tattooed on their faces.102 Later sainted as Theodorus and Theophanes, these brothers came 
to be known by the surname Grapti, from the Greek ‘graptoi’, meaning written upon. Penal 
stigmatisation was a form of bodily inscription which, as the Roman emperor Valerius Maximus (AD 
14–37)  put it, turned the stigmatised into the ‘image of his own penalty'.103   
Page duBois draws our attention to a play written by Herondas in the third-century BC, in 
which ‘a slave is tattooed on the forehead with the proverbial words “know thyself”’.104  This 
tattooing was a punishment meted out by a mistress upon a slave who is her lover, but who ‘has lost 
sight of his position as a slave’ by cheating on her.105  The choice of the Delphic maxim ‘know thyself’ 
underscores the way in which a penal stigmatisation functioned as an injunction to a particular kind 
of self-knowledge: a mortifying punishment through which you were taught to ‘know yourself’ by 
‘knowing your place’ in a highly stratified social order.106  Stigmatisation was thus an act of 
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pedagogical violence through which a person was tutored back into a place of unfreedom, and a 
means through which domestic slaves, indentured miners, soldiers, roadbuilders, munitions workers 
could be ‘marked for life with the insignia of their professions’ – stigmata signalled that that your 
labour (and body) was owned by another.107 
This Graeco-Roman practice of writing a crime or criminal sentence into the skin adds a 
literal dimension to the practice of being sentenced. As Steven Connor suggests, in ‘the mark incised 
or pricked or burned upon the body of the criminal, the law precipitates a lasting sign of its action, 
the letter of the law made actual and present.’108 As a ‘running advertisement of one’s guilt and 
subjugation’, stigmatisation was designed to permanently lower your social status.109 For example, in 
Ancient Rome, where slaves could theoretically earn their freedom, a Roman law from the fourth-
century AD details that slaves who had been tattooed on account of a crime should never be 
allowed to become free citizens. If a tattooed slave later earned their freedom they were consigned 
‘to the lowest possible category of free non-citizens’.110 A penal tattoo (a stigma) relegated the 
stigmatised to a bottom rung in the extant social hierarchy. The letters on your body marked your 
exclusion from citizenship (and rights).  
The Ancient Greeks associated voluntary tattooing, undertaken as an aesthetic and/or a 
religious practice, with ‘barbarians’ and in particular with their despised northern neighbours, the 
Thracians.111 Surviving Greek pottery portrays Thracian women as marked with decorative tattoos.112 
Indeed, within the iconography of vase painting, Greek artists employed tattoos to visually 
differentiate Thracian women, other foreigners and enslaved people from their unmarked Greek 
superiors. In ‘Stigma and Tattoo’, Christopher Jones suggests that it was likely because of this abject 
cultural association between tattoos and feminised foreign others that the Greeks developed the 
practice of tattooing slaves as a humiliating punishment. As we shall see, the association between 
voluntarily acquired tattoos and ‘barbarians’ was revived in eugenicist social scientific discourses in 
the nineteenth century, when the tattoo became foundational to the development of the discipline 
of criminology, and its ancient connotations of ‘barbarianism’ were viciously reworked as a means of 
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classifying the ‘lower orders’ both within the European interior, and its Imperial outposts – including 
India.113 
Penal stigmatisation was so entrenched a practice in antiquity that it began to be used 
metaphorically as a term of disgrace. The Greek orator and writer Aelius Aristides (117–181 BC) 
attacks Plato for slander with the words ‘you never tattooed any of your own slaves but you have as 
good as tattooed the most honoured of the Greeks’.114  The Roman Poet Martial (circa AD 38–104) 
also employs stigma as a metaphor, writing that ‘whatever the heat of my anger burns into you will 
remain for good and be read throughout the world, and Cinnamus [an acclaimed historian] with his 
cunning skill will not erase the tattoos’.115 The Roman writer known as Nicanor Stigmatias (in the 
early second century) was given the name Stigmatias as a teasing reference to his work as a 
grammatican, a labour which involved punctuating text; the joke being that it was unimaginable that 
a citizen, especially one of such high standing, would be actually stigmatised. It is in these ancient 
allegorical uses of the term stigma, that the modern understanding of stigma as a symbolic mark of 
disgrace was forged. Indeed, these metaphorical uses mark the beginning of a traffic in the meaning 
of stigma, between stigma as a literal punishment, and the more psychological meanings that stigma 
subsequently acquired.  
 
[A] Capturing labour  
In the Ancient Graeco-Roman world, penal stigmas had a specific economic function as a mechanism 
for the systematic exploitation of specific classes of people. That is, stigmatisation was a way of 
marking bodies in order to secure an indentured or slave labour force. Over time, the economic 
efficacy of penal tattooing intensified as ‘the sentence of exile and, most likely, hard labour’, became 
‘part of the total package of which the penal tattoo [was] the sign’.116 Indeed, the Romans extended 
practices of penal stigmatisation to ‘all classes virtually indentured to the state’ employing stigma en 
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masse to generate new sources of slave labour for the vast economies and infrastructures of 
expanding Empires.117  
In the Roman period, while a penal stigma might still record the name of a specific crime or 
infraction, it was as likely to spell out the type and length of the criminal sentence bequeathed by a 
court of law, or the name of the emperor under whose jurisdiction a sentence of hard labour was 
enforced. As the classics scholar Mark Gustafson details, there is extensive evidence in late antiquity 
of the words metallicae damnationis (condemned to the mines) being tattooed on the foreheads of 
those convicted in Roman courts. People marked in this way were called the metallic. They were 
tattooed, ‘beaten with clubs’ and chained, before being transported, by land and sea, to Imperial 
outposts, where they would be lucky indeed to survive their sentence of hard labour.118 The Romans 
also regularly tattooed captured enemy soldiers during border skirmishes and expropriation of 
territory, and tattooed army recruits (evidence suggests mainly on the wrists) so they could be 
‘recognised if they go into hiding’.119   
As the classics scholarship suggests, the meaning of stigma is entwined with slavery, with the 
punishment of the enslaved and with the capture of people as unfree labour. In Metamorphoses 
(The Golden Ass), the Roman writer Apuleius (c.AD 124–170) describes an utterly abject scene of 
labourers working in a public flour mill. Whip marks have left their skin ‘painted with livid welts’, 
their heads are half-shaven, and their feet are chained together.120   What marks out these mill-
workers as slaves who have been sentenced to indentured labour is their tattooed foreheads 
(frontes litterati).  
Graeco-Roman economies were ‘slave economies’: ‘slaves were essential in mining, worked 
on the rural estates and in the workshops and businesses of the wealthy, and served them in their 
homes’.121 There is a tendency to ‘forget’ that slavery was the economic structure which 
underpinned these often-venerated cradles of European civilization and democracy. Or rather, 
ancient systems of slavery have been mystified and romanticised in ways that disguise the material 
realities of enslavement, including the fact that ‘the ancient Greeks and Romans routinely tortured 
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slaves’.122 As Page duBois suggests, the ‘torturability’ of slaves and their susceptibility to being 
written upon marked ‘the boundary between slaves and free beings’.123   
Penal stigmatisation was particularly associated with people’s attempts to escape 
enslavement. Indeed, a penal stigma was often a record of an escape attempt. In some cases, slaves 
who had previously tried to escape would be collared rather than tattooed. These slave collars were 
iron neck rings which would have been riveted in place, and the inscriptions on them ‘often provide 
the owner’s name, status, occupation, and the address to which the slave should be returned’.124 
Several Roman slave collars ‘have been found in funerary contexts, suggesting that, for some slaves 
at least, a metal neck collar was permanent’.125  One surviving fourth- or fifth-century Roman slave 
collar has a bronze tag that reads: ‘I have run away; hold me. When you have brought me back to my 
master Zoninus, you will receive a gold coin.’126 Like the advertisements for runaway chattel slaves 
posted in British and North American newspapers more than 1,000 years later, these penal forms of 
stigmatisation signalled commodification and ownership, and were a means of identification, 
capture and retrieval.  
 
[A] Threads of racism  
In Black and British a Forgotten History (2016), David Olusoga details a similar fashion for slave 
collars in eighteenth-century Britain: ‘usually brass or copper, occasionally silver’, these collars ‘were 
riveted or padlocked around the neck and could not be removed’.127 A runaway advertisement 
posted in The Edinburgh Evening Courant in 1727 reads: 
 
RUN away on the 7th Instant from Dr. Gustavus Brown’s Lodgings in Glasgow, a Negro 
Woman, named Ann, being about 18 Years of Age, with a green Gown and a Brass Collar 
about her Neck, on which are engraved these Words “Gustavus Brown in Dalkieth his Negro, 
1726.” Whoever apprehends her, so as she may be recovered, shall have two Guineas 
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Reward, and necessary Charges allowed by Laurance Dinwiddie Junior Merchant in Glasgow, 
or by James Mitchelson, Jeweller in Edinburgh. 
 
People like Ann who were collared in Georgian England were evidentially unfree and considered 
property.128 Just as in Ancient Rome, these slave collars demand ‘the reader’s attention on behalf of 
the absent owner’ and ‘assert the owner’s control of the slave’.129 In so doing, they stigmatise the 
collared person as a possession, an object – a Negro.  That those stigmatised in this way were not 
considered fully human is underscored by eighteenth-century English paintings such as Bartholomew 
Dandridge’s portrait A Young Girl with an Enslaved Servant and a Dog (c. 1725), in which both the 
servant and dog are collared. Olusoga directs us to a 1726 advertisement for ‘Matthew Dyer, a 
goldsmith on Duck Lane in Westminster’, who specialises in making silver collars and padlocks ‘for 
Blacks or Dogs’.130 
The similarities between the tattooing, branding and collaring of slaves in the Ancient 
Graeco-Roman Empires, and in Georgian Britain at the dawn of another European Empire, is striking. 
In The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (2004), Benjamin Isaac argues that we can trace ‘red 
threads’ of connection between ‘proto-racisms’ in the Graeco-Roman world and modern scientific 
racisms. As Isaac argues, ‘racism is a phenomenon that can assume many apparently different 
shapes and forms while preserving a remarkable element of continuity which is undeniable, once it 
is traced over the centuries’.131 Similarly, Cedric Robinson argues that the ‘template’ for modern 
racism, ‘its ordering principle, its organizing structure, its moral authority, its economy of justice, 
commerce, and power’, can be found in the writing of Aristotle, and other ‘aristocratic apologists’ 
for slavery in the Ancient world.132 This racialised understanding of slavery in the Ancient world is 
highly contested, raising questions about the changing meaning of ‘race’ and whether systems of 
slavery are always racialised. Amongst critical race scholars, the general consensus is that modern 
epistemologies of race emerged during the European Renaissance with European colonisation of the 
Americas. Scholars such as Sylvia Wynter, C. L. R James and Aimé Césarie suggest that modern 
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racism is coincident with Columbus's discovery of the West Indies in 1492, the expansion of the 
West into the New World and the racial genocides that followed.  
What we can say with certainty is that penal tattooing forms part of a long and expansive 
European tradition of social classification through degrading forms of bodily marking, and is linked 
especially to the stigmatisation of slaves. Robinson makes the further point that ‘slave labor 
persisted within European agrarian production up to the modern era’.133 We also know also that the 
penal tattooing of slaves, serfs and indentured workers continued within Europe ‘through late 
antiquity and the Byzantine Empire into the Middle Ages and into the modern period’.134 With the 
advent of the colonial capitalist world order from the fifteenth century, distinctions between citizens 
and slaves, civilised and barbarian, capital and labour, and between the propertied and unpropertied 
classes sedimented in the creation of a new classed, gendered and racialised social hierarchies. The 
European men who placed themselves at the top of this new global racial order exported and 
innovated penal stigmatisation as technologies of classification and subjugation.  
In summary, stigma is an Ancient Greek word which originated to describe forced tattooing 
– words, marks and images etched into the skin against your will, in ways designed to permanently 
lower your social status and curtail your mobility. In a world before identity-cards, passports, finger-
printing, bio-metric forms of marking, penal tattooing was an important technology of identification, 
surveillance and social control, innovated and expanded to aid colonial expansion. Seeing the 
tattooed faces of slaves and indentured labourers doubtless functioned as a terrorising warning to 
others, assisting with the task of imposing order on the variously dispossessed and disenfranchised 
multi-ethnic classes of slaves and non-citizens who lived within the vast territories of these ancient 
empires, and quelling the freedom dreams of conquered and subjugated peoples. Stigma was also, 
then, an important form of political publicity.  
 
[A] Misogyny and stigma 
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Penal stigma also has a gendered history. In Women and Power: A Manifesto (2017), Mary Beard 
teaches us that women of all social classes were barred from (full) citizenship in the Graeco-Roman 
world.  Even elite women had no independent legal personhood, but existed in a property 
relationship to male heads of households, and the wider Patriarchal state. Oratory was the ‘defining 
attribute’ of elite masculinity.135 Citizenship was in effect demarcated by those who had the right to 
speak in public (and in so doing could participate in politics), and those who did not. Only free male 
citizens could exercise this right. The mothers, wives and daughters of citizens, along with slaves and 
foreigners, were prohibited from public speech.  
If the exclusion of slaves from citizenship was distinguished by their vulnerability to being 
written upon, women were identified by their muteness.136  Beard quotes a second-century AD 
writer who notes that, ‘a woman should as modestly guard against exposing her voice to outsiders 
as she would guard against stripping off her clothes’.137 There is a relationship, then, between the 
social position of women of all social classes and that of slaves of both sexes – in as much as they all 
existed in a property relationship to men. Page duBois highlights how women were ‘sometimes 
likened to a writing tablet, a surface to be “ploughed,” inscribed by the hand, the plough, the penis 
of her husband and master’.138 
It is not only, as Beard argues, that women’s voices were absent from the public sphere, but 
that this prohibition on women’s speech was trumpeted, flaunted and enjoyed by male citizens. 
Greek and Roman literature is replete with examples of women actively being silenced. The muzzling 
of women was publicised in every genre of cultural production – in legal documents, in philosophy 
and literature and in comic and tragic plays. Women’s attempts to speak were laughed at and 
mocked; they are transformed into wordless statutes, animals, nymphs, echoes, and they are more 
violently ‘shut up’ – raped, mutilated, their tongues cut out.  
The parading of gagged and silenced women in antiquity has cast a long shadow. As Beard 
writes, ‘this is not the peculiar ideology of some distant culture. Distant in time it may be. But I want 
to underline that this is a tradition of gendered speaking – and the theorising of gendered speaking – 
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to which we are directly or indirectly heirs’.139  The ancient genealogy of misogyny is instructive, she 
argues, in understanding the machinations of contemporary practices that seek to ‘quiet women’ 
within spheres of public debate today, ‘from the front bench to the shop floor’.140 What is the 
relationship, Beard enquires, between ‘Twitter threats of rape and decapitation’, and ancient 
practices of gagging women?141 As she reflects, even when women are ‘not silenced’ they still ‘pay a 
very high price for being heard’.142  Beard’s prescient examination of the shade cast by ancient forms 
of misogyny deepens our understanding of how we might learn from antiquity.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here: Branked woman being ridden by a man] 
 
[Caption:] Figure 1: ‘Ann Bidlestone being ridden through the streets of Newcastle by an officer of 
the city’ by Ralph Gardiner, 1655. 
 
 
[A] ‘Muzzled like dogs and paraded through the streets’ 
 
The public exhibition of silenced and gagged women continued in Europe for millennia. In medieval 
England practices of ‘scolding’ insubordinate women were recorded in court records from the 
thirteenth century. The scolding of garrulous women was also represented (often in comic guises) in 
church woodcarvings and stained-glass windows, in which the women are often depicted with 
gorgets (bands of linen) pressed over their mouths.143 This practice of gagging women is most 
dramatically illustrated by ‘the scold’s bridle’ or ‘brank’, which was employed in Britain (and her 
colonies) from the sixteenth until the mid nineteenth century to torture and publicly humiliate 
women whose speech was deemed unruly, rowdy or otherwise troublesome (see Figure 1, an 
engraving based on a witness 1655 account).144  The brank was particularly used to punish ‘older 
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women such as widows and paupers’ who were perceived as ‘a drain on the parish’ or as not under 
the appropriate control of a male head of household.145 
Branks consisted of an ‘iron framework to enclose the head, having a sharp metal 
gag or bit which entered the mouth and restrained the tongue’.146  Surviving branks reveal 
that the bit was sometimes spiked with pins, which would have pierced the tongue and the 
roof of the mouth. Women sentenced to the brank were ‘ridden’ through the town by a 
male ‘rider’. The motion of being jerked along would have continually disturbed the bit in 
the woman’s mouth, ‘threatening to break her teeth, shatter her jawbone, or lacerate her 
tongue’.147  
The riding of the branked woman was a form of street theatre. E. P. Thompson 
describes the noise of jeering and clattering that accompanied these kinds of ‘rough music’ 
processionals as ‘ritualised expressions of hostility’.148  At the end of this mocking parade, 
the branked woman would have been made to stand in a market square or village green and 
subjected to verbal scorn, and had mud, stones, urine, shit and rotten food thrown at her. In 
1686, one Dr Plott writes that the brank was not removed ‘till after the party begins to show 
all external signs imaginable of humiliation’.149  
There is only one known surviving first-hand account of the experience of being 
branked, which was written by Dorothy Waugh, a servant from Preston in Lancashire. 
Waugh, a radical Quaker, was branked by the Mayor of Carlisle for preaching in the town in 
1655. Waugh’s account was later published in a pamphlet, which was intended to stir 
sympathy and support for the persecution of the Quakers, and it begins with her arrest at 




[The Mayor was] so violent & full of passion that he scarce asked me any more questions, 
but called to one of his followers to bring the bridle as he called it to put upon me, and was 
to be on three hours, and that which they called so was like a steel cap and my hat 
being violently plucked off which was pinned to my head whereby they tore my clothes to 
put on their bridle as they called it, which was a stone weight of Iron and three bars of Iron 
to come over my face, and a peece of it was put in my mouth, which was so 
unreasonable big a thing for that place as cannot be well related, which was locked to my 
head. And so I stood their time with my hands bound behind me with the stone weight of 
Iron upon my head and the bitt in my mouth to keep me from speaking. And the Mayor said 
he would make me an example to all that should come in that name. And the people to see 
me so violently abused were broken to tears…And that man that kept the prison door 
demanded two pence of everyone who came to see me while their bridle remained. After a 
while …the Mayor… sent me out of the city with it on, and gave me very vile and unsavoury 
words, which were not fit to proceed out of any man’s mouth, and charged the officer to 
whip me out of the town, from constable to constable to send me, till I came to my own 
home.150 
 
Silvia Federici argues that it is significant that it was during the ‘Age of Reason’, and at the dawn of 
capitalism societies, ‘that women accused of being scolds were muzzled like dogs and paraded 
through the streets’.151 The branking and scolding of woman was part and parcel, Federici suggests, 
of a broader movement of capitalist accumulation through enclosure. As we shall see, this process 
was characterised in England by the enclosure of land but also involved the enclosure of social 
relations. As Federici argues the European witch-hunts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
was part of this project, ‘a war against women … a concerted attempt to degrade them, demonize 
them, and destroy their social power’.152 The stigmatising punishments meted out to outspoken, 
unruly women was, then, part of a deeper and wider political project (of capitalist enclosure) which 
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signalled the hardening of a gendered social contract in which women were understood as the 
property of men.  
This enclosure of women within the new social relations of the Patriarchal capitalist state 
was supported by mass propaganda, including ‘countless misogynistic plays and tracts’.153 As 
Federici notes, ‘Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew (1593) was the manifesto of the age’.154 
Indeed, publicity was a central function of these ritual stigmatising punishments. The scolding of 
women functioned as a warning to other women to hold their tongues. More than this, the riding of 
branked women, the piercing of tongues, the whippings and public scorn, and ‘the stakes on which 
the witches perished’, were sites through which new ideals of obedient domestic womanhood were 
forged. 155 
 
[A] Branking in the twenty-first century  
More than traces of this history persist in the misogynistic violence regularly employed to stigmatise 
women today in practices of public scolding which seek to silence and deter women from political 
and public speech. For example, as numerous feminist scholars have detailed, the rise of social 
media platforms has seen a significant intensification of misogynist vitriol and threats of violence 
directed against women.156 The scolding of women in virtual public spaces extends from practices 
involving the use of humiliating, sexist and often sexualized epitaphs (cunt, bitch, whore), to physical 
threats (most frequently threats of sexual violence and rape).157 Speech which, as Dorothy Waugh 
described it, is characterised by ‘vile and unsavoury words, which were not fit to proceed out of any 
man’s mouth’. 
These virtual branking campaigns escalate and move offline when sustained trolling 
campaigns are accompanied by the release of identifying information, such women’s home 
addresses or phone numbers, sometimes leading to stalking or physical acts of harm.  This 
‘technology-facilitated sexual violence’ is frequently triggered when women speak out in public, 
often when they raise issues of inequality, but also when they participate more generally in political 
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or public debate – as many women politicians and public figures have discovered to their cost. 158 
Indeed, Mary Beard was prompted to write Women and Power: A Manifesto after becoming subject 
to misogynistic trolling campaigns. After I published my book Revolting Subjects, I received death 
threats, including a suggestion I should be cremated in a gas oven. For many women communication 
technologies which have ostensibly been designed to enhance, facilitate and democratise public 
speech are also experienced as stigma machines – spiked with threats of violence.  
In short, men continue to use stigmatising devices to brank women – that is, to humiliate 
them in order to deter them from public speech and terrorise them into silence. As in the 
seventeenth century, these twenty-first century practices of branking weaponise stigma to inculcate 
fear and curtail women’s freedom. 
 
While Stigma focuses on developing an account of stigma as an inscriptive form of power which 
operates through the axis of race–class, the penal history of stigma reminds us that stigma is also a 
mechanism of Patriarchal power. It stresses also how ritual forms of humiliation are elements within 
the wider systems of stigmatising classifications which accompanied the emergence of a new 
capitalist world order. Just as the scolding of women intensified with the emergence of the capitalist 
state, other stigmatising punishments were devised to punish, control and mark the criminalised 
‘lower orders’ within Europe and her expanding oversea dominions. Indeed, it is important to note 
that branking devices were employed in exactly the same historical period to muzzle enslaved 
people on colonial plantations (see Figure 2).  
 
[A] Slave Masks 
 
Historical evidence suggest that slave masks were sometimes used to subdue resistance when 
people were captured and transported in coffles (lines of people fasted together with wooden 
planks, ropes or chains) from the African interior to the coast, and during the holding of people in 
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slave factories and slave ships. Slave masks were employed more often as a punishment for 
insubordination or escape attempts on colonial plantations in the West Indies and Americas, and as 
a means of preventing the enslaved from eating crops, or soil – ‘dirt eating’ was a documented 
method of self-harm and suicide amongst the enslaved.159 
In Plantation Memories: Episodes of Everyday Racism (2008), the Portuguese artist and 
academic Grace Kilomba explores the historical dynamics of contemporary racisms in Europe 
through the cultural archive of plantation era violence. Kilomba introduces us to a figure from her 
childhood, the popular Brazilian saint ‘Escrava Anastácia’ – an enslaved woman of African descent 
who is usually depicted wearing a muzzle over her mouth and an iron collar around her neck. 
Anastácia has been muzzled, one version of the legend has it, to stop her speaking of her sexual 
torture and rape by a plantation owner. Kilomba argues that the muzzling of enslaved women 
‘represents colonialism as a whole…. It symbolizes the sadistic politics of conquest and its cruel 
regimes of silencing’.160 
In 1968, an illustration of a masked and collared woman made by the French artist Jacques 
Arago circa 1817 was discovered in a Rio church in Brazil, and was displayed in Rio’s black museum 
(Museo de Negro) (see Figure 2). This image was interpreted by many black Brazilians as evidence 
for the existence of the mythical Anastácia.161 Indeed, the display of this single image saw the cult of 
Escrava Anastácia grip Brazil. For many descendants of the enslaved, Escrava Anastácia remains a 
venerated figure – a defiant rebellious symbol of the resistance of black women. As Kilomba 
suggests, the veneration of Escrava Anastácia, the making of shrines and icons and in her image, is a 
means of speaking the history of slavery, colonialism, and of making visible its enduring legacies of 
anti-black racism and misogynoir sexual violence. 
 




[Caption:] Figure 2:  ‘Escrava Anastácia’, engraving of an enslaved woman by Jacques Arago, whom 
he describes as wearing a ‘Máscara de flandres’, originally printed in Souvenirs d'un aveugle: voyage 
autour du monde in 1868. 
 
[A] The changing meanings of tattoos  
While the word stigma has its roots in practices of penal tattooing and slavery in the ancient world, 
we don’t ordinarily associate practices of tattooing with the word stigma today -- although 
interestingly one of the most popular brands of ink-tattooing machines is called Stigma. One of the 
likely reasons for the obfuscation of the etymological associations between the word stigma and 
practices of penal tattooing is due to the introduction of the word ‘tattoo’ into the English language 
in the eighteenth century, a word which is primarily used to denote voluntarily bodily inscriptions for 
aesthetic or cultural reasons. In a ground-breaking collection of essays, Written on the Body: The 
Tattoo in European and American History (2000), Jane Caplan explains that the Western history of 
tattooing ‘remains barely researched and widely misunderstood’.162 
The first documented appearance of the word ‘tattoo’ appears in English explorer and 
cartographer James Cook’s journal in 1769 when his ship HMS Endeavour arrived at the Pacific Island 
group of Tahiti and he witnessed Tahitians ‘tattowing’ their skin with pieces of sharp bone or shell 
and a black ink derived from candle nuts ‘in such a manner as to be indelible’.163 Contemporary 
historiographies of tattooing often begin with heroic accounts of Cook’s expeditions in the Pacific. 
Frequently mentioned is a young tattooed Polynesian man called Mai (Omai) who had worked as an 
interpreter for Cook, and who was brought to England in 1774. On his arrival, Mai was exhibited to 
paying customers in a ‘Museum of Curiosities’, and was taken under the wing of Cook’s celebrated 
botanist Joseph Banks.  During his two-year stay in Britain, Mai was examined by scientists, 
presented at the court of George III and to scholars at the University of Cambridge, then toured 
around country estates, and drawn and painted by the most celebrated artists of the day.  
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Polynesian tattoos entered British visual and literary culture through paintings, drawings, 
engravings, prints and stories about Mai. The most famous visual depiction of Mai was Portrait of 
Omai (1776) by the fashionable London portrait painter Joshua Reynolds, which was exhibited at the 
Royal Academy Exhibition. Reynolds portrays Mai in a classical idiom, turbaned and draped in toga-
like robes, with the distinctive tattoos which so fascinated eighteenth-century London society clearly 
visible on his hands and arms. Mai would be the first of many tattooed people displayed as exotic 
objects of curiosity in Europe.  
Conventional chronologies of tattooing in Europe describe how European sailors adopted 
and adapted practices of Polynesian tattooing, and began inking themselves as a means of recording 
their travels and marking their identities on their skin. Certainly, by the nineteenth century, 
voluntary tattooing was widely practised amongst the working classes, particularly those who lived 
and worked on the social margins, such as sailors and travelling labourers. However, a focus on 
fashions for voluntarily acquired tattoos occludes the fact that practices of penal tattooing co-
existed within Europe in the same period. In medieval and early-modern Europe, up to and including 
eighteenth-century England, into which the word ‘tattoo’ was imported, the penal tattooing and/or 
branding of convicted criminals was an established practice.  
As Caplan details, ‘the relative absence of institutions of confinement’ ‘made branding and 
tattooing valuable public markers of criminal identity’.164 In France, up until 1832, ‘offenders were 
branded or tattooed on the arm with letters denoting their criminal status’ and sentence. The letter 
G or GAL was tattooed on those sentenced to indentured labour on galleys, and TP (short for 
travaux publics) for those condemned to hard labour in public works, which might well involve 
transportation to a penal colony.  Similarly, in England ‘all kinds of alphabetic marks, from the V for 
vagrant, to thumb-brands of “M” for murderer, or “T” for thief’ were used to stigmatise criminals 
and the indigent poor.165 Judicial practices of penal tattooing and branding continued well into the 
nineteenth century. For example, the penal tattooing of serfs (unfree indentured peasant labourers), 
was not abolished in Russia until 1863.166 In the Siberian penal system ‘public serfs’ who were 
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convicted of a crime, had the letters KAT (for katorshniki, meaning ‘public slave’) tattooed into their 
cheeks or forehead before ‘gunpowder was rubbed into the wounds’.167  
 
While I was writing Stigma I undertook jury service at the Crown Court in Lancaster, which is housed 
inside the medieval Lancaster Castle – the museum in the castle also houses a scold’s bridle. This is 
one of the oldest courts in England, and in the dock there still hangs ‘a metal holdfast designed to 
immobilise the wrist and fingers’ and a ‘branding iron embossed with the letter M’ which was 
heated and applied to the brawn of the thumb, identifying the convicted prisoner as a 
'malefactor'.168 It was from this practice of branding convicted prisoners that the custom arose of 
requiring those on trial to raise his or her hand while they swore on the bible, so judge and jury 
could see whether they bore the mark of a previous conviction. The last recorded use of this 
branding iron was in 1811.  
Lancaster was one of the major judicial centres for the sentencing to transportation of 
convicts to colonial outposts during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As I noted in the 
Introduction, eighteenth-century Lancaster was also the fourth largest slave-trading port in England. 
While Lancaster slave traders shipped branded Africans as chattel across the Atlantic, Lancaster’s 
judicial elites branded and transported the English poor to North America, the West Indies, and, 
after the American War of Independence, to Australia. For a period, then, Lancaster was a small but 
significant global headquarters for the forced movement of unfree labour across the world.  
For the hundred years between 1700-1800 at least 122 ships sailed from Lancaster to the 
coast of Africa, sealing their signs of ownership on captured African’s. Lancaster merchants were 
involved in the capture and selling of an estimated 30,000 people. We can now scrutinise the 
records of Lancaster ships in the trans-Atlantic slave ship database.169 For example, the slave ship 
Thomas and John, captained by Thomas Paley, purchased 152 people in the Sierra Leone estuary in 
1768 and delivered 130 survivors to the slave market in Savanna la Mar in Jamaica, before returning 
with a cargo of sugar, rum, cotton, pimento, logwood and 36 planks of mahogany to Lancaster 
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Quay.170 This ship was owned by Thomas Hinde, a former slave ship captain, come slave ship-owner, 
merchant and plantation investor, and twice a Mayor of Lancaster. Indeed, it would be difficult to 
find a Lancaster elite from this period whose wealth and power wasn’t derived from what is often 
euphemistically referred to as the West-Indies trade.171  
This mixed traffic and trade in stigmatised bodies underscores the extent to which the tattoo 
(and brand mark) was ‘a promiscuously travelling sign’ in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
‘moving literally on the homeless bodies of slaves, criminals, pilgrims, sailors, soldiers and 
transported convicts’.172 However, there are crucial differences in the meaning and function of these 
bodily inscriptions. For example, those convicted in the Lancaster Assizes who were deported from 
England with the indelible brand of a criminal class on their thumb, travelled as human beings not as 
property. The conditions they endured on board prison hulks and ships were wretched, dangerous 
and sometimes deadly. Nevertheless, transported people kept their names, and their conviction and 
forced emigration was recorded – a difference underscored by the fact that Australian citizens can 
today use court archives to trace histories of transportation in their family trees; an impossibility for 
the descendants of enslaved Africans whose relatives travelled as chattel (and whose owners 
christened them with new names). Transported African men, women and children ‘were stripped of 
all specificity, including their names’; only their ‘financial value’ was ‘recorded and preserved for 
insurance purposes’.173 As Saidiya Hartman reflects, for the descendants of enslaved Africans 
genealogical research involves encountering ‘a past that has been obliterated so that even traces 
aren’t left. … Life worlds disappeared and destroyed; the names of places that would never be 
remembered and all the names of persons that would never be uttered again’.174 In contrast, after 
completing a sentence of forced labour, deported convicts were able to earn (or buy) their freedom. 
Indeed, those convicts shipped to Virginia from England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
sometimes used their freedom to purchase slaves.175 
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The differential meaning of tattooed bodies in the eighteenth century is exemplified by the 
fact that advertisements for public exhibitions of drawings and etchings of Mai, whose tattoos were 
an object of intense public curiosity,176 appeared in mid-eighteenth-century British newspapers at 
the same time as newspaper advertisements seeking the return of branded, tattooed, lettered, 
numbered and collared chattel slaves. In 1743, the year before tattooed Mai arrived in England, 
celebrity artist and satirist William Hogarth painted The Inspection, which depicted the young 
syphilitic mistress of a Viscount with the letters ‘FC’ tattooed on her breast: a penal tattoo which 
likely meant ‘Female Convict’.  
These genealogies of penal tattooing reveal that practices of bodily marking are continually 
shifting, and have multifarious meanings and functions. One argument of Stigma is that by 
considering penal stigmatisation as a dehumanising classificatory technology, we can trace links 
between what at first glance may seem unconnected practices. In so doing, we can begin to map the 
role of penal stigma in the formation of the figure that Sylvia Wynter terms ‘Man-as-human’.177  
Namely the ways in which over many centuries European Enlightenment man emerges as the 
unmarked universal category of humanity, against and through which other categories and forms of 
human life are marked and measured, valued and judged. 
 
[A] The enclosure of land   
To deepen our understanding of the relationship between practices of penal stigmatisation and 
what Beverley Skeggs terms ‘the entangled vine of gender, race and class’, it is helpful to turn our 
attention to the history of enclosures.178 In the sixteenth century, merchant capitalism, namely the 
trade in and export of goods, including enslaved people, by entrepreneurial merchants (which also 
involved from the outset the expropriation of foreign land) began to combine with the power of the 
state. That is, what began as the private enterprise of individuals and companies, developed into 
state-sponsored and state-governed systems of commerce and colonial occupation. The financial 
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institutions, banks, insurance companies, legal systems and the like developed to support overseas 
trade in goods and people, reshaped the government of English society.  
As E. P. Thompson details in The Making of the English Working Class (1963), the 
transformation of feudal agricultural England into a capitalist state was characterised by the mass 
enclosure of land, a practice that began in the fifteenth century but continued over many centuries. 
Land enclosures were most intensive during the eighteenth century, and between ‘1760 and 1810’ 
alone it is estimated that ‘five million acres of common fields’ were enclosed.179 This mass 
privatisation of land saw the ‘open field’ system (in which land was divided and shared amongst a 
community) transformed into a tenant farm system, in which land became the property of individual 
landowners, and was worked by wage labourers. As Robert Allen has argued, in terms of 
productivity land enclosures brought few if any benefits, but greatly enriched landowners.180 
Critically, these enclosures cut off people’s rights of access to the common wealth of the land –-
freedoms to graze animals, grow crops, gather firewood and hunt for food.  The enclosures also 
eroded long-established customs and moral codes of social provision, by transforming those who 
could work into precarious waged worker and tenants, and making those who couldn’t, such as the 
sick, elderly or disabled, vulnerable to the whims of aristocratic landowners and their tenant 
farmers. (Jim Crace’s wonderful novel Harvest (2013) imagines land enclosures from the perspective 
of dispossessed villagers). 
As the poet Robert Crowley reflected in 1550, working people were held to ransom by ‘the 
great farmers … the men of law, the merchants, the gentlemen, the knights, the lords’. These men, 
Crowley laments ‘take our houses over our heads, they buy our grounds out of our hands, they raise 
our rents, they levy (yea unreasonable) fines, they enclose our commons’.181   
 
Men without conscience. Men utterly devoid of God’s fear. Yea, men that live as though 
there were no God at all! Men that would have all in their hands; men that would leave 
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nothing for others. … Cormorants, greedy gulls; yea, men that would eat up men, women 
and children.182 
 
In short, the transformation of England into a capitalist society was a form of internal 
colonisation in as much as it involved the theft of land, and the systemic destruction of people’s 
customary access to independent means of subsistence. This massive act of state-legislated theft 
was implemented through forced evictions, the use of bloody penal codes, the innovation of 
stigmatising Poor Laws, the introduction of new policing and surveillance measures, the 
incarceration of people in workhouses and prisons, mass transportation (forced emigration to the 
colonies) and the use of hunger as a weapon.  
 
[A] Enclosure Propogandists 
In the eighteenth-century utilitarian arguments about the need for greater efficiency in systems of 
agricultural production were used by the social elites to justify the enclosure of land. Economic 
arguments were supported by the construction of what E. P. Thompson terms ‘a moral 
machinery’.183 Indeed, in the eighteenth century a panoply of ‘enclosure propagandists’, aristocrats, 
politicians, journalists and a new middle class of social-policy gurus, argued that land enclosures 
were a moral and civilising mission.184 Enclosure propaganda painted the commons ‘as a dangerous 
centre of indiscipline’ and a ‘breeding-ground for barbarians’ 185 For example, Arthur Young (1741–
1820), an influential writer on agricultural improvements, described the commons as ‘nursing up a 
mischievous race of people’.186 As Thompson puts it, ‘Ideology was added to self-interest’ and ‘it 
became a matter of public-spirited policy for the gentleman to remove cottagers from the commons, 
reduce his labourers to dependence, pare away at supplementary earnings, drive out the 
smallholder.’187  
Within this new moral schemata, the village poor were transformed from entitled and 
rights-bearing subjects into undeserving populations, ‘designing rogues, who, under various 
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pretences, attempt to cheat the parish’ and whose ‘whole abilities are exerted in the execution of 
deceit which may procure from the parish officers an allowance of money for idle and profligate 
purposes’.188 Indeed, there was a growing consensus amongst the propertied elites that ‘it was 
essential to restore in the poor a proper sense of degradation’.189 Essential not only because the 
existing systems of poor relief were perceived as unaffordable (poor rates had inevitability increased 
as common land was enclosed) but because the very idea of relief was increasingly perceived as 
incompatible with the new capitalist doctrine of laissez-faire; an ideology which sought to enhance 
the rights and increase the wealth of the propertied classes by encouraging self-sufficiency, 
resilience and rugged individualism amongst the unpropertied masses. What this meant in practice 
is the devastation of people’s access to a measure of security and the basic resources they required 
to sustain the lives of themselves and their dependents. Enclosures were a ‘revolution of the rich 
against the poor’. 190 
As Thompson documents, resistance to enclosures was fierce and sustained. Faced with this 
catastrophe, people gathered to plan how to resist the violence wrought upon them. Popular radical 
movements emerged, as people furiously debated the pros and cons of continuous agitation, riots, 
large-scale organised revolts (including the bearing of arms), and softer tactics of democratic 
enfranchisement and moral persuasion. Mass campaigns of direct action saw the levelling of the 
ditches and walls which had enclosed common land, machine breaking, rioting, the destruction of 
private property, and bread riots: As Thompson notes, there were repeated food riots, ‘in almost 
every town and county’ up until the 1840s.191 
 
 
[A] Branding the vagabond, badging the poor 
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Karl Marx summarises the history of the English enclosures in Capital, describing how ‘agricultural 
people [were] first forcibly expropriated from the soil, driven from their homes, turned into 
vagabonds, and then whipped, branded, tortured by laws grotesquely terrible, into the discipline 
necessary for the wage system’.192  As this reference to branding suggests, penal stigmatisation was 
a pivotal technology in these processes of enclosure, deployed to manage the massive social 
upheavals and class conflicts that followed in the wake of the destruction of people’s customary 
access to the means of subsistence.  
In a chapter of Capital titled ‘Bloody Legislation Against the Expropriated, from the End of 
the 15th Century’ Marx details how new criminal codes and poor laws were devised to apprehend 
‘masterless’ men and women within systems of indentured, coerced or low paid labour such as the 
Elizabethan Roundsman System, which involved the public auctioning of unemployed men – an early 
form of workfare. Marx gives the example of a late Tudor law, the Vagabonds Act of 1547 which 
ordained that anyone in England who refuses to work ‘shall be condemned as a slave to the person 
who has denounced him as an idler’.193 This act mandated a series of stigmatising punishments, 
notably the use of branding irons to mark the skin of offenders: V for vagabond, S for slave. A 
subsequent act ordered that ‘incorrigible and dangerous rogues are to be branded with an R on the 
left shoulder and set to hard labour, and if they are caught begging again, to be executed without 
mercy’.194 The use of penal stigmatisation and other bloody practices to mark out the wayward, 
displaced, marginal and unemployed continued over the centuries that followed. What I want to 
emphasise here is that stigma statues and stigmatising practices were introduced, as Marx puts it, to 
‘shorten the transition’ to a society in which people would have nothing left ‘to sell but their own 
skins’.195   
The word pauper, a deeply stigmatising term for an ‘unproductive’ person – ‘a person having 
no property or means of livelihood; a person dependent on the charity of others’ – came into 
everyday use in the eighteenth-century to describe the mass impoverishment which followed in the 
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wake of enclosures.196 ‘Look at England’, cried the Member of Parliament William Cobbett in 1816 
‘swarming with paupers, and convulsed in every limb of her body.’197  
Experiments in the stigmatisation of the poor intensified as social elites sought to find ways 
to deter people from making claims on the parish for relief. During the seventeenth century, violent 
physical practices of stigmatisation, such as branding, were supplemented with less permanent but 
still visible penal stigmas, such as the wearing of cloth badges and humiliating forms of dress. For 
example, a 1697 Poor Law decreed that paupers in receipt of alms were compelled to at all times 
display a cloth badge with the letter P and ‘the first letter of the name of the parish or place where 
they lived’ upon their right sleeve. 198 These impermanent stigmas allowed the possibility of reform if 
you were willing to adopt new forms of work discipline.199  
While practices of badging of the poor were formally repealed in England in 1810, badging 
continued into other similar practices of social stigmatisation and public shaming.  
Practices of badging emerged in concert with new workhouse experiments, for example. Like 
badging, these houses of correction sought to use stigma, incarceration and hard labour to deter 
people from seeking relief from the parish – those who had no option but to enter a workhouse 
were stripped of their remaining worldly possessions, forced to wear humiliating uniforms, and had 
to undertake demeaning and often backbreaking work in return for their keep. ‘I dread the 
workhouse for the workhouse coat is a slothful, degrading badge. After a man has had one on his 
back, he’s never the same’, a blind tailor told journalist and social reformer Henry Mayhew in 
1851.200 As Virginia Richmond details, up until the early twentieth century men from workhouses in 
the North of England were forced to work in public ‘with a large P stamped on the seat of their 
trousers’.201 These practices of badging the poor continue in the government of welfare today – for 
example, through stigmatising media depictions of benefits claimants as ‘designing rogues’ (see 
Chapter Four).  
In The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (1944), the 
political economist Karl Polanyi argued that the stigmatised figure of the pauper and the market 
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economy ‘appear in history together’.202 As Marx writes, ‘it is already contained in the concept of the 
free labourer, that he is a pauper, virtual pauper’.203  What Marx meant by this is that for ordinary 
people the institution of capitalist systems of government made people radically vulnerable to 
poverty—a system of dependence in which only work for the profit of others could secure some 
measure of freedom.  
 
 
[A] Bentham’s panoptical welfare stigma machine 
 
In the late eighteenth century, near famine conditions, and revolts and uprisings, saw the problem of 
paupers become central to social and political debate. Thomas Malthus (1766–1834), famously 
concerned about population growth, argued that hunger, disease (and war) were checks on 
population size which shouldn’t be interfered with. Hence he proposed the total abolition of the 
poor relief, with workhouses used as a place of last resort, arguing that ‘survival of the fittest’ 
policies combined with moral restraints, such as limitations on marriages amongst the poor, would 
naturally curtail population growth.  
Another popular suggestion was that paupers should be encouraged (or forced) to migrant 
to colonies, to release tax-payers from the burden of relief. Edward Wakefield (1796–1862), a major 
player in the British colonisation of New Zealand and Canada, argued that the new ‘misery of the 
bulk of the people’ could be ameliorated through ‘systematic colonization’. 204 What Wakefield 
meant is that forced emigration and settler colonialism might solve the problem of the growing 
pauperisation in England.205 Of course this implied the seizure and enclosure of overseas land, and 
the displacement and pauperisation of indigenous populations. 
In contrast, one-man social-policy think tank Jeremy Bentham (1748 -1882) argued that 
deporting paupers to the colonies was an expensive and uncertain enterprise. The American War of 
Independence from 1775 to 1783 had stalled transportation of British convicts to North American 
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colonies, which had created a prison population crisis: prison hulks (prison ships) were periodically 
overflowing with people sentenced to transportation. Bentham advocated instead for internal 
colonisation, by which he meant the building of a vast carceral welfare state within England in which 
paupers could be ‘farmed’ for profit.206 Bentham’s extensive proposals, the first detailed plans for a 
fully comprehensive system of state welfare in Britain, was a panoptical stigma machine. 
 
[A] The enclosure of the poor 
In Outline of a Work Entitled Pauper Management Improved, first published in serial form in the 
Annuals of Agriculture in 1798, Jeremy Bentham outlined ‘the most radical and comprehensive 
revision of the poor law ever proposed’.207 An extraordinary and terrifying work of utilitarian 
speculative fiction, Bentham’s scheme for farming paupers involved transforming what he called 
‘that part of the national live stock which has no feathers to it and walks with two legs’ into a 
profitable captive labour force.208 Bentham’s proposals for the management of paupers called for 
mass privatisation of welfare, including the abolishment of all existing practices and institutions of 
poor relief, the ending of all outdoor relief, especially cash payments and wage supplements (as in 
the Speenhamland system), 209 the rescinding of all existing poor laws and the closure of all existing 
prisons, bridle houses, asylums, hospitals, workhouses and orphanages. In the place of this uneven 
patchwork of welfare institutions and provisions, Bentham proposed the setting up of a National 
Charity Company: 
 
The management of the concerns of the poor throughout South Britain to be vested in one 
authority, and the expense to be charged upon one fund. This Authority, that of a Joint-
Stock Company under some such name as that of the National Charity Company.210 
 
Bentham argued that his scheme would rid the government once and for all of ‘the whole body of 
the burdensome poor’: the disabled, the elderly, widows, orphans, felons, vagabonds, beggars, any 
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and all who might be a drain on the public purse.211 His charity was to be state subsided (a public-
private partnership), funded through the existing systems of poor relief (local taxation), but this tax-
booty would now be transferred directly to Bentham’s company, which would have ‘responsibility 
for the entire management and distribution of relief, having at its disposal the entire sum available 
for relief, and functioning solely through the medium of industry-houses’.212 This income would be 
supplemented by funds derived from private share-holders in the company – Bentham particularly 
hoped to encourage small-scale investments from middle-class shareholders.213  
The setting up of this company would involve the building of an ‘unprecedented multitude 
of establishments’ to be known as ‘industry-houses’.214 These industry houses were modelled on 
Bentham’s famous panoptical prison plans, which he had initially designed (in response to a 
newspaper competition to design a new prison) to incarcerate three thousand people in a single 
building. In Pauper Management, Bentham scaled up these plans, proposing the building of 500 
industry-houses, which together would form a massive prison-like estate within England, initially 
housing five hundred thousand people and rising to one million within twenty-one years. Bentham 
estimated that the resident population in England and Wales was nine million, so his plan was to 
forcibly incarcerate one in nine people, targeting those who were reliant (or were at risk thereof) on 
poor relief; one million people interned to undertake forced labour.  
The National Charity Company was to be granted legal powers to compulsorily enclose land, 
and the industry houses would be spread across the entirety of southern England, their location 
determined by mathematical division of land to produce ‘an exact equality of distribution’, the 
‘Average distance accordingly between house and house 10 2/3 miles’.215 Every ten miles then, a 
panoptical workhouse with an accompanying farm (or what he sometimes and significantly refers to 
as a plantation), in which to segregate, incarcerate, breed and farm England’s paupers.  
While the clientele of Bentham’s original panoptical prisons (if they had been built) would 
have been convicted criminals supplied by the courts, these mixed welfare institutions would receive 
a vast and diverse clientele rounded up by the company itself. For this purpose, Bentham stated that 
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his company would be granted unlimited legal powers for ‘apprehending all persons, able-bodied or 
otherwise, having neither visible or assignable property, nor honest and sufficient means of 
livelihood, and detaining and employing them’.216 Indeed, Bentham’s new privatised welfare state 
involved the creation of a private police force – one of the first proposals for a national police force. 
It is significant in this regard that Bentham argued that his scheme would remove the fiscal burden 
of paupers from hard-working taxpayers and contain the insurrectionary threat to property (and the 
propertied classes) posed by the indigent poor. State welfare was imagined from the outside as a 
system for policing the poor. 
Bentham’s proposals were not without precedent, he drew on existing practices of 
identification and surveillance, such as the registration and badging of the poor. He also drew on 
existing workhouse experiments in England, notably The Relief of the Poor Act 1782 (Gilbert’s Act) 
which allowed neighbouring parishes to join together to develop regional workhouses. Bentham’s 
friend, the philanthropist Jonas Hanway was experimenting with similar systems of carceral work 
discipline in his Magdalen Hospital for Penitent Prostitutes (opened in 1758).217 However, the 
proposed National Charity Company was on a totally different scale, the enserfment of the entirety 
of England’s poor in a system which would combine the panoptical prison-factory with the colonial 
plantation system to form what Bentham termed ‘a domestic colony’. 218   
 
[A] Colonise at home 
Bentham’s entire scheme was dedicated to the proposition, ‘Colonize at home!’, and he imagined it 
as a pauper empire.219 He argued that his industry houses and plantations would provide all the 
advantages of colonisation without the risks which came with the management of foreign 
colonies.220  Further, his charitable company was to run on the mercantilist principles of the East 
India Company, and managed, like the East India Company, by a Board of Directors elected by the 
share-holders.221 Indeed, Bentham argued that ‘the government of such a concern as that of the 
proposed National Charity Company would be like child’s play to a Director of the East India 
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Company’, writing that in India ‘you see twenty or thirty millions under the management, and much 
more absolute government of one Board, and those spread over a surface of country several times 
as large as South Britain’.222 Bentham himself was to be director of this charitable company, a role he 
described as ‘Sub-Regulus of the Poor’.223 
It is notable that Bentham proposed introducing a system of what he termed ‘identity 
washing’ (using chemical dyes to mark the faces of inmates) as a surveillance technology for 
managing the pauper labour force in his proposed domestic colony of industry houses.224 
Bentham’s plans drew extensively on the new tools of accountancy and labour management 
(forms of punishment and discipline) innovated in colonial plantations in India, the West Indies and 
North America.225 Bentham and his brother Samuel had previously spent time (1786-7) 
experimenting with new systems of labour discipline on a Russian colonial estate – where Samuel 
managed a serf labour force.226 Indeed, it was on this Russian colony that Bentham had first devised 
his famous panoptical prison design. Bentham wanted to refine these management techniques to 
transform England’s waste populations into work machines. As he wrote, ‘Not one in a hundred is 
absolutely incapable of all employment. Not the motion of a finger—not a step—not a wink—not a 
whisper—but might be turned to account in the way of profit in a system of such magnitude.’227  
This marked and captive population would labour for their keep on a debt-bondage model. 
Breeding was to be encouraged by the company, and children would be held as collateral and 
security – with child labour used to pay off any inherited debts owed to the company. He imagined 
paupers (and crucially their offspring) as an untapped treasure trove whose capture and exploitation 
would yield dividends for investors in his scheme, calculating that within a short number of years his 
company would become profitmaking. Bentham’s lengthy proposals are best understood as both a 
policy document and a business proposal. He described his colonial style welfare scheme as ‘my 
Utopia’.228  
Bentham’s utopia was never realised in his lifetime. He blamed the government and the king 
for not adopting his plans, as he lamented: ‘But for George the Third, all the paupers in the country 
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would, long ago, have been under my management’.229 However, his proposals deeply influenced 
the draconian The Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 (also known as the New Poor Law) passed into 
law the year of Bentham’s death. The 1834 Poor Laws were composed by Bentham’s devoted former 
secretary and acolyte Edwin Chadwick.  
Indeed, Bentham’s vision of panoptical houses of industry spread across the land was 
effectively a blue print for the 1834 Act, which legislated for the abolishment of all outdoor relief 
and the building of pauper workhouses across England. This Act was, as E.P Thompson describes it, 
‘the most sustained attempt to impose an ideological dogma, in defiance of the evidence of human 
need, in English history’.230  
Bentham’s panoptical workfare scheme has continued to cast a long shadow over welfare 
policy making in Britain (and further afield). Indeed, Bentham’s legacy weighs heavily on the ongoing 
austerity enclosures of the twentieth-century welfare commons, and the rise of what Virginia 
Eubanks has described as ‘digital poor houses’, namely the development of high-tech tools to mark 
out, survey, profile, police and govern the poor.231  
 
[A] ‘Flogged, fettered and tortured in the most exquisite refinement of cruelty’  
 
As Karl Marx, Karl Polanyi and other many influential political economists have highlighted, the 
stigmatised figure of the pauper, and the constellation of stigma practices innovated to mark out 
and govern populations pauperised by capitalism ‘stands at the centre of a political and epistemic 
complex’ from which the British state emerged.232 However, it is no coincidence that the stigmatising 
laws and terrorising punishments employed in England from the fifteenth-century to transform (and 
sort) agricultural peasants into waged labours and paupers bear resemblances to the English slave 
codes devised in colonial plantation economies in the Caribbean and North America; laws which 
sought to transform chattel slaves and their descendants into ‘Negros’ – ‘a marginally human group 
… fit only for slavery’.233  Indeed, the proposals of people like Wakefield for ‘systematic colonisation’, 
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and the schemes of people like Bentham’s for an internal colony of pauper industry houses and 
plantations within England, underscores the extent to which ‘the enclosure movement in England 
[was] continuous with colonial dispossession and possession in the “New World”’.234  It is imperative 
to consider the operations of this stigma politics, not least as it highlights the ways in which racial 
capitalism operates through the production of race-class distinctions—classificatory distinctions 
which differentially function to enclose and exploit those dispossessed by the advocates and 
beneficiaries of colonial capitalism. 
In Slavery and Capitalism, Eric Williams notes that by ‘1750 there was hardly a trading or a 
manufacturing town in England which was not in some way connected with the triangular or direct 
colonial trade. The profits obtained provided one of the main streams of that accumulation of 
capital in England which financed the Industrial Revolution.’235 Once again the eighteenth-century 
history of Lancaster is instructive in this regard. The first cotton mills in the Lancaster district were 
established in a village called Caton in 1783 by a man called Thomas Hodgson (1738–1817). Thomas 
Hodgson and his brother John worked as slave traders for over 30 years. Between 1763 and 1791 
they were involved in the capture and selling of at an estimated 14,000 people. Thomas began his 
slaving career working for the Lancaster-born slaver Miles Barber; indeed, records suggest that the 
Hodgson brothers took over the running of ‘Factory Island’ from Barber in 1793 – a decade after 
they opened their first cotton mill (see Introduction on Barber). For a period, then, these Lancashire 
brothers owned and managed these two factory complexes simultaneously.  
The Hodgson cotton mills in Caton specialised in the exploitation of pauper child labourers, 
transporting children from urban centres across England to work in their mills – primarily from 
Liverpool but also from London.236 As Karl Marx details, alongside colonial planation slavery, it is 
child factory labour which characterised ‘the infancy of Modern Industry’.237 Marx quotes from 
Fredrick Eden’s The State of the Poor (1797) who describes how the ‘small and nimble fingers of little 
children’ were procured by men like the Hodgson’s from parish workhouses and orphanages to be 
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‘flogged, fettered and tortured in the most exquisite refinement of cruelty’ to work ‘the newly-
invented machinery’ of Lancashire’s cotton mills.238 
During the same period, John Bond (1778–1856), another Lancaster man who would twice 
be appointed as Mayor of the town, inherited several plantations and over 700 enslaved people in 
British Guiana and Grenada from his slave-trading uncle Thomas Bond.239 His inheritance included a 
cotton plantation in Guiana called Lancaster.240  The Lancaster cotton planation was visited in the 
mid-eighteenth century by an English physician, Dr George Pinckard, who described it as 
‘distinguished’ by ‘the inhuman treatment of the slaves’. 241 This is a place, Pinckard wrote, where 
‘cruelty had become contagious’ and the plantation manager ‘hardened in savage conduct’ and 
‘diabolical cruelty’.242 
During Pinckard’s visit an enslaved husband and wife from the Lancaster plantation escaped. 
They were recaptured and flogged. Pinckard describes how he is called on to offer medical 
assistance. When he arrives the man has already died of his wounds, ‘an iron collar’ still fastened 
around his neck and heavy chains binding his body to that of his ‘almost murdered’ wife.243 She is in 
a condition so ‘horrid and distressing can scarcely be conceived’, her ‘flesh’ is ‘so torn as to exhibit 
one extensive sore, from the loins almost down to her hams’.244 Pinckard calls this episode ‘the most 
shocking’ instance of ‘barbarity’ he witnessed during his journey through the West Indies and South 
America. His published letters were later used to support the political case for the abolition of 
slavery.  
[A] The cotton that connects, the cloth that binds 
Cotton is one of the threads which connects and binds together the lives of those who ‘built the 
wealth of the European machine’ over centuries.245   Manufactured woollen and cotton goods were 
sometimes used by slave traders to purchase people on the West African coast. The raw cotton, 
picked by the enslaved in plantations, was weighed and baled, before being shipped to the same 
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quaysides from which slave ships had departed; ‘Negro Cloth’ – a coarse material sometimes made 
by grinding up the rags of factory workers– was sent back across the Atlantic as clothing for 
plantation slaves: an industry of recycling waste cloth which was known as the shoddy trade.246 
In an art work called Cotton.com (2002), installed inside a former cotton mill in Manchester, 
the artist Lubaina Himid brings the ghosts of mill-workers and plantation workers into dialogue 
through the medium of cotton, paint and words. As Himid describes this project in an interview with 
the historian Alan Rice: 
[I] imagined the cotton workers in these buildings taking the cotton off the barges that had 
come up the ship canal and finding little bits of fabric, perhaps finding a bit of cloth, or a bit 
of hair, some kind of thing that had accidently found its way from the cotton picker’s body 
or clothes or field … into these bales and managed to find its way back across the Atlantic, 
up the Manchester Ship Canal, there you get this whole bale of cotton off and you have to 
card it and thin it …. imagine all the thoughts you might have had.247 
We cannot understand the history of industrial capitalism separately from the history of slavery and 
colonialism. We cannot separate Lancashire’s cotton mills from the Lancashire-owned slave factories 
on the African coast, and the Lancashire-owned cotton plantations – they form part of the same 
archipelago of enclosure and exploitation. As the economic, judicial, political, architectural and 
welfare histories of cities like Lancaster attest, the unpaid labour of the enslaved was the source of 
surplus value which structured the ‘free’ but exploited waged labour of the English working class. 
That is, the ability of the ‘freeborn’ English man to sell ‘his own skin’ was grounded in the radical 
unfreedom of others.  
In 1862, a ‘cotton famine’, precipitated by the American Civil War, saw the threads of 
connection between enslaved cotton pickers in the American South and Lancashire mill workers 
become visible in people’s everyday lives in Industrial England, with many mill workers, unions and 
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co-operative organisations expressing their solidarity with the enslaved through an embargo on 
Southern picked cotton, and waves of strike action.248 These acts of transatlantic solidarity testify to 
the fact that we cannot disentangle class struggles in England – the machine breakers, the levellers 
and strikers of Britain’s multi-ethnic working class – from the freedom struggles of those enslaved in 
factories, ships and plantations. As Marx reflected on the tumultuous events of the Lancashire 
cotton famine, ‘Labour cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded’.249  
Plantation slaves, enserfed agricultural workers, indentured ‘coolie’ workers, child labourers, 
waged factory workers and workhouse paupers are ‘concretely intertwined and ideologically 
symbiotic elements of a larger unified though internally diversified structure of exploitation’.250  
Indeed, chattel slavery and plantation labour were as formative in the formation and structuring of 
English class society as the enclosure of common land and the exploitations attendant with the 
growth of Industrial capitalism in factories and mills. We cannot disentangle the history of the 
development of the English welfare state and its ‘charitable institutions’ of orphanages and 
workhouses from the history of slavery and colonial capitalism.251 As Robbie Shilliam writes, ‘the 
working class was constitutionalized though empire and its aftermaths; and in this respects, class is 
race’, by which he means that ‘there is no politics of class which is not already racialised’.252 
Many excellent histories of colonial capitalism have been written by others; see for example 
Eric Williams, Catherine Hall, Sven Beckert, Edward Baptist and more. What Stigma seeks to 
contribute here is an understanding of how penal practices of stigmatisation which devalued and 
dehumanised people, underpinned the emergence of capitalism as a world system. I want to turn 
briefly to a final twist in the history of the penal tattoo, the moment when the tattoo becomes a 
building block within the classist and racist eugenicist epistemologies of social scientific knowledge, 
before finally returning to India and the stigma machine of caste.   
 
[A] Eugenic epistemologies of tattooing 
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In 1864, the Italian scientist Cesare Lombroso, who is often called 'the father of criminology', 
developed a highly influential theory of ‘the born criminal’. As Lombroso explains, the idea of ‘the 
born criminal’ came to him in 1864, when he worked as an army doctor and was ‘struck by a 
characteristic that distinguished the honest soldier from his vicious comrade: the extent to which 
the latter was tattooed’.253  From this initial association between tattoos and violent behavioural 
traits, Lombroso penned a Darwin-inspired thesis, which argued that criminality was a hereditary 
trait which linked low class Europeans to savage primitive races. He developed a classificatory 
system through which, he claimed, criminality could be read off the body, through the identification 
of physical traits, such as small skulls, and secondary traits, most especially tattoos.  
In his best-selling book Criminal Man (1876), Lombroso argued that the (voluntary) tattoo is 
a strange relic of ‘a former state’, a practice of ‘atavistic origin’ undertaken by the lower classes – 
peasants, sailors, workers, shepherds, soldiers, and especially criminals.254 In short, if the penal 
tattoo had long been used by social elites to criminalise the bodies of the poor, now voluntarily 
acquired tattoos were employed as a means of identifying the ‘congenital criminal’. By the mid-
nineteenth century, tattoos were ‘routinely included in physical descriptions of suspects, convicts 
and prisoners and they continued to figure in the more elaborate anthropometric descriptions that 
were developed in the later nineteenth century, which by then also incorporated the more modern 
technologies of photography and fingerprinting’. 255 
 
In ‘Criminal Skins’ (2005), Jimena Canales and Andrew Herscher detail how Lombroso’s 
eugenicist stigma thesis deeply influenced the Twentieth century modernist movement. This 
influence is evident in the writing of the Czech architect Adolf Loos, whose essay, ‘Ornament and 
Crime’ (1913) utilised the Italian School of eugenicist social science to argue that ‘the evolution of 
culture is synonymous with the removal of ornamentation from objects of everyday use’.256 For Loos 
the tattoo was a symbol of degenerate ornamentation par excellence, ‘a sign of the survival or 
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recurrence of primitive savagery in the bosom of civilisation’.257 Loos argues that ‘primitive people’, 
such as Papuans (people from or originating from Papua New Guinea and the Pacific region, like Mai 
we met earlier), criminals and women (women of all social classes), ‘are seized with an inescapable 
urge to ornament themselves and their surroundings’.258 
 
A modern person who is tattooed is either a criminal or a degenerate. There are prisons in 
which eighty per cent of the prisoners are tattooed. Tattooed men who are not behind bars 
are either latent criminals or degenerate aristocrats. If someone dies in freedom, then he 
does so a few years before he would have committed a murder.259   
 
What Lombroso and his followers such as Loos inspired was a eugenicist classificatory gaze, the 
foundation for a stigma science which extended from reading the tattooed bodies of individuals to 
the entire ‘degenerate culture’ of ‘lower order social classes’: an atavistic underclass who could now 
be identified through their ‘tattooed environments’, such as the graffiti which ornamented the 
buildings in areas in which they lived, and the use of jargon in their speech and writing. The tattoo 
comes then to function as a device which authorises particular ideological, spatial and aesthetic 
practices of social cleansing.  
We can still see this eugenicist classificatory gaze at work today in the ways in which 
practices of gentrification operate through the ‘territorial stigmatisation’.260 Indeed, we can begin to 
trace here is the ways in which the material histories of places (architecture, built environment, the 
zoning and policing of urban spaces) are shaped by the development of eugenicist race-class 
distinctions. Indeed, Canales and Herscher argue that the history of architectural modernism and 
modernist architectural practices pivot on tattooed body of the race-class other--- giving rise to an 
aesthetic of the unmarked, unornamented building, and ‘the white abstraction of “less is more” 
architecture’.261  While the implications of these insights are beyond the scope of this book, what I 
want to underscore here is the ways in which the penal tattoo not only informs modernist aesthetics 
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and values, but underpins the policies and practices of urbanisation, and its attendant culture 
industries (such as the white cube of the art world).262 In short, this stigma history is inscribed into 
the everyday material infrastructures of the built environments and cultures in which we live.  
To the history of penal tattooing as a literal practice employed used by slave traders and 
propertied elites to mark out the bodies of those they wished to humiliate, devalue, capture and 
exploit, the voluntarily tattoo is now used to compose a science and practice of social classification. 
This in turn informs new ways of seeing and knowing, and leads to the development of new punitive 
practices of classification, criminalisation, policing and social control. These two genealogies of 
stigma dramatically combine in the British colonisation of India.  
 
 
[A] Penal stigma in India  
 
In the mid-eighteenth century the British East India Company was morphing from trading company 
into a colonial power – ‘the Corporate Raj’. In this period, the British East India company was ‘a 
dangerously unregulated private company headquartered in one small office, five windows wide, in 
London, and managed in India by an unstable sociopath’ – a British Army Officer and privateer called 
Robert Clive.263  Clive drew on the resources of the East India Company to fund a vast private army 
with which to assume administrative control over large swathes of the Indian subcontinent. This 
campaign for the political and economic domination of India began in wealthy Bengal. As Thomas 
Paine wrote in 1775: ‘fear and terror march like pioneers before [Clive’s] camp, murder and rapine 
accompany it, famine and wretchedness follow in the rear’.264  The Great Bengal Famine (1769–73) 
killed an estimated one-third of the population in the Bengal, around ten million people. It was the 
largest of a series of eighteenth-century famines in areas of India under the yoke of the Corporate 
Raj as it enclosed India, and bled the region dry.  
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Paine wasn’t alone amongst his contemporaries in decrying the murderous exploits of the 
British in India as ‘an extermination of mankind’.265 Reports about the Bengal famine caused such 
disconcertion amongst the British newspaper-reading public that an investigation into the East-India 
Company was undertaken by the British Government. In April 1773, a damning report by a House of 
Commons select committee was prefaced by the statement ‘that the reports contained accounts 
shocking to human nature, that the most infamous designs had been carried into execution by 
perfidy and murder’. 266  In actuality, the East India Company was a private-public partnership 
between state actors and business elites – indeed one quarter of British MPs ‘owned stock in the East 
India Company’ in this period. 267 Jeremey Bentham who, as detailed above, proposed to base the 
government of his new panoptical welfare state on the East India Company, was also a shareholder.268  
In 1797, the Corporate Raj introduced penal tattooing within its judicial systems of 
punishment in Bengal, a practice it later extended to other areas in South India under company 
control.269 From this period onwards life convicts in Bengal ‘had their name, crime, dates of sentence 
and court by which convicted’ tattooed on their foreheads.270 It seems quite likely that a shortage of 
labour in wake of famines in Bengal contributed to the decision of the Corporate Raj to introduce 
tattooing in this period. Certainly, as the historian Claire Anderson details, colonial control and 
expansion necessitated ‘a cheap and, preferably controllable labour force’ to build the 
infrastructures of Empire, and ‘convicts had their identity as a prison labour force literally inscribed 
upon their person’.271  This tattooed labour force was also transported to other East India Company 
territories and British owned plantations as ‘coolie’ labour.272 Being tattooed or branded in India in 
this period effectively turned you in the property of the company.  
Penal tattooing wasn’t unheard of in pre-colonial India, where ‘the use of tattooing as a 
punishment’ was bound up with other caste-sanctions ‘of shame and humiliation’: including 
mutilation (amputation of nose, ears or hands) and public shaming (head shaving and face 
blackening). The introduction of penal tattooing by the British was also differentiated along caste 
lines.  For example, serious offenders from high caste groups, such as Brahmins, might be tattooed 
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in place of execution.273  These penal tattoos were of course deeply humiliating and a source of 
shame. Anderson notes the how strategies emerged to conceal penal tattoos: ‘turbans were worn 
low to hide godna [tattoo] marks’, hair was fashioned to conceal them, and practices of tattoo 
defacement and removal (through scarification) proliferated.274   
By the time the British government took direct control of India (the British Raj, 1858–1947), 
penal tattooing was falling out of favour, as it was perceived as at odds with the British governments 
stated civilising colonial mission, and a new emphasis on reform in penal systems (led in part by 
utilitarian thinkers such as Jeremey Bentham). As Anderson notes, a debate took place in colonial 
India over the efficacy of flogging of convicts, as the scars left by whip marks on offenders bodies 
were a stigmata which made it harder for them unable to find gainful employment after their 
release.275 Despite this new emphasis on reform (through indentured labour), as we have seen 
throughout this chapter, the suppression of one form of penal stigma is often accompanied by 
emergence of new stigmatising forms of classification and stigma practices. The British continued to 
exploit and innovative shaming punishments, legal sanctions and surveillance technologies, 
particularly by exploiting existing caste-hierarchies in India, to which they added their own 
stigmatising ‘prejudices and value judgements’. 276  
 
[A] The stigma of genetic criminality  
 
In 1871, the British Raj passed the ‘Criminal Tribes Act’, which saw the introduction of punitive laws 
for ‘the registration, surveillance and control’ of Indian’s indigenous and traditionally nomadic tribal 
populations – often known today by the collective term Adivasi.277 Under the terms of this act, 
‘criminality was viewed as hereditary’, and many Adivasi found themselves classified as ‘janam 
churas (criminals-by-birth)’.278  To assist in the implementation of this act a nation-wide survey and 
census of India’s castes and tribal groups was undertaken. Herbert Risley (1851 –1911), a British civil 
servant, anthropologist and race science enthusiast was appointed Census Commissioner for India in 
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1899, and undertook an ethnographic survey of the population of Bengal.279 Inspired by the new 
European eugenicist social sciences, Risley employed phrenology, finger-printing and photography 
as methods for classifying criminal castes and tribes. Risley’s field workers were particularly 
instructed to document tattoos, as tattoos were understood, in the wake of Lombroso’s 1876 thesis, 
as evidence of ‘hereditary criminality’.280  
Once registered as ‘criminals by birth’, the Adivasi became subject to punitive systems of 
administration and policing, which included the introduction of a pass system to control their 
movements. Under this pass system people were forced to register, sometimes daily, at local police 
stations and were frequently confined to specific villages. These forms of social and spatial 
segregation bore resemblances to the Jim Crow laws in the United States (introduced in 1877) and 
the pass systems developed in colonial South Africa to control black labour (for example, in 1896 
black African men were required by law to wear on their upper arm a metal badge stamped with a 
number in order to enter labour districts in the Cape).  
In India, those found in breach of pass laws were subject to fines, beatings and 
imprisonment in reformatories – places of confinement which, as the criminologist Preeti Nijhar 
argues, bore a strong resemblance to English workhouses.281  
In his research on the policing of ‘criminal tribes’ in Punjab, the historian Andrew Major 
reveals that in the early twentieth century large agricultural and industrial reformatories were 
established to intern, reform and skill Adivasi for the labour market, including cotton mills.282 In 
1919, a reformatory prison-factory established at the site of Amritsar prison held 860 Adivasi men, 
women and children, these people were mainly from the so-called criminal tribe Sansi.  During the 
First World War this prison-factory complex effectively functioned as a sweatshop. Jeremy Bentham 
would likely have described this carceral workplace as a utopia. 
 
The political scientist Gopul Guru describes how caste was ‘chalked’ on people as a means of 
enabling and legitimating colonial era rule, including the enclosure of land, resources and labour.283 
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Certainly, it is no coincidence that stigmatising punishments, punitive policing and internment 
measures employed against the Adivasi intensified during the same period when the British were 
actively enclosing the lands in which Adivasi had traditionally lived. For example, the passing of 
multiple Forest Acts saw the British government declare ownership over all forested land – as a 
means, amongst other things, to harvest wood for use in the manufacture of railway sleepers. These 
land enclosures saw Adivasi deprived of traditional ‘grazing, hunting and gathering rights’.284 As with 
the enclosures of common land in England, the innovation of new penal systems of classification and 
surveillance were employed as a technologies of colonial capitalist enclosure.  
 
[A] Indian democracy 
When British rule ended in 1947, India became the largest democratic nation state in the world. The 
Constitution of India (1950) was explicit in prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion, race, 
caste, sex or place of birth. Untouchability became a criminal offence and Dalits were reclassified as 
Scheduled Castes, while Adivasi were reclassified as Scheduled Tribes.  Ostensibly these new 
governmental classifications sought to de-stigmatise the caste system, and to enable those 
disadvantaged by colonial-era social hierarchies to benefit from new redistributive social policies 
and legal protections, including programmes of ‘affirmative action’ which promised to offset 
generations of subordination.285 However, in the context of historically ‘entrenched social, 
economic, and political inequalities created and justified by the caste-based hierarchical social 
order’, and given the many elite interests invested in the maintenance of this order, these 
constitutional doctrines remained ‘paper principles’.286 As the Dalit Panthers (inspired by the US 
Black Panthers) stated in their 1973 manifesto: 
Under pressure of the masses [the Indian Government] passed many laws but it cannot 
implement them. Because the entire state machinery is dominated by … the same hands 
who, for thousands of years, under religious sanctions, controlled all the wealth and power, 
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today own most of the agricultural land, industry, economic resources and all other 
instruments of power.287 
 The Criminal Tribes Act wasn’t repealed until 31 August 1952. From this date those 
registered as ‘born criminals’ were ostensibly freed ‘from their 80-year-old bondage’.288 However, as 
Sarah Gandee notes, the act was replaced ‘by a series of provincial Habitual Offenders legislation 
which effectively reproduced the colonial frameworks of surveillance and control.’289 The very same 
government officers and police forces who had supervised the ‘criminal tribes’ were now 
‘responsible for implementing the ostensibly liberalised agenda of the postcolonial state’.290 Indeed 
these groups are still listed as criminal tribes in police training manuals.291    
As the researcher and activist C. J. Bijoy notes, the spectre of the so-called criminal tribes 
continues to haunt Adivasi people – the Sansi, Pardhi, Kanjar, Gujjar, Bawaria, Banjara and others – 
who ‘are still considered as the first natural suspects of all petty and sundry crimes’.292 In their 
encounters police and other state actors, Adivasi still endure ritual humiliations, unfounded 
accusations, and threats against their family and friends.293  
Public humiliation remains a signal feature of the treatment of both Adivasi and Dalit 
populations. Social boycotts and sanctions against them extend from restricting access to drinking 
water, through destruction of property, beatings, sexual harassment, rape and lynchings. Particular 
kinds of violence are reserved for Adivasi and Dalit women, including ‘extreme filthy verbal abuse 
and sexual epithets, naked parading, dismemberment, being forced to drink urine and eat faeces, 
branding, pulling out of teeth, tongue and nails, and violence including murder after proclaiming 
witchcraft’.294 Feminist scholars have detailed how extreme caste violence, rape and public shaming 
rituals are often targeted at Dalit women in order to demonstrate caste control over Dalit men.295 
Through practices of gender-based violence, women's bodies are effectively made depositories of 
the stigmatising violence of the caste system itself. This echoes the long gendered history of penal 
stigma explored in this chapter, and the ways in which misogyny combines with classism, casteism 
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and racism. The history of racial capitalism cannot be separated from regimes of patriarchy -- stigma 
power functions intersectionally.  
 
[A] The stigma machine of caste 
In 2016, a new annotated edition Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar’s seminal 1935 The Annihilation of Caste 
was published. Ambedkar (1891 –1956) was India’s first Law and Justice Minister following 
Independence, and in this role was largely responsible for drafting the new Constituion. Ambedkar 
was born into an untouchable Dalit caste. Extraordinarily, considering his background and the 
period, Ambedkar was university educated. In 1916, he began a PhD at the London School of 
Economics (completed in 1922) and also undertook his formative legal training in London. An 
economist, as well as politician, lawyer and social reformer, Ambedkar was a prolific writer and 
campaigner on Dalit and other issues of social justice.  
In a long essay that prefaces the new edition, Arundhati Roy asks why caste, unlike other 
‘contemporary abominations like apartheid, racism, sexism, economic imperialism and religious 
fundamentalism’, hasn’t been ‘politically and intellectually challenged in intellectual forums’.296  As 
Roy argues, despite being ‘one of the most brutal modes of hierarchical social organisation that 
human society has known’, the Indian caste-system still eludes ‘scrutiny and censure’.297   
Roy reflects on growing up as the daughter of a high-caste Hindu father and a Christian 
mother in post-Imperial India with ‘the fissures and cracks of caste’ all around her, a social context in 
which caste was implied and practised but rarely overtly stated. Reflecting on her childhood, Roy 
describes caste as everywhere, in ‘people’s names, in the way people referred to each other, in the 
work they did, in the clothes they wore, in the marriages that were arranged, in the language they 
spoke’, and yet, she says, ‘I never encountered the notion of caste in a single school textbook’.298   It 
is not only that caste ‘is not colour-coded’ and is therefore ‘not easy to see’, especially to untrained 
eyes, but rather that this erasure of the lived realities of caste discrimination is an integral element 
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of post-Imperial India’s narrative of political modernity: a nationalist project which Roy describes as 
a ‘Project of Unseeing’.299 
From an outsider’s perspective (such as my own), understanding caste, its origins, changing 
historical meanings and forms seems a dauntingly complex task; however, the ‘organising principles’ 
of caste are not difficult to grasp.300   At its simplest, we can understand the Indian caste system as 
‘graded inequality’ grounded in an ‘ascending scale of reverence and a descending scale of 
contempt’.301 As Roy puts it, the ‘top of the caste pyramid is considered pure and has plenty of 
entitlements. The bottom is considered polluted and has no entitlements but plenty of duties. The 
pollution–purity matrix is correlated to an elaborate system of caste-based, ancestral occupation’.302  
 Ambedkar captures Indian social hierarchy in a ‘chilling metaphor’, as ‘a multi-storeyed 
tower with no staircase and no entrance’ in which everybody is doomed ‘to die in the storey they 
were born in’.303  To keep people in their allotted place in this ‘hierarchical, sliding scale of 
entitlements and duties’, the caste system relies upon an ‘elaborate enforcement network in which 
everybody polices everybody else’ – the daily grinding of the stigma machine of caste.304 
 
This chapter on the penal genealogy of stigma opened with five Adivasi women tortured and 
tattooed by police with the words Jeb Katri.  These women were all from a denotified tribe called 
Sansi, classified as a ‘hereditary thieving race’ under the British Criminal Tribes Act.305 Recalling the 
Jeb Katri case, Justice Singhvi, one of High Court Judges who initially awarded the women 
(inadequate) compensation for their torture, stated: ‘It appears that the poor in this country are 
born with different tags on their heads while the law bends for the rich’.306 However, we cannot 
understand this story through the lens of economic injustice and the inequalities of class. What 
these women were engraved with was the violent signature of caste. To borrow Arundhati Roy’s 
words, ‘for a court to acknowledge that caste prejudice continues to be a horrific reality in India 
would have counted as a gesture towards justice’.307 Instead, here, as in so many other cases of 
caste violence in contemporary India, the judge ‘airbrushed caste out of the picture’.308   
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In the context of ongoing state, police and Hindu caste violence against Adivasi and Dalit 
people in India, what is remarkable about the Jeb Katri case wasn’t that it took 23 years for the 
policemen to be convicted, but that there was any measure of justice at all.309 That this case was 
prosecuted is a testament to the courage of these Sansi women, and particularly that of Parmeshri 
Devi who unveiled her penal tattoo before the judge’s bench. As Devi told journalists in 2016: ‘Let us 
assume that I was a thief. But the police had no right to brand me as Jeb Katri.’ 310 
 
[A] Hindu supremacy  
I began this chapter with the Jeb Katri case because the word stigma has its ancient roots in 
practices of penal tattooing which so clearly resonate with the humiliation and torture of these 
women at the hands of the police. I wanted to stress that violent material practices of stigmatisation 
are not only historically entrenched forms of race–class–caste dehumanisation but are ‘live’ 
practices in the contemporary world. What I particularly want to underscore here, is that the 
stigmatising classificatory systems which continue to undergird the Indian social hierarchy were ‘not 
based on the self-representation of the castes in question’ but rather derived ‘from the worldview of 
native elites and colonial ethnographers’. 311 The stigma politics of caste is particularly instructive for 
understanding the entanglement of stigma power within histories of colonial capitalism. 
The caste system continues to have ‘buoyant admirers in high places’ who now argue that 
caste describes not discrimination but rather cultural differences that form a ‘social glue that binds 
as well as separates people and communities in interesting and, on the whole, positive ways’.312 For 
example, when Dalits ‘tried to raise caste as an issue at the 2001 World Conference against Racism 
in Durban’, the Indian establishment ‘insisted that caste was an “internal matter”’, criticising 
‘international do-gooders’ for ‘misconceptions’ and for interfering in Indian affairs.313 In a statement 
to the BBC, India's junior foreign minister, Omar Abdullah was quoted as saying that ‘condemning 
the caste system would equate casteism with racism, which makes India a racist country, which we 
are not’.314   In defence of caste, the Indian government showcased ‘theses by well-known 
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sociologists who argued at length that the practice of caste was not the same as racial 
discrimination, and that caste was not the same as race’.315 The ‘cultural thesis’ of caste continues to 
be employed by Indian elites, who argue that condemnations of the caste-system are ‘political 
correctness gone mad’.  
In 2014, Hindu-nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi (2014- present) and the right-wing 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) assumed control of the Indian government. Modi was re-elected in a 
landslide victory in 2019. The power base of BJP is firmly anchored in upper caste Hindu support, 
and pursues purist caste Hindu policies, an ideology of Hindutva (Hindu-ness). It is in effect the 
political arm of a proto-fascistic paramilitary organisation called the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS).316 As Priyamvada Gopal notes, ‘Modi was a leading activist’ for the ‘secretive and militaristic’ 
RSS: an organisation that ‘on a good day, looks like the British National party but can operate more 
like Nazi militias’.317  In ways akin to other 21st-century far-right and ethno-nationalist movements in 
Europe and North American, this stigma politics exploits and generates divisions between different 
factions of Indian’s poorest communities; this includes both ritual performances of Dalit inclusion in 
the project of Hindu nationalism, and the vilification of Muslims (and other non-Hindus).  It is well 
documented, for example, that the RSS ‘is responsible for vicious attacks on Christians, murdering 
missionaries and calling for Muslims to choose between Pakistan and the graveyard’.318  
Since Modi came to power incidents of communal violence (violence across caste, religious 
or ethnic lines) has increased exponentially, especially against Muslims.319 Notably, Modi was the 
Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2002, when widespread riots against Muslims broke out in the region, 
which saw the mass beatings, rapes, and killings of Muslims by Hindu extremists. It is estimated that 
2000 people died and many more were injured in this violence.320 Evidence of the involvement of 
police and government officials in these riots have led to claims that this was a state-sponsored 
pogrom against Muslims. Both RSS and BJP members were named in reports filed by eyewitnesses 
after the riots.  
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As I completed this chapter, the Modi led Indian government was busy further tearing up 
the promises and protections enshrined in the Indian constitution of 1947. In August 2019, the India 
Government took direct administrative control over the predominately Muslim States of Jumma and 
Kashmir, a process which has seen seven million people effectively caged into the region, with all 
communications to the outside world cut off.321 In short, a massive new state-led colonial capitalist 
enclosure of land and people is underway. The long history of Hindu-supremacist caste stigma 
politics cemented under British rule continues to play a pivotal role in legitimating violence and 
dispossession in the India.  
 
[A] Connected histories of stigma power 
Stigma is an ancient practice, and the word originated to describe tattooing for penal purposes, 
words, marks and images etched into the skin against your will to denote an offence or crime and to 
signify a permanently degraded social status. By unpicking some threads from the vast history of 
penal stigma, my aim in this chapter has been to underscore the ways in which Ancient Graeco-
Roman practices of penal stigmatisation, have not only persisted but have been deployed, over 
many centuries, as terrorising governmental technologies. One argument of Stigma is that the penal 
function of stigma persists not only within the etymology of the word, but within contemporary 
forms of social discipline and exploitation.  
Understanding stigma as a socio-political calligraphy of subjection, is central to the 
reconceptualisation of stigma in this book. Of course, the meaning and purpose of penal tattooing 
and related practices of stigmatising marking, and the violence with which these marks are 
inscribed, changes over time and in place. For example, class-based systems of indentured pauper 
labour in eighteenth-century England, caste-based penal labour systems in eighteenth-century 
colonial India, and the racialised dehumanisation of enslaved people in eighteenth-century colonial 
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plantations are not equivalent phenomena, but they are nevertheless connected systems of 
oppression and exploitation.  
Jeremy Bentham’s eighteenth-century proposals to ‘colonise at home’ through the 
enclosure of land and the development of a prison-plantation system for farming England’s paupers, 
plans he first hatched while managing a serf labour force on a Russian colonial estate, is one 
amongst many examples of the ways in which the emergence of capitalism as a world system, saw, 
over many centuries, a global traffic in stigmatising practices, policies, laws for the expropriation 
(and reproduction) of labour power.322  
Through a focus on penal stigma, the intention has been to draw out threads of connection 
between some of the practices of dehumanisation which were central to the constitution of colonial 
capitalist modernity. Indeed, one of my motivations for reconceptualising stigma as a form of power, 
is a concern with thinking about the intersections between different forms of stigmatisation. To 
develop a new understanding of stigma as ‘a conglomerate of sociopolitical relations that discipline 
humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans and nonhumans’ in order to trouble the naturalised 
hierarchies of person value upon which patriarchal, capitalist, racist and disablist systems of 
exploitation depend.323  What is at stake in stigma is how, as Stuart Hall puts it, ‘systems of 
classification become the objects of the disposition of power’.324 
Holding to a reading of stigma as punitive practices of bodily inscription is instructive, for 
these genealogies allows us to rethink stigma from the outside in, retraining our gaze upwards, onto 
the social, political and economic function of practices of stigmatisation. Certainly, in re-coupling the 
concept of stigma to histories of capitalism and colonialism, what we gain sight of is stigmacraft; the 
mechanisms through which stigma is produced, and the processes through which it becomes 
attached to bodies (and places), by whom, and for whose gain. What emerges from this chapter is 
an understanding of stigma as a technique of social classification, a governmental strategy of social 
sorting, a mechanism through which inequalities are inscribed and materialised  – a process Franz 
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Fanon termed the epidermalization of inferiority.325  In the following chapters I will unwind some of 




[CH] 2. From Stigma Power to Black Power 
 
 ‘Long we’ve borne the nation’s shame.’  
John Thompson, ‘Exhortation’, 1933326 
 
‘I am black. I know that. I also know that while I am black I am a human being, and therefore I 
have the right to go into any public place.’  
Stokely Carmichael, Black Power, Berkeley, 1966327 
 
 
In January 1960, a black teenager called Joseph McNeil travelled back from a Christmas visit with his 
family in New York to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University (known as A&T) in 
Greensboro. 328 When McNeil got back to campus he described the bus journey to his friends: ‘In 
Philadelphia, I could eat anywhere in the bus station. By Maryland, that had changed; by the time I 
arrived in Richmond, Virginia I was refused a hotdog at a food counter reserved for whites…It was a 
degrading experience; three hours ago I was a human being …three hours later…some kind of 
pariah.’ 329 Travelling from the Northern to the Southern states in 1960 meant crossing, in Erving 
Goffman’s terms, from one social interaction order into another. Arriving in the South in 1960 meant 
immersion in the spatial politics of white supremacy, manifest in the Jim Crow signs that segregated 
social spaces, and in the unspoken ‘customs’, rules, rituals and codes ‘designed to degrade and 
divide’ 330  
Jim Crow was a stigma term for African American’s, which came to be used as the shorthand 
for state level and local laws which enforced racial segregation in the Southern States of the US after 
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the civil war and the formal end of slavery in 1865.331  By 1960 the Jim Crow era ‘of institutionalized 
violence’ had lasted for close to a century. 332 
 
McNeil and three teenage friends, Franklin McCain, David Richmond and Jibreel Khazan,333  
had spent the evenings of their first term at university talking long into the night about their heroes, 
Ghandi, Langston Hughes, Martin Luther King, about the failures of the civil rights movement to 
effect meaningful change and about the quotidian humiliations of living under white supremacy. 
Furious after his degrading bus journey, McNeil persuaded his friends to action.  
On 1 February, the four went into the Woolworth’s store on South Elm Street in Greensboro 
and sat down at the ‘Whites only’ lunch counter.334 They asked for coffee. The waitress refused to 
serve them, saying, ‘We don’t serve Negroes here.’ 335 The police were called, an officer arrived: ‘He 
took his knife stick out. He took his billy club and began to hit it on his hand.’336 Taking their place in 
a long history of Southern freedom fighters, the four refused to move from their seats.  
The Greensboro four returned to Woolworths lunch counter every day that week, 
accompanied by growing numbers of students from A&T, Bennett College (a black liberal arts college 
for women), and Dudley High School (then a segregated black school). By 6 February, 1,000 students 
were sitting-in at Greensboro Woolworths lunch counter. These initially small scale challenges to 
segregation escalated into the largest black resistance movement in the history of the United States.  
The protests garnered extensive national television news coverage. By 1958, over 80 per 
cent of American homes had television sets, and by 1960 the use of 16mm film and the development 
of wireless audio recorders transformed the ability of television journalists ‘to capture volatile 
demonstrations as they unfolded’.337 As a consequence of this rapidly growing television audience, 
and technical advances in shooting news footage, ‘the sit-ins provided the nation with a unique 
experiment in moral theatre, where black protestors (at times with white allies) non-violently 
withstood verbal and physical abuse.’ 338 Anne Moody, then a sociology student at Tougaloo college, 
described the scene at a sit-in at a Woolworth’s lunch counter in Jackson, Mississippi:   
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The white students started chanting all kinds of anti-Negro slogans. We were called a little 
bit of everything. The rest of the seats except the three we were occupying had been roped 
off to prevent others from sitting down. A couple of the boys took one end of the rope and 
made it into a hangman’s noose. Several attempts were made to put it around our necks. 
The mob started smearing us with ketchup, mustard, sugar, pies, and everything on the 
counter. […] a Negro high school boy sat down next to me. […] the word ‘nigger’ was written 
on his back with red spray paint.339   
 
Being black in the United States in 1960 was to be ‘smeared with the stigma of “racial inferiority”’. 340 
By putting their bodies in white-only spaces, these young people sought to dramatise ‘the studied 
humiliations’ of Jim Crow.341 Protesting against the political and economic terrorism of white 
supremacy came at a price; people were heckled, intimidated, beaten, arrested and expelled from 
schools, colleges and jobs. As then student activist (and later sociology professor) Joyce Ladner 
notes: ‘It was very, very difficult to continue because the local police and all the towns had almost 
crushed us. … They murdered people, they beat people.’ 342 What motivated young people to 
participate in the face of these ‘terrible beatings, brutalities’ was often a deeply personal need to 
express the anguish of living with anti-black racism.343 These ‘subversive demands for a dignified life 
free from harassment’ were acts of resistance against what Malcolm X described as the 
‘psychological and physical mutilation that is an everyday occurrence in our lives’.344 As McCain 
reflects: ‘It really started out as a personal thing… we didn’t like the idea of not having dignity and 
respect… and decided it was really up to us to find a solution to this thing we were suffering with.’  345 
McCain described the Woolworths protest as a reparative act: ‘Almost instantaneously after sitting 
down on a simple dumb stool, I felt so relieved, I felt so clean’… a feeling of total freedom.’ 346 
Similarly, when Jibreel Khazan was asked what moved him to act, he replied: ‘Something had to be 
done to remove the stigma.’347 
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Two months after Greensboro electrified the civil rights movement from below, the formation of the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) saw young people’s actions against racial 
segregation extended to ‘Freedom Rides’ which challenged segregation on interstate travel, and 
staged kneel-ins at segregated churches, sleep-ins at segregated motels, swim-ins at segregated 
pools, wade-ins at segregated beaches, read-ins at segregated libraries, play-ins at segregated parks, 
watch-ins at segregated cinemas and theatres, wait-ins at housing developments, chain-ins at city 
halls and rent-strikes. By the spring of 1960 it was estimated that 50,000 people had participated in 
By 1963, ‘the southern struggle had grown from a modest group of black students demonstrating at 
one lunch-counter to the largest mass movement for racial reform and civil rights in the 20th 
century’. 348  
 
 
[A] Struggles in the interaction order 
 
In the midst of this burst of political resistance against the violent regimes of racial stigma and 
segregation of Jim Crow, Erving Goffman wrote his influential book Stigma: Notes on the 
Management of a Spoiled Identity (1963). 
What distinguishes Erving Goffman’s contribution to sociology is his career-long focus on 
‘social interaction’, which he defined as ‘social situations …in which two or more individuals are 
physically in one another's response presence’.349 In ‘The Interaction Order’ (1982), his 
posthumously published Presidential Address to the American Sociology Association, Goffman lists 
the kinds of everyday places he was interested in studying: ‘a local bar, a small shop floor, a 
domestic kitchen … factories, airports, hospitals, and public thoroughfares’. 350  Goffman’s approach 
involved observing how people interact with each other in these spaces and what this revealed 
about the rules, norms and conventions of social life. Those familiar with Goffman’s oeuvre will be 
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reminded of his dramaturgical understanding of the interaction order as ‘a natural theater’, with a 
front and back stage, in which people perform social roles.351  
Given his lifelong interest in studying how society works and coheres through social 
interactions, one might have thought that Goffman would have been interested in the direct and 
open challenges to (racist) laws, rules and norms of social interaction instigated by young people like 
the Greensboro Four which were taking place in bars and cafes, buses, shops, schools, universities, 
workplaces and public streets across the US in the 1960s. After all, the grassroots struggles that 
characterised this period were taking place within the very kinds of behavioural settings and 
involved conflicts in the very kinds of service transactions which were, ostensibly, at the very centre 
of his sociological interest. Black citizens were refusing to ‘go along with current interaction 
arrangements’ and were revolting against the stigmatised ‘social roles’ they had been assigned.  352 
However, while Goffman acknowledges that ‘questions do arise when we consider the fact that 
there are categories of persons – in our own society very broad ones – whose members constantly 
pay a very considerable price for their interactional existence’ 353 he states that his approach is not 
‘informed by a concern over the plight of disadvantaged groups’. 354 What is so striking about this 
statement is that Goffman’s career as a sociologist spanned some of the most tumultuous decades 
of resistance by ‘disadvantaged groups’ to the dominant social order in US history – including black 
people, women, disabled people, so-called ‘mad’ people, lesbian women and gay men.  
Between 1960 and 1963 Goffman was teaching a course called ‘Deviance and Social Control’ 
at the University of Berkley in California, Goffman’s book on stigma was composed in part from the 
lectures he wrote for this course. While teaching at Berkley, Goffman would have been acutely 
aware of the black freedom struggles that were exploding all around in ‘sit-ins, marches, protest 
rallies and urban upheavals’.355 As indicated, television footage of ‘chanting demonstrators being 
sprayed by fire hoses and attacked by dogs, freedom riders being abused, sit-in participants being 
taunted or beaten, and small black children requiring military escorts to enter public schools’ made 
for powerful viewing in this period.356 Further, in solidarity with southern sit-in movements the 
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‘pernicious de facto segregation of the Urban North’ was being openly contested in states like 
California.357 From the spring of 1960, Berkeley students were picketing hotels and shops which 
were known to practise racial discrimination in their employment practices.358 This anti-racist politics 
leaked into Goffman’s classroom, as Gary Marx, a student in Goffman’s 1961 ‘Deviance and Social 
Control’ class recalls: 
 
At the end of the last class session a black student said, ‘This is all very interesting Professor 
Goffman, but what's the use of it for changing the conditions you describe?’ Goffman was 
visibly shaken. He stood up, slammed shut the book he had open on the desk and said, ‘I'm 
not in that business’ and stormed out of the room.359 
  
In what follows, I examine what happens to Goffman’s account of stigma when we take seriously the 
question of this unnamed black student: what's the use of it for changing the conditions you 
describe?360 When we begin also with Jibreel Khazan’s clarion call for something ‘to be done to 
remove the stigma.’361 
 
 
[A] Social relations without power relations 
 
In the opening pages of Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity, Goffman offers a 
working definition of stigma as: ‘an attribute that is deeply discrediting’ and ‘the situation of the 
individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance’.362 Goffman roots his definition of stigma in 
his existing understanding of social identities as ‘perspectives’ produced in interactional settings. 
What he means by this is that people acquire stigma in their exchanges with other people – be this a 
look, a glance, a comment or a more overt form of discrimination such as name-calling. So while 
stigma might appear to be ‘natural’, as emanating from the body of the stigmatised, and while 
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stigma might be experienced as an automatic response (for example to somebody who is physically 
disfigured), for Goffman stigma describes a social relation between people. In short, stigma is not a 
fixed property of a person, but is produced between people in social settings. The attribution of 
stigma is a socially conditioned response to somebody who is perceived to deviate, whether through 
their appearance or their behaviour, from accepted social norms, standards and ideals.  
This is much- like a classically liberal nineteenth-century definition of stigma. For example, in 
his Dictionary of English Synonymes (1816), George Crabb defines stigma as follows: 
 
A stigma is what falls upon a person in the judgement of others; it is the black mark which is 
set upon a person by the public, and is consequently the strongest of all marks, which 
everyone most dreads and every good man seeks least to observe. 363 
 
What Goffman adds to this nineteenth-century definition of stigma is a distinctly twentieth-
century social scientific understanding of social norms. For Goffman, a stigma arises (or is attributed) 
when an individual fails to realise ‘a particular norm’. This understanding of stigma pivots on the 
existence of a social consensus about what is ‘normal’. That is, what is or isn’t stigmatising is 
determined by prevailing social norms and attitudes.  
For Goffman, society ‘coheres’ to the extent that members of a given society implicitly 
understand and share the norms in operation in a given social context. So, in our social interactions, 
Goffman argues, ‘there is some expectation on all sides that those in a given category should not 
only support a particular norm but also realize it’.364 We generally understand, for example, how we 
are supposed to interact with shopkeeper or a taxi driver. A child quickly learns how they are 
expected to interact with others in a school classroom. We implicitly understand the social roles in 
place in a given setting, and what role we are supposed to play therein.  
Stigma not only describes a relation between people, but also a relation of self to self.  
Goffman suggests that it is through processes of socialisation that an individual ‘learns and 
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incorporates the stand-point of the normal’ and in so doing learns how he or she is likely to be 
placed in a stratified social order of normal-stigma positionalities; for example, a person with an 
attribute which is stigmatising, such as a speech impediment, likely knows in advance of an 
interaction how they might be perceived by others. That is, people judge themselves against an 
incorporated norm and come to anticipate ‘the standards against which they fall short’. 365 
Where do these norms come from? Again, Goffman anticipates but doesn’t this answer this 
question, stating on the first page of Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity that: 
‘Society establishes the means of categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be 
ordinary and natural for members of these categories’. 366 Towards the end of his book, he admits 
that stigmatisation is historically specific in the forms it takes, notes that ‘shifts have occurred in the 
kinds of disgrace that arouse concern’ and implicitly acknowledges that stigma can also function ‘as 
a means of formal social control’. 367  However, he expresses little curiosity in how social norms 
might be challenged or transformed. Rather, he is concerned with detailing the more abstract 
operations of the system within which face-to-face interactions take place, in smooth or disordered 
ways. That is, his interest is in how social rules work rather than in what they proscribe. Hence the 
question of Goffman’s student – how can we use this knowledge to change things? 
So while a relational understanding of stigma is at the core of Goffman’s account, his 
understanding of normal-stigma relations is divorced from power relations – both the macro-level 
structural power relations of, for example, Patriarchy, or the power inflected micro-aggressions of 
everyday interactions. The critical point is that Goffman’s theorisation of stigma as ‘a language of 
relationships’ excludes the fact that social relations are always already structured through histories 
of power (and resistance).  
 
[A] The erasure of the history of penal stigma 
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It is worth noting at this juncture that Goffman opens Stigma: Notes on the Management of a 
Spoiled Identity with a reference to the ancient penal etymology of stigma, but only in order to 
swiftly diminish its contemporary relevance. He writes: 
The Greeks, who were apparently strong on visual aids, originated the term stigma to refer 
to bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the 
signifier. The signs were cut or burnt into the body and advertised that the bearer was a 
slave, a criminal, or a traitor — a blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, 
especially in public places.  
 
Today the term is … applied more to the disgrace itself than to the bodily evidence of it. 
Furthermore, shifts have occurred in the kinds of disgrace that arouse concern.368 
 
Goffman is right that today the meaning of stigma tends to be used to refer to the state of 
‘disgrace itself’, and to experiences of being stigmatised, rather than the literal violent acts of 
inscription that the longer etymology suggests. What I want to underscore here is how Goffman 
contributes to this more passive meaning. For example, if you read the passage above again, you will 
see how Goffman already diverts attention away from those doing the stigmatising – here the 
slaveholders and tattooists of Ancient Greece. What Goffman obscures, from the very first page of 
his book on stigma, is an understanding of stigma as a relation of power. In doing, he conceals the 
more active purpose that stigmatising classifications serve, namely the function of stigma in the 
subjugation, exploitation and control of others. That Goffman produced a stigma-concept so 
toothless, and so emptied of power is, given the history of this concept, an astounding achievement. 
The sociology of stigma remains caught within this torpid perspective – it is this flat ahistorical 
powerless understanding of stigma which this book seeks to change.  
Fredric Jameson suggests that Goffman’s suspension of questions of power is deliberate, for 
his ambition is ‘to evolve abstractions which hold for all social situations’, rather than to develop an 
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understanding which is ‘concrete and historically determinate’. 369  It is possible to read power back 
into Goffman, and indeed this is what many social science scholars who draw on his stigma concept 
have subsequently done, for example by thinking about stigma more explicitly as a form of 
oppression or discrimination. However, it is the contention of this chapter that interrogating 
Goffman’s account in more detail is important if we are to decolonise the stigma-concept, and in 
doing push past some of the prevailing limitations in research and social action around stigma.  
 
 
[A] Atrocity tales: Goffman’s methods 
Despite his career-long concern with social interaction, Stigma: Notes on the Management of a 
Spoiled Identity is not grounded in empirical research, as are some of Goffman’s earlier studies such 
as Asylums (1961), or his PhD research in a Shetland Islands community which formed the basis of 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956). Indeed, despite being recognised as ‘one of the founding 
figures of microsociology’, and despite his self-presentation as a pioneer of observational methods, 
his ‘links to both ethnography and empiricism are rather tenuous, since he rarely engaged in 
traditional fieldwork and drew on both fictional literary texts and fabricated anecdotes for his 
evidence’.370  
Goffman states that his objective in Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity 
is to explore what a burgeoning psychological literature on stigma – but ‘especially popular work’ – 
might ‘yield for sociology’.371 As Heather Love details, it transpires from his footnotes and references 
that what Goffman means by ‘popular work’ is memoirs and biographies, letters and newspaper 
articles, ‘lightly fictionalized [medical] case histories, human interest stories, and counterfactuals’.372 
Indeed, Stigma opens with an epigraph, a fictional letter from sixteen-year-old girl who was ‘born 
without a nose’ to a newspaper ‘agony aunt’, which Goffman has taken from Nathanael West’s dark 
comic depression-era novel Miss Lonelyhearts (1933). Goffman’s use of this fictional epigraph has 
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been interpreted as signalling compassion.373 However, given West’s ‘ironic’ and ‘dispassionate’ 
treatment of ‘emotionally and politically charged material’ in this novel, it seems more likely that 
Goffman is making a playful statement about his own cool and detached approach to stigma. 374 
Indeed, I would argue that his use of this epigraph is best understood as a dry joke: the punchline 
being, as Goffman will reveal at the end of his book, that ‘we normals’ (as he calls his readers) might, 
just like the antihero in West’s novel, find ourselves switched into the role of the stigmatised.   
Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity draws together a heterogeneous 
and eclectic archive of writing about blindness, facial deformities, cripples, amputees, alcoholics, 
gentleman criminals, ex-cons, prostitutes, homosexuals, the ‘mentally deficient’, ‘the mad’, anti-
Semitism and anti-black racism. Goffman describes his reading method as ‘an exercise’ in ‘marking 
off the material on stigma from neighbouring facts’ and ‘showing how this material can be 
economically described within a singular conceptual schema’.375 Love argues that this ‘marking off’ 
of context produces what she approvingly describes as a ‘thin description’.376 What this amounts to 
in practice is that there often no discernible difference in how Goffman deploys, for example, an 
extract from a clinical account of a facial disfigurement, or a personal memoir or fictional account on 
the same topic.  Certainly, he rarely introduces the authors of the materials he quotes from, but 
rather substitutes particular accounts of stigma in his text with abstract ‘stigma figures’, such as ‘a 
blind writer’, ‘a cripple’, ‘a prostitute’, ‘a homosexual’, ‘a Negro’, ‘a Jew’. An abstraction which, as 
Susan Schweik argues, produces an effect of ‘impartial realism’.377  
What is veiled through this method of abstraction are the textual techniques, the particular 
genres and aesthetics of the writing he draws upon, and the multiple perspectives encoded within 
these texts. Most significantly, in suppressing ‘neighbouring facts’ Goffman erases the original 
intentions which might have motivated what is often confessional writing about experiences of 
stigma This point is underlined by his acerbic characterisation of some of the literature he draws 
upon as ‘atrocity tales’ written by ‘heroes of adjustment’ and ‘stigma professionals’ who seek to 
‘present the case for the stigmatised’.378  
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In short, Goffman draws on the writing of people who have experienced stigma but it fails to 
engage with the authors of these literatures as knowledge producers. Kristie Dotson describes this 
method of abstraction as ‘an active practice of unknowing’ which appropriates, erases and silences 
the other, committing what she terms an epistemic violence.379 (A theme I will return to in Chapter 
Five). 
It is important to note at this juncture that Goffman’s Stigma was written during a 
resurgence in confessional writing in US and wider European culture. Indeed, this ‘confessional turn’ 
was central to social and political struggles of the period, beginning with the civil rights movement 
and extending to feminist, queer, disability and anti-psychiatry movements (Goffman’s book 
Asylums played a central role in the latter). Goffman acknowledges the ‘current literary fashion’ for 
confessional writing, self-help literature and ‘advice to the stigmatised’ in which ‘deeply hidden 
sores are touched upon and examined’. 380 He cites the writing of James Baldwin in a footnote as an 
example of ‘good material of this kind in regard to Negroes’ but side-lines any of the reformist, 
consciousness-raising and/or political intentions of these ‘atrocity tales’. 381 
More than this, by transforming the authors of stigma experiences into abstract figures – 
such as ‘Negroes’ in the aforementioned footnote – Goffman mimics the dehumanising practices 
which the concept of stigmatisation describes. This nicely illustrates how stigma is actually a relation 
characterised by the relative power of ‘the normal’ to silence, constrain and misrepresent ‘the other’ 
through the attribution of stigma. The argument I am signalling here is that reconceptualising stigma 
as a political economy of dehumanisation and devaluation requires critical methods which are 
rooted not in the imagined ‘neutral’ and ‘detached’ observational methods of the social scientist, 
but in people’s knowledge of and struggles against the social structures that, as Du Bois puts it, 
produce them as ‘markedly inferior’. 382 
 
[A] The stigma of disability 
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While this chapter focuses on racial stigma (racism), I want to note at this juncture the 
understanding of stigma developed by disabled people in the early 1960s. In particular, I want to 
draw attention to the ground-breaking collection Stigma: The Experience of Disability (1966), a series 
of autobiographical essays written by physically disabled people and edited by activist and writer 
Paul Hunt. What Hunt develops, through the curation and editing of this collection of essays, is a 
multi-perspectival account of stigma from below. Indeed, in his contribution to this collection, ‘A 
Critical Condition’, Hunt argues, in a thinly veiled critique of Goffman, that stigma should not be 
theorised from the perspective of so-called normals but from ‘the uncomfortable, subversive 
position from which we act as a living reproach to any scale of values that puts attributes or 
possessions before the person’. 383 
In this essay, Hunt develops an understanding of stigma as a technology of disablement 
which stratifies people along a differential axis of in/humanity. Hunt’s concept of stigma emerged 
from his concern with the ways in which stigma legitimated the segregation of disabled people from 
mainstream society. It is stigma, he argues, which allows disabled people to be perceived as 
‘unfortunate’, ‘useless’, ‘tragic’ and ‘abnormal’ and thus undeserving of the rights or considerations 
of ‘normal’ able-bodied citizens. Indeed, Hunt composed Stigma: The Experience of Disability in a 
residential home in England where he was incarcerated against his will.  
 
All my adult life has been spent in institutions amongst people who, like myself, have severe 
and often progressive physical disabilities. We are paralysed and deformed, most of us in 
wheelchairs, either as the result of accident or of diseases like rheumatoid arthritis, multiple 
sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, cerebral palsy and polio. 384   
Hunt’s understanding of stigma as a political economy of disability resonates with the longer penal 
history of stigma, as cruel systems of classification which mark out categories of people in order to 
impede their freedom and mobility. Further, his understanding of the relationship between stigma 
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and segregation – for his was an anti-segregationist abolitionist disability politics – was directly 
inspired by the US Civil Rights Movement.  Hunt notes that the ‘injustice and brutality suffered by so 
many because of racial tension makes our troubles as disabled people look very small’, yet the 
dehumanisation of disabled people ‘stirs in me a little of the same anger’ which ‘James Baldwin 
reveals in The Fire Next Time’: a rather different reading of Baldwin and his centrality to freedom 
struggles against stigma than that suggested by Goffman.385  
James Baldwin’s The Fire Next Time was, like Goffman’s Stigma, published in 1963. It is a 
defining, personal and passionate account of the psycho-social impact of living with anti-black 
racism in mid-twentieth century America; ‘the indescribable struggle to defeat the stratagems that 
white Americans have used, and use to deny him his humanity’.386 You can hear the influence of 
Baldwin throughout Hunt’s Stigma: The Experience of Disability. As Hunt concludes ‘we who are 
disabled are deeply affected by the assumptions of our uselessness that surround us. But it is vital 
that we should not accept this devaluation of ourselves’.387  
While I cannot do justice to Hunt’s pivotal contribution to disability activism and scholarship 
here, it is important to note the foundational role his conceptualisation of stigma as a pivotal force 
in the social segregation of disabled people played in the subsequent social movements of disabled 
people. Hunt was central to the development of the ‘social model’ of disability: in which it is 
disability is understood as a social problem, rather than a consequence of individual impairments. 
The policy and attitudinal changes which followed in the wake of disabled peoples movements for 
equality have transformed millions of lives across the world. Sadly, it is Goffman’s, and not Hunt’s 
book which is the most cited text in disability studies today.388   
[A] Professor Normal 
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The problems I have identified with Goffman’s methods, his suppression of questions of power, and 
his silencing of the perspectives of the ‘stigma knowers’ he draws upon, are embedded within the 
very structure of his stigma concept. To further illustrate this, I want to return briefly to the status of 
norms in Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity. As feminist, queer and critical race 
theorists have variously elaborated, it is often by unpacking norms that we get to the crux of the 
problem, the problem here being how Goffman’s ‘neutral’ sociological account of stigma in 1963 
reproduces what Du Bois described as the ‘National Stigma’ of racism. 389 
Goffman uses the terms ‘norms’, ‘normal’ and those he designates as ‘we normals’ in 
multiple ways. At some points norms seem to designate ideals ‘and standards’; at others norms refer 
to foundational social rules that precede all social interactions; and at others, norms are imagined as 
more akin to perceptual frames – the social optics – through which we perceive others. In all these 
cases, norms describe accepted rules, conventions and ways of seeing. Indeed, Goffman is emphatic 
that ‘a necessary condition for social life is the sharing of a single set of normative expectations by 
all participants’. 390 
The normal human being is also used to mark the authorial position of Goffman, the 
‘neutral’ sociological observer, in the text, while the address ‘we normals’ is employed several times 
to address the imagined readers of his book. What ‘we’, his readers, are invited to imagine we have 
in common with the authorial ‘I’ is a shared normality. So while, as noted above, Goffman’s account 
of stigma draws on the experiential knowledge of stigmatised people, he mediates this stigma 
knowledge through the perspective of ‘we normals’. As he writes, ‘norms regarding social identity 
pertain to the kinds of role repertoires or profiles we feel it permissible for any given individual to 
sustain’.391   
Goffman justifies grounding his definition of stigma in ‘the notion of the “normal human 
being”’ by arguing, firstly, that this is ‘the basic imaginary’ through which ‘laymen currently conceive 
of themselves’, and secondly, that we live in rational societies characterised by ‘the tendency of 
large-scale bureaucratic organizations, such as the nation state, to treat all members in some 
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respects as equal’.392 Yet as he wrote this millions of American citizens were explicitly contesting ‘the 
facts’ of this equality, and ‘the forms’ that ‘a normal human being’ could take. As we have 
established, Goffman was aware of ongoing social and political challenges to white normativity 
(white supremacy), but refused to dwell on the politics of stigma. 
Unsurprisingly, and perhaps accurately in the context of the United States in the early 1960s, 
Goffman reveals that the singular norm he is writing about (and from the perspective of) is ‘that of 
the young, married, white, urban, northern’ male: ‘There is only one complete unblushing male in 
America’, he argues, and ‘[e]very American male tends to look out upon the world’ from the 
perspective of heterosexual able-bodied white masculinity. 393  Goffman describes this white male 
norm as the ‘general identity-values’ of American society, adding that this ideal identity casts a 
‘shadow on the encounters encountered everywhere in daily living’. 394  
Goffman doesn’t reveal the figure of heterosexual able-bodied white masculinity as the 
measure of ‘general identity-values’ until the reader is reaching the final chapters of Stigma. 
However, once the abstract normal collapses into the particularity of this figure, he grants us a key 
with which to unravel ‘the normal perspective’ through and from which he has produced his account 
of stigma. Given the strictures of this ideal human, people’s potential to fail this norm, and be 
stigmatised as a consequence, is extensive. Goffman’s cast of ‘stigma figures’ includes the physically 
disabled, people with ‘blemishes of individual character’ such as ‘weak will, domineering or 
unnatural passions, treacherous, mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, 
homosexuality, unemployment, suicidal attempts’, and  extending to ‘radical political behavior’ and 
those tainted by what he terms ‘tribal stigma of race, nation, and religion’.395  Perhaps Goffman was 
reflecting on his own Jewish ethnicity, but it seems more likely he was reflecting on the stigma of 
being black in the United States, when he added that ‘tribal stigma … can be transmitted through 
lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family’. 396   
Goffman’s figures for the racially stigmatised include the ‘educated northern Negro’ who 
finds themselves mistaken for a Southern negro, ‘urban lower class Negroes’, ‘an apprehended 
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Negro’, ‘black skinned Negroes who have never passed publicly’ (it is unclear here if Goffman means 
people who fail to pass as white, or as white enough to be considered fully human), and ‘a passing 
Negro and the white girl he wants to marry’.397 Goffman also comments on how skin-lightening 
products are fraudulently sold as a remedy for the stigma of black skin, and reflects on the 
ambivalent social position of ‘the light-skinned Negro’ who ‘can never be sure what the attitude of a 
new acquaintance will be’.398  
While Goffman suggests that many stigmas can be successfully concealed or managed, he 
reflects on the fact that visibly racialised minorities and members of the lower class ‘who quite 
noticeably bear the mark of their status in their speech, appearance, and manner, and who, relative 
to the public institutions of our society find they are second class citizens’ are ‘all likely on occasion 
to find themselves functioning as stigmatized individuals’.399   
For sure, the version of white normativity which Goffman depicts tallies with accounts such 
as that of W. E. B. Du Bois, who had argued two decades earlier in Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward 
an Autobiography of a Race Concept that being black in America is to be ‘badged’ by colour, to be 
marked out ‘for discrimination and insult’.400 However, as Angela Davis argues, living as a person 
racialised as black in the early 1960s didn’t mean being stigmatised ‘on occasion’; it meant daily 
confrontation ‘with the realities of racism, not simply as individual acts dictated by attitudinal bias’ 
but with an entire society organised through ‘racial terrorism’. 401 Further, unlike his black 
sociological elders and peers, Goffman offers no account of why ‘to be unconditionally “American” is 
to be white, and to be black is a misfortune’, or how historical norms of white supremacy were being 
challenged as he wrote his book. 402 
Moreover, we reach a major contradiction in Goffman’s account of racial stigma, when he 
suggests that there is a natural difference between what he terms the ‘congenital’ sign of skin colour 
and imposed social signs such as ‘a brand mark or maiming’. 403 Goffman is here not only illustrating 
existing racism in US society but also normalising racial difference as a ‘fact’ – a consequent of 
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deeper genetic human difference, rather than an outcome of histories of slavery and colonialism. A 
history which included, as we have seen, the penal stigmatisation of black lives through ‘branding 
and maiming’, physical stigmata which were later displaced by the stigma of the colour line. Indeed, 
Goffman’s argument that the ‘congenital’ fact of blackness is ‘a permanent part of the person’ 
seems to contradict his argument that ‘the normal’ and ‘the stigmatized’ are social roles – and that 
anybody might find themselves in either role in a given (interactional) context. 404  
For Goffman, blackness is a stigma which is it impossible to erase: a ‘stigma of inferiority 
that resides not merely in the label or designation of race’, but is imagined as ‘embodied in black 
presence’.405 In this regard, Goffman’s figure of the normal human doesn’t only describe existing 
social norms but reproduces what Lewis Gordon describes as ‘the in-advance claim of the white 
world to human status’. 406 Indeed if, as Goffman argues, ‘we believe the person with a stigma is not 
quite human’, then black readers of this book will find that they are ‘not structurally regarded as 
human beings’ in the context of white society, and further that this dehumanised positionality is 
their permanent fate.407 
For many sociologists, what is appealing about Goffman’s conceptualisation of stigma is 
precisely that it is relational, contextual, contingent and historically malleable. However, by taking 
Goffman ‘at his word’, I have demonstrated that one of the limitations of his account is that he uses 
norms to obfuscate and naturalise historical arrangements of power. Further, while Goffman 
stresses that the ‘psychological price’ of stigmatisation is ‘living a life that can be collapsed at any 
moment’, he offers neither compassion nor space for imagining alternatives to the system of 
confining and discriminating norms he describes.408 Rather, he argues that normal and stigmatised 
people should ‘accept’ social norms. As he tersely puts it, ‘Not doing so, one could hardly get on with 
the business at hand; one could hardly have any business at hand.’ 409  That this is a political 
recommendation is most evident in one of the final sections of his book, when Goffman makes a 
series of proposals about how individuals might manage living with stigma. This is one of the few 
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places in the book that Goffman addresses the stigmatised rather than ‘we normals’. His proposals 
to those suffering with stigma are conservative, pragmatic and, given the relational character of his 
theory of stigma, oddly individualistic.  
‘Normals’, Goffman reassures the stigmatised, ‘really mean no harm’, and ‘should therefore 
be tactfully helped to act nicely’.410  He argues that the stigmatised should not contest the norms 
that produce stigma, but instead develop strategies of stigma management in social settings where 
stigma might arise. Goffman’s proposals for the stigmatised include ‘information management’, ‘the 
arts of impression management’, employing strategies of ‘passing and covering’, adopting a position 
of ‘tolerance’ and refraining ‘from pushing claims for acceptance much past the point normals find 
comfortable’.411  As he writes, ‘When the stigmatized person finds that normals have difficulty in 
ignoring his failing, he should try to help them and the social situation by conscious efforts to reduce 
tension’.412  In the context of Goffman’s larger oeuvre, we might understand these proposals on the 
management of stigma as dramaturgical – in the sense that they offer suggestions to the stigmatised 
about how to play an assigned social role which minimises the discomfort of ‘normals’, and in doing 
so support, rather than challenge, the relations of power inscribed in social norms.  
Further, while Goffman cautions that the stigmatised should not ‘ingratiatingly act out 
before normals the full dance of bad qualities imputed to his kind’, he also advises they should play 
the parts society has assigned to them.413 To this end he quotes the Norwegian writer Finn Carling 
who, reflecting on his own experience of living with cerebral palsy, notes: 
…the cripple has to play the part of the cripple, just as many women have to be what the 
men expect them to be, just women; and the Negroes often have to act like clowns in front 
of the ‘superior’ white race, so that the white man shall not be frightened by his black 
brother.414   
What Goffman suggests is that people racialised as black should act in white society in ways which 
protect white people from what Patricia Williams terms ‘the ferocious mythology of blackness… as 
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the embodiment of inferiority’.415 In order to decolonise Goffman’s stigma concept, it is imperative 
that we question why he is so seemingly invested in maintaining an arrangement of normal–stigma 
relations in which only people who are socially marked as white can be normal. We also have to 
question why Goffman remained so empathically silent about the struggles against anti-black racism 
which precisely sought to challenge white normativity by disrupting racist norms of social 
interaction. Struggles which were unfolding all around him, including in his own classroom. 
 
 
[A] ‘A black boy hacked into a murderous lesson’  
 
Reading Goffman’s Stigma through the lens of black freedom struggles, it is possible to discern ‘the 
strategies of power that are immanent’ within his stigma theory.416  In effect, by arguing for the 
management of stigma – that is, for its pacification – Goffman normalises stigma and conceals ‘its 
violent underpinning and periodic atrocities’.417  From this perspective, Goffman’s stigma concept ‘is 
not innocent of politics, but on the contrary, provides epistemic authority’ for the suppression of 
black humanity.418   
To take just one example, the Greensboro Four and many others amongst the black 
students, who would follow them in staging sit-in protests across the segregated Southern states, 
were haunted by the lynching of 14-year-old Emmett Till in Mississippi in 1955; indeed, Joyce Ladner 
coined this generation of civil rights activists ‘the Emmett Till generation’.419 Born and raised in 
Chicago, Till was visiting relatives in the small town of Money, when he allegedly wolf whistled at a 
white woman in a Grocery store.420 Seemingly unaware of social norms and conventions, and ‘the 
subtleties of the Jim Crow Mississippi code of racial etiquette’, for this crime of flirtation he was 
abducted, tortured, maimed and shot.421  His body was later recovered from the Tallahatchie River. 
Till’s mother insisted her son’s mutilated corpse be displayed in an open coffin in order, in 
her words, to ‘rip the sheets off the state of Mississippi’.422 However, the terrible violent truth 
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exposed by the circulation of photographs of Till’s disfigured body, and the later acquittal of his 
killers by an all-white jury, left many black teenagers feeling fearful, vulnerable, angry and 
despairing. For this generation of young black citizens, images of Till’s body functioned as both an 
image of injustice and, as Audre Lorde put it, as a ‘veiled warning’ – a ‘black boy hacked into a 
murderous lesson’.423   
The death of Till, the publicity surrounding his death and the acquittal of his killers reveal 
how white normativity as a ‘general identity-value’ cast its long shadow over black lives in the 1960s. 
Franklin McCain described Till’s death as a revelation which left his 15-year-old self in a suicidal 
depression: ‘there seemed no prospect for dignity or respect as a young black man’. 424 This was a 
context in which black people daily negotiated interactional settings where not playing your socially 
assigned role as a racially stigmatised person, failing to manage your racial stigma appropriately by 
reducing tensions in your interactions with white people, could led to your death. As Jibreel Khazan 
recalled, this murder revealed ‘what happened if we broke the code. If we spoke out of turn, we too 
could die like Emmett Till’.425 The haunting of this generation by the lynching of Emmett Till 
illustrates how stigma functions to confine, segregate, and subjugate black lives. However, it also 
reveals how the violence of being stigmatised can become politicised and act as a catalyst for social 
change.  
Joyce Ladner, a leading civil rights activist, describes how as a teenager she kept a scrapbook 
of cuttings about Emmett Till which she would regularly weep over in her bedroom. As she states: 
‘That was the image for our generation that galvanised our generation, we all saw that image on the 
front cover of Jet magazine…Every black southerner for sure had seen that photograph and it was 
like the clarion call for action…when we got older we were going to avenge his death.’ 426 Ladner 
would later bring this activism to bear on the discipline of sociology itself, laying bear, in her edited 




[A] Stigma as struggle 
Jodi Melamed has detailed the ways in which seemingly neutral or objective forms of liberal 
knowledge production, typified by mid-twentieth-century social science, operate to naturalise and 
institutionalise existing relations of power.427 These epistemologies work through producing and 
classifying human differences in ways which secure particular hierarchies of human value. By way of 
contrast, black sociologists of stigma, from Du Bois onwards, developed historical and contingent 
understanding of racial differences as forged within histories of slavery and colonialism, and 
cemented by the monstrous abnormality of ideologies of white supremacy.  
Resituating Goffman’s stigma concept within the context of black freedom struggles against ‘the 
legal stigma of second class citizenship’ has revealed how his understanding of stigma proceeds from 
what was then, as now, a deeply contested understanding of white prototypicality and black 
inhumanity.428  While Goffman’s stigma concept uncouples the perception of black skin as a stigma 
from histories of slavery, black freedom struggles remind us that racism is an historical practice 
‘centuries in the making’.429 A regime of seeing, a ‘stigma-optics’, crafted in order to deny black 
people personhood.  
The sociologist Karen Fields and the historian Barbara Fields describe this process as ‘racecraft’ – 
namely the ‘trick of transforming racism into race, leaving black persons in view while removing 
white persons from the stage. To spectators deceived by the trick, segregation seemed to be a 
property of black people, not something white people imposed on them’.430 By insisting on their 
equal humanity the freedom fighters of the 1960s sought to denaturalise stigma, expose the race-
trick, and in doing ‘win recognition as human outside of the restrictive terms set by the racial 
order’.431  As Stokely Carmichael put it in his ‘Black Power’ speech to students at Berkeley in October 
1966, ‘we are now engaged in a psychological struggle in this country… The question is, “How can 
white society begin to move to see black people as human beings?”’432 
By targeting the interaction order, freedom fighters made visible the concrete ways in which 
white supremacy invaded ‘the lives of Black people on an infinite variety of levels’.433 As the radical 
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civil rights activist James Boggs noted, this was unlike the preceding Civil Rights Movement of the 
1950s in that ‘it aimed at creating the issue, provoking it’. 434 In order to challenge what Du Bois 
termed ‘the stigmata of degradation’ young people broke the social rules around segregation and 
refused to play the roes assigned to them.435 Reflecting on what motivated him to join the sit-in 
movement as a teenager in 1960, Stokely Carmichael recalls how: ‘when I saw those kids on TV, 
getting back up on the lunch counter stools after being knocked off them, sugar in their eyes, catsup 
in their hair—well, something happened to me. Suddenly I was burning.’ 436 As Abdelmalek Sayad 
notes: 
Black American sociology and colonial sociology teach that, as a general rule, one form of revolt, 
and undoubtedly the primary form of revolt against stigmatization … consists in reclaiming the 
stigma, which then becomes an emblem of [resistance].437 
 
Through acts of stigma dramaturgy, the Civil Rights Movement publicised, revolted against and 
transformed the stigma of blackness into black power.  
 
<A> Stigma after Goffman 
 
In 1963, the year Goffman’s Stigma was published, the pioneering black sociologist and activist W. E. 
B. Du Bois died in exile in Accra, Ghana – the US government had confiscated his passport. After Du 
Bois’ death, ‘Maya Angelou led a group of Americans and Ghanaians to the U.S. embassy in Accra, 
carrying torches and placards reading “Down with American Apartheid” and “America, a White 
Man's Heaven and a Black Man's Hell”’. 438 A day later, at the March on Washington, Roy Wilkins, 
leader of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), led a minute’s 
silence in remembrance of Du Bois. As he stated to the hundreds of thousands of marchers, ‘his was 
the voice that was calling to you to gather here today in this cause. If you want to read something 
that applies to 1963 go back and get a volume of The Souls of Black Folk by Du Bois, published in 
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1903’.439  While Goffman didn’t reference him, Du Bois was the first theorist of stigma power, 
identifying not only ‘the problem of the Twentieth Century as the problem of the color-line’, but 
detailing how this line was enforced, reproduced and legitimated by the ‘systematic humiliation’ of 
black lives.440 
As Les Back and Maggie Tate have argued, ‘Sociological segregation weakens the field as a 
whole, not only for those to whom it offers a racially unequal place at the table of ideas. It 
diminishes the intellectual lifeblood of the discipline itself and its capacity to comprehend the key 
problems of the twenty-first century’.441 When Goffman was teaching at Berkeley this segregation 
was challenged by black students (and this challenge to the racial segregation of knowledge 
continues today in the global ‘Why is My Curriculum White?’ movement). In the spring of 1961, a 
group of Berkeley students formed a reading group, the Afro-American Association, which crafted an 
alternative ‘Black Curriculum’ featuring the work of scholars such as Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, James 
Baldwin, E. Franklin Frazier and Kwame Nkrumah.442  
This reading group soon extended their activities into the wider community, running a 
weekly radio programme that attracted other Bay area college and university students, including 
Huey Newton and Bobby Seale who went on to form the Black Panthers. At the same time, in 
segregated black universities in the Southern states, such as Tougaloo College in Mississippi, 
sociology students such as Anne Moody, Joyce Ladner and their professors became active 
participants in the sit-in movements. Indeed, Jibreel Khazan of the Greensboro Four was also a 
sociology major. Together these students, activists and scholars were busy producing sociological 
knowledge about stigma, and developing anti-stigma strategies, which included the psychologically 
reparative work of protest itself.  
Of central importance to these black freedom struggles was Carmichael and Hamilton’s anti-
stigma concept of ‘Black Power’, which reconfigured racial stigma into ‘a revolutionary emotion’: 
‘We aim to define and encourage a new consciousness among black people’, they wrote, and 
facilitate ‘a sense of peoplehood: pride, rather than shame, in blackness’.443 The contemporary Black 
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Lives Matter movement marks another resurgent moment in the long history of resistance against 
the stigma politics of racial capitalism in the United States – a period Michelle Alexander has coined 
‘The New Jim Crow’. 444 
Despite the sophisticated understanding of racial stigma developed over a hundred years of 
black sociological thought, the conceptualisation of stigma in the social sciences has largely ignored 
this body of knowledge. 445 In seeking to historically resituate Goffman’s original account, this 
chapter has drawn on a wide range of interlocutors working in a black sociological tradition, 
including Mario Biondi, James Boggs, Stokley Carmichael, Patricia Hill Collins, Angela Davis, 
Kimberley Dotson, W.E. B. Du Bois, Roderick Ferguson, Frantz Fanon, the Greensboro Four, Paul 
Gilroy, Lewis Gordon, Charles Hamilton, Harry Haywood, Robin Kelley, Joyce Lamont, Manning 
Marable, Zine Magubane, Anne Moody, Cedric Robinson, Hortense Spillers, Cornell West, Patricia 
Williams and Gary Younge. The account of stigma that emerges through this black genealogy of 
stigma-thinking challenges the individualism of psychological approaches to social problems, 
exposes the limits of Goffman’s white normative perspective, and troubles ‘race neutral’ forms of 
interactional analysis. What this scholarship offers in place of a Goffman-esque approach, are rich 
historical, political and economic conceptualisations of stigma as technologies of de-humanisation, 
and stigma as a form of power that has been collectively resisted from below.  
It is the argument of this chapter that bringing racism and anti-racist scholarship to the front 
and centre of sociological understandings of stigma enriches its utility as an analytic for 
understanding other forms of ‘dehumanisation’ – such as castist, classist, disablist and misogynist 





[CH] 3. The Stigma Machine of the Border 
 
‘People no more fasten the stigma of race upon themselves than cattle sear the brand into 
their own flesh.’  
Barbara Fields and Karen Fields, 2012 446 
‘Why they put a number on me? Why they call me by a number? We are humans. We have names. 
Even they wrote numbers on small children’s arms.’  M., refugee from Syria, 2015.447 
 
During 2015, an unprecedented 1.3 million people applied for asylum in the 28 member states of the 
European Union, Norway and Switzerland. This was ‘nearly double the previous high-water mark of 
approximately 700,000 [asylum] applications in 1992, after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union’.448  Those seeking protection in Europe were largely fleeing wars, 
conflicts and political oppression in Syria (over 50 per cent), Iraq, Afghanistan and Eritrea.  Some 
arrived via Balkan land routes, but these borders were soon blocked and the vast majority made 
treacherous Mediterranean Sea crossings. An estimated 3,771 people drowned in the Mediterranean 
in 2015 alone, evidence of the life and death stakes of this journey. In the summer of 2015, 
newspapers and news websites across the world were filled with photographs of drowned children 
and people desperately paddling towards shore on overloaded dinghies.  
In response to the growing humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean, the German Office for 
Migration and Refugees announced on the social media site Twitter on 25 August 2015 that they 
were ‘no longer enforcing #Dublin procedures for Syrian citizens’.449 What this meant for Syrian 
refugees on the ground was that if they could navigate a route to Germany, they would be 
guaranteed at least temporary leave to remain. This triggered ‘a million-man march through Europe’, 
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as hundreds of thousands of people caught in dire conditions at camps and transit zones across 
Europe’s southern borders made their way north by foot, car, bus and train.450 It was amidst this 
intensifying human and political drama that shortly after midnight on 1 September 2015, two trains 
drew to a halt in Břeclav, a town in Czechia (the Czech Republic) close to the border with Austria and 
Slovakia. 
 
[A] Scene one: Břeclav railway station, Břeclav, South Moravia, Czechia, 1 September 2015 
At Midnight on 1 September 2015, a squad of Czech Alien Police boarded two trains in Břeclav and 
forcibly removed 214 people (115 men, 38 women and 61 children). The first train had arrived from 
Vienna shortly before midnight, the second shortly after midnight from Budapest, both bound for 
Germany. Czech government officials described the passengers it removed from these two trains as 
‘214 illegal migrants’. The vast majority, over 90 per cent, were refugees from Syria. Many of them 
had survived treacherous sea-crossings from Turkey to Greek islands and were just hours away from 
their German destination when the trains were intercepted by police, who moved through the 
carriages checking people’s documents. All of those without an EU passport or a travel visa that 
allowed them to be on Czech territory were removed. The state-owned Czech Railways had informed 
the Czech Alien Police that large numbers of ‘migrants’ were on the train, which is why the police 
were waiting for them in such numbers at Břeclav – along with journalists, for as we shall see this 
was a politically orchestrated event. After escorting people from the trains, some in handcuffs, the 
police assembled people on the platforms and proceeded to use indelible pens to ink numbers on 
their arms and wrists.  
Kateřina Rendlová, a spokeswoman for the Czech Alien Police, stated that the inking of 
refugees was a means of keeping a record of family members. ‘We also write the code of the train 
they have arrived on so that we know which country we should return them to within the 
readmission system,’ she said, adding, ‘We used to put the numbers on a piece of paper but they 
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kept throwing them away.’451 The refugees were then packed onto buses destined for temporary 
camps in local school gymnasiums in south Moravia, where officials said they would be processed, 
before being transferred to remote rural detention centres in Zastávka near Brno, Vyšní Lhoty, north 
Moravia, and Bělá-Jezová, central Bohemia.  
[Insert Figure 3 near here] 
Figure 3: ‘Inking Refugees’: refugees being numbered by Czech border police at Břeclav train station, 
South Moravia, Czech Republic, 1  September 2015, reprinted with copyright permission.   
Events at Břeclav were captured by a Czech News Agency photojournalist, Igor Zehl, and were posted 
on the Associated Press website. There was one photograph in particular which caught the attention 
of international news editors, an image of a small child sitting on his mother’s lap, his face folded into 
her body, while a Czech policewoman wearing blue plastic gloves writes numbers on his arm. This 
image was printed in newspapers, published on news websites and shared across social media 
platforms around the world (see Figure 3). This photograph and the news stories that accompanied it 
aroused an international outcry from human rights organisations for the disturbing associations it 
elicited with the badging and tattooing of Jews during the Second World War. As Ruth Dureghello, a 
Jewish community leader in Rome, explained: 
It is an image we cannot bear, which recalls to mind the procedure at the entrance of Nazi 
extermination camps, when millions of men, women and children were marked with a 
number, like animals, and they were sent to die.452 
These allusions to the Nazi holocaust were not lost on far-right activists. Adam Bartoš, the leader of 
the fascistic Czech National Democracy Movement (český nacionalista), used Facebook to call for 
‘the Břeclav intruders’ to ‘be concentrated in Theresienstadt’, a former Nazi labour and 
concentration camp near Prague.453 As Jan Čulík, editor of the independent Czech news website 
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Britské listy and a scholar of Czech society detailed, these views were symptomatic of rising anti-
refugee sentiments in the Czech public sphere in this period.454 Indeed, it was not just extremist 
minorities but establishment figures, such as the Czech President Miloš Zeman, who crafted 
‘mendacious anti-refugee narratives’.455 As Zeman stated in September 2015: ‘I am profoundly 
convinced that we are facing an organised invasion and not a spontaneous movement of 
refugees.’456 Zeman warned the Czech public that refugees were ‘Muslim invaders’ who might bring 
infectious diseases into the nation and could harbour sleeper cells of Islamic terrorists.457  The fear 
these kinds of official political statements generated was apparent in local responses to the 
detention of refugees in Břeclav.  
On 8 September, 350 people from Břeclav attended a meeting convened by police, the 
Mayor and representatives from the Government Ministry of the Interior.458  This meeting was called 
to allay the fears of local citizens in the face of ‘the refugee invasion’. So many turned up to the 
public meeting that officials had relocate it from the town hall to a local cinema. Officials reassured 
locals that migrants would be segregated from any contact from local people and policing measures 
would be robust. ‘The conversation’, reported a local journalist, ‘was refined and quiet. Only 
occasionally did the audience shout out statements such as: “It's too late. Europe has turned black.”’ 
459 
[a] ‘migrants are like cockroaches’ 
 
I have researched issues of asylum, detention and immigration for over a decade, but began working 
on this chapter during the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe. In the years which have immediately 
followed, state practices of bordering, detention, incarceration have intensified around the world. 
Indeed, the concentration of people, in prisons, cages and camps, and the expulsion of people from 
state borders, is a signal feature of the current global authoritarian turn  - a turn which has 
irrevocably shredded post-World War II international level agreements around human rights and 
particularly the rights of people with uncertain legal status, stateless people and refugees. This shift 
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has been most visible in the United States were since 2017 there has been a significant increase in 
‘mass illegal pushbacks of asylum-seekers at the US–Mexico border’, with many ‘thousands of illegal 
family separations’, the deliberate and purposeful infliction of extreme suffering and ill-treatment, 
including torture, and the ‘arbitrary and indefinite detention of asylum-seekers, without parole, 
constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (ill-treatment) which is 
absolutely prohibited in international law.’460 The flagrant disregard for international law in 
ostensibly liberal democratic states has arguably legitimated abhorrent and inhuman practices of 
detention, torture and expulsion elsewhere in the world.  
 
Citizenship regimes around the world are becoming more punitive and exclusionary, for example it is 
estimated that 12 million people are currently stateless, one third of whom are children. People 
without citizenship live in a state of non-personhood without recourse to basic human rights or 
governmental protections. Globally, the number of refuges is also rising, in 2017 it was estimated 
that 65.6 million people were living in contexts of forced displaced, as a consequence of violence 
and persecution, wars and conflicts and human rights violations. 
 
It is in this broader context, that this chapter examines the amplification of stigma politics which 
accompanies the current authoritarian turn. For the mass breaching of international law and human 
rights regimes we are currently witnessing across the world operates in tandem with, and is 
lubricated by, stigmatising representational practices which involve the extreme dehumanisation of 
people. For it is only when publics no longer see those seeking refuge as human beings, that state 
governments can openly and unashamedly engage practices of segregation, incarceration, expulsion 
and torture. The forms of dehumanisation this requires pivot on racism, that is on the radical 
devaluation of human lives through racist representations of non-citizens and unwanted people as 
less than human—that is as waste populations. What I mean by this is that the institution of policies 
in places such as Europe which, for example, have now made it illegal for humanitarian groups to aid 
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and rescue those drowning Mediterranean Sea,  require the activation of stigma power. This 
involves the crafting,  and the accumulation over time, of stories and visual depictions which 
transform flesh and blood humans in objects and things. For example, in response to desperate 
scenes of overcrowded boats in the Mediterranean Sea in 2015, the British far-right journalist and 
media celebrity Katie Hopkins published a newspaper column titled ‘Rescue boats? I’d use gunships 
to stop migrants’, stating that  ‘migrants are like cockroaches … I don’t care. Show me pictures of 
coffins show me bodies floating in water, play violins and show me skinny people looking sad. I still 
don’t care.’461  
 
The resurgence of public racism on the scale witnessed in Europe during the 2015 refugee crisis 
doesn’t emerge from nowhere. Racism is historical, that is, it draws its ‘narrative energies’ from 
existing grids of associations, from ‘semantic and iconic folds’ that are deeply etched in the collective 
memories of people and places.462 As the UN high commissioner for human rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al 
Hussein noted in 2015, the use by commentators such as Hopkin’s of words such as ‘cockroaches’ to 
describe refugees arriving in Europe invokes past racial genocides. As Hussein reminded us, the term 
cockroach was widely employed by the Nazi regime in mid-twentieth century Europe Nazi to 
dehumanise Jews, and was also used by the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. In short, 
this choice of word was a deliberate incitement to racial hatred which cited previous rituals of 
dehumanisation, which had been employed as precursors to ethnic and racial genocide.  
 
This chapter unfolds from the scene at Břeclav in 2015. In what follows, I dig into this event in order 
to understand better ‘the rush of past racial “debris”’ it provoked, and what we can learn from this 
about the states we are in and the fascistic return we face.463 One argument of this chapter is that 
the genealogy of penal stigma examined in Chapter One haunts the images of refugees being written 
upon at Břeclav train station. As Stuart Hall put it, racism is ‘a badge, a token, a sign’, a political 
practice of classification.464 As we saw in the previous chapters, the badge of race has long been 
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employed as an othering practice, a colouring device, to dehumanise slaves, colonial subjects, non-
citizens, refugees and migrants.465 Racism is ‘a system of marks’ a mechanism which ‘outlines space 
in order to assign forced residence or to close off borders.’466 In what follows, I hold to a reading of 
stigma as material practices of dehumanisation to further examine the relationship between 
stigmatisation, racism, dehumanisation and practices of enclosure and expulsion.   
 
[A] Europe’s racist crisis 
 
This chapter focuses on events in Czechia in 2015. Czechia is a nation of 10.5 million people which 
joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 as part of a group of former communist states, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia, which are known collectively as the Visegrád group. From the early 1990s the 
Visegrád states were transitioned from Soviet-style command economies to neoliberal market 
economies. This process involved the implementation of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, a policy 
package involving rapid privatisation of state-owned infrastructure and assets and the liberalisation 
of labour and financial markets.467  This ‘shock treatment’ injected economic inequality into the 
region: wage levels collapsed, workers’ rights and welfare provisions were eroded, public services 
and infrastructures were privatised.468  
While the availability of cheap credit initially cushioned the impact of neoliberal social and 
economic reforms, there has been increasing public disillusionment with the ‘so-called “freedom” 
and capitalism’ promised by EU membership.469 This disenchantment ‘with the ascetic catching-up 
ideology’ intensified in the wake of the North Atlantic Financial crisis in 2008, and there was a 
political shift away from democratic pro-EU parties which embraced neoliberal reforms to 
nationalist right-wing parties. As Jodi Dean argues, the inequalities and insecurities introduced by 
‘globalized neoliberal capitalism’ are managed politically through ‘racist, nationalist 
ethnocentrism’.470 Visegrád politicians harnessed the animosities generated by growing economic 
inequalities in the region to nationalist fantasies of ‘ethnic security’ through ‘border security’. As 
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Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán announced in 2014, ‘the new state that we are building is an 
illiberal state, a non-liberal state.’471   
As the humanitarian crisis at Europe’s borders deepened in 2015, right-wing Visegrád 
politicians and public commentators began to craft a special geopolitical role for the region as a 
buffer zone against which (Western) Europe could be protected against what was characterised as 
an unstoppable catastrophic flood of (Muslim) migrants entering Europe. A rush of fence-building 
began on Eastern borders, the opening of new camps to detain migrants, the formation by neo-Nazis 
of ‘human walls’ against refugees on state borders and the formation of armed citizen militia groups, 
such as Hungary’s state-funded ‘border hunters’ and a 2,500 strong Czech vigilante border militia. In 
2015 alone, the Hungarian government ‘invested more than 100 million euros on razor-wire fencing 
and border controls’, transforming itself into what Amnesty International described as ‘a refugee 
protection free zone’.472 Explicit in these regional securitisation programmes was the idea that 
misguided liberal Western European political leaders failed to see the ‘genocidal’ consequences of 
granting refugee to Middle Eastern, African and/or Muslim refugees. As former Czech President 
Václav Klaus stated, as he launched a national online petition titled ‘Against Immigration’ in 2015: ‘if 
Europe wants to commit suicide by accepting an unlimited number of refugees, let them do it but 
not with our consent’.473   
 
[A] ‘A genocide against white people’ 
In Czechia, a populist narrative emerged which, drawing on histories of German and Communist 
occupation, imagined the Czech people as engaged in an existential struggle against invading ‘foreign 
hordes’. This struggle was explicitly framed as a race war. For example, a news headline on 3 
September 2015 quoted Czech Sociologist, Petr Hampl, stating, ‘We have the right to deal with the 
refugees as though they were aggressors. The traitors of the Czech nation are helping them to 
exterminate us like the whites have exterminated the Red Indians’.474 An editorial in the Czech 
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broadsheet newspaper Lidové Noviny, penned by ‘expert ethnologist’ Mnislav Zelený-Atapana and 
titled, ‘Is a genocide against whites next for Europe?’, argued that: ‘Mrs Merkel and those like her are 
basically undertaking an artificial mixing of the races in which the white race will be gradually 
liquidated and we Europeans will become black or brown. This is a genocide against white people.’  475 
These ethno-nationalist sentiments spilled onto the streets.  
On 12 September 2015, thousands gathered in Prague to protest against refugee arrivals, 
one of many such demonstrations across the country and wider Visegrád region that year. Video 
footage of the Prague protest captures a carnival atmosphere, with young people and families with 
children carrying Czech flags and holding up banners with the demands ‘Send them back!’ and 
‘Protect the borders’. Many wore T-Shirts and face paint adorned with anti-Islamic and anti-refugee 
slogans, and crowds chanted in unison, ‘Fuck off, Islam.’  
While there were also pro-refugee marches and campaigns in Czechia, sustained and 
organised resistance to the rise of populist proto-fascist politics has proved difficult. The Visegrád 
states have no significantly large non-white or migrant populations, except for a highly persecuted 
Roma minority. The once substantial and vibrant Jewish communities in the Visegrád region either 
emigrated or were murdered in the Nazi holocaust. For example, there were only an estimated 2,000 
Muslims living in the Czechia in 2015– a fact which led Selma Muhič Dizdarevič, an assistant 
professor at Charles University in Prague, to describe the alarming increase in levels of anti-Muslim 
racism in the country as ‘Islamophobia without Muslims’.476   
 
[A] ‘No Camp, no Camp’ 
 
It is also important to note that Visegrád states are transition rather than destination countries for 
refugees. For example, in 2015 Czechia granted refugee protection to a mere 71 people, out of a 
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total of only 1,525 asylum applications. Indeed, these are states that habitually record negative net 
migration rates, as young people seeking higher wages migrate West. National policies in the region 
are designed to deter refugees and migrant workers, despite growing labour shortages. The small 
numbers of refugees straying onto Czech territory in the summer of 2015 were seeking only to cross 
the border. In practical terms, refugees and migrants are unlikely to be able to speak Czech or to 
have family, friends or other contacts to induce them to remain.  
What this tells us is that the inking and detention of the refugees at Břeclav was 
orchestrated political theatre. The refusal to let refugees continue unmolested on their journeys was 
an opportunity to demonstrate control over national borders. In particular, the timing of the 
detention of the refugees at Břeclav was designed to add weight to a Visegrád-wide negotiating 
position on a proposed EU quota system that would require states to accept an agreed number of 
Syrian refugees. A matter of hours after the detention of refugees at Břeclav, the Czech Interior 
Minister stated to journalists that he was interested in negotiating a ‘simplified procedure’ with 
Berlin, which might allow refugees to travel unmolested across the Czech territory on the 
understanding that any quota scheme would be ‘unacceptable to the Czech government.’477 
That events in Břeclav on 1 September 2015 were political theatre was underscored by 
similar events on a much larger scale in neighbouring Hungary when, on 3 September, the Hungarian 
government abruptly cancelled all international train services to Western Europe. Thousands of 
refugees heading for Germany were trapped at central Keleti train station in Budapest, effectively 
held hostage by Viktor Orbán’s government. International journalists and news crews captured the 
scenes of despair at Keleti; people left with useless train tickets, families sleeping on the streets, and 
a lack of food, water and sanitary provisions.  
The chaos at Keleti train station saw several hundred people set off on foot to Austria, a 
walk of 110 miles. Another group of approximately 500 people were eventually herded onto a single 
train which they were told was heading to Germany, indeed it ‘prominently featured a German 
flag).’ 478 In actuality this train was destined for a migrant detention camp near the town of Bicske, a 
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mere 20 miles from Budapest. In scenes, again recorded by international journalists, hundreds of 
riot police boarded the train at Bicske and attempted to force people to disembark. British journalist 
James Mates described how the refugees pleaded with journalists and television crews not to leave 
Bicske train station, and chanted ‘no camp, no camp’ from the train windows.479 A siege ensued, in 
which hundreds of people attempted to break through police blockades at the train station in order 
to avoid detention and walk to the Austrian border. Some refugees succeeded in fleeing Bicske train 
station, but a 50-year-old man died in one escape attempt when he fell and hit his head on the train 
tracks.  
 
[A] Genealogies of racism in Europe  
As Magdalena Nowicka argues, ‘Eastern Europe remains a blind spot in theorizing racism in 
Europe’.480 Even though the worst atrocities of the Second World War took place on Nazi-occupied 
Central and Eastern European soil (often with the collaboration of local populations), under 
communist rule there was no acknowledgement of historical state racisms. Even while the material 
remnants of a more multicultural past were hidden in plain sight – for example in formerly Jewish 
neighbourhoods and empty synagogues – neither the genocides that took place during the Nazi 
occupation, nor the racial classification of Eastern Europeans as ‘Slavs’, nor the expulsion of German-
speaking citizens after the war, was understood through the lens of racism. Further, while under 
post-War state socialism, racism continued to be practised against minorities, notably Roma 
populations, racism wasn’t acknowledged as a social problem.  
While the occlusion of Nazi-era racial genocide from official histories of Eastern European 
states has been partially revised since the fall of the Iron Curtain, this process of remembering has 
been complicated by the ways in which ethnic forms of nationalism became associated with 
liberation from communist totalitarianism (Soviet era controls suppressed nationalism through 
ideologies of a supra-national union). Furthermore, it is not only that state racism has been 
historically repressed, but that racism per se as a topic of debate and concern continues to be 
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marginalised within the Visegrád public sphere, including within academic scholarship. As Nowicka 
remarks on the Polish context, ‘the popular opinion, common also among Polish scholars [is] that 
“the racial problem has never existed in Poland”’.481 In short, racism is imagined as a problem 
imported from Western Europe, and a consequence of Western European colonialism and 
migration. As the aforementioned ‘expert ethnologist’ and Czech public figure Zelený-Atapana puts 
it vis a vis the 2015 refugee crisis: ‘They [Western European states] started in the distant past 
colonialist division of the world and after WWII began to reap the rotten fruit as they opened 
borders to people of former colonies. We, however, did not participate in [colonialism] and 
therefore we have no moral obligation to accept refugees.’482 
In 2015 racism emerged ‘starkly into the open’ in the Visegrád public sphere but was 
imagined as a ‘new’ problem which originates from ‘outside’.483 It is important to note also that race 
is still understood in much of Eastern Europe through the lens of scientific racism.484 This was 
evident in political and other public responses to the refugee crisis, where racist views about 
refugees were expressed not only in terms of religious and cultural differences (for example as 
Islamophobia), but also in terms of biological differences (see for example Zelený-Atapana’s 
comments on race mixing as racial genocide above).  
The persistence of these older forms of racist thinking trouble liberal understandings of race 
and racism. In Western Europe, scientific theories of race have been incrementally discredited since 
the Second World War and there has been some official acknowledgment of state racism through 
the memorialisation of (some) past genocides, albeit primarily Nazi-era atrocities that took place on 
European soil. However, as Alana Lentin has argued, this commemoration of racist crimes occludes 
‘the foundational relationship between the liberal political project and the racial-colonial domination 
within and despite which it developed’.485 Indeed, as Lentin notes, in Western Europe ‘real racism’ is 
imagined as something which was overcome (with Nazi-era fascism), and eruptions of racism are 
thus imagined and legislated against as the aberrant beliefs and behaviour of a minority of deviant, 
uneducated individual racists. In the process, actually existing forms of institutional and state racism, 
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including the ongoing exclusion of racialised citizens from the full rights and protections of 
citizenship, are occluded.  
The clash of post-communist and liberal regimes of racism was apparent in liberal Western 
European commentary around the refugee crisis, were explicit expressions of racism in the East – in 
political commentary and anti-refugee protests – was storied in the West as a conflict between 
‘backward’ Eastern European racism and a ‘superior moral stance of humanitarianism’.486  By 
situating racism geographically in the East, state racism against refugees and other racialised 
minorities was in effect orientalised as a symptom of underdevelopment – a further sign of the 
distance ‘they’ must travel ‘to become liberal, humanitarian and modern Europeans’.487 
This chapter does not seek to contribute to the stigmatisation of Eastern Europeans as ‘more 
racist’ than the Western neighbours, or to diminish the central role of Western European powers in 
enabling mass internments and deaths at the borders. It is, however, interested in what we might 
learn from the conjunction of these different genealogies of racism. Not least, in terms of what 
these overlapping regimes of racism might teach us about the dramatic blossoming of neo-fascist 
politics in Western Europe in the same period. For it not only right-wing Visegrád politicians who 
crafted and mobilised populist racisms against refugees as a means to make political capital.   
In the UK Brexit campaign in 2016, for example, the two key themes of the leave campaign, 
namely that immigration is ripping apart the nation and that  ‘anything foreign, except investment, is 
abhorrent’ not only granted ‘a fillip to popular racism’ but allowed ‘fully fledged state racism’ to 
emerge.488 Indeed, while Hungary undertook a state-sponsored propaganda campaign against 
migrants in October 2016 (see below), the far-right United Kingdom Independence party (working in 
conjunction with the official leave campaign led by high profile politicians), used almost identical 
tactics and messages in its campaign to leave the EU. One of the most notorious posters in the Brexit 
campaign, titled ‘Breaking Point’, and subtitled ‘We must break free of the EU and take back control 
of our borders’, employed a doctored photograph of refugees crossing the Croatia–Slovenia border 
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(taken in 2015) as evidence that white Europe was being ‘invaded’ by brown migrants (indeed the 
visibly white person in the photograph was obscured by a text box in the poster).  
A matter of hours after this anti-refugee poster campaign was launched, Jo Cox, a pro-EU 
Labour MP for Batley and Speen in Yorkshire and a high-profile political advocate for the human 
rights of migrants and refugees, was assassinated in the street by a white supremacist nationalist. 
Cox was shot and stabbed repeatedly, as she was slaughtered her killer shouted ‘Britain first, keep 
Britain independent, Britain will always come first’, before finally yelling, ‘This is for Britain.’  
What indelibly connects the two regimes of racism briefly outlined here, namely scientific 
racism in which race is understood as a consequence of genetic differences in a stratified global 
hierarchy of human life, and liberal regimes of racism in which race is understood through the lens 
of cultural and religious differences in which (Western) European society is imagined as more 
progressive and more ‘developed’, are white supremacist ideologies. In short, liberal or illiberal, 
these overlapping regimes of racism are rooted in the same histories and epistemologies of 
European modernity. 
[A] Fascism as a connecting thread 
In 2015 different genealogies of racism cross-pollinate and coalesce in anti-migrant racism 
but they all draw energy from twentieth-century European fascism and ideologies of white 
supremacy. Indeed, it is precisely fascist tropes of ‘racial self-defence’, ‘self-cleansing’ , ‘political 
hygiene’, and programmes of ‘total dehumanization’, which characterised the responses of right-
wing politicians, pundits and publics across Europe to refugee arrivals in 2015. 489  
In Modernity and the Holocaust, Zygmunt Bauman warned us that ‘antisemitism survived 
the populations it had ostensibly been targeted against.’490 As he writes, ‘in countries where the 
Jews have all but disappeared, antisemitism …. continues abated’, albeit , he adds, often against 
different populations, most notably Muslims.491 Bauman describes this phenomena as ‘antisemitism 
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without Jews’, describing the proliferation and diffusion of fascistic forms of racism in post-War 
Europe as ‘a game without frontiers’.492 
In Europe, the resurgence and amplification of fascist ideologies, practices and policies is 
evident on every scale and in every sphere of social life: in the resurgence of far-right, white 
supremacist nationalistic political parties and the election of charismatic right-wing politicians on 
anti-immigration platforms; in the unashamed embrace of racist ideologies across the entire political 
spectrum; in state-led propaganda campaigns against refugees and migrants; in a rush of fence-
building and the erection of checkpoints; in the opening of ever more prisons to detain migrants, in 
the formal and informal dispersal of border enforcement roles to state officials, medical authorities, 
schools and universities, welfare agencies, employers and landlords; in the incessant production of 
racial stigma and hate-speech in news reporting, social media and everyday speech; and in rising 
levels of hate-crime and everyday racist violence. While explicitly anti-foreigner in orientation, the 
explosion of public racisms across Europe has also legitimatised racial hatred and violence towards 
existing racialised citizens, especially Muslims, Jews, Roma, Gypsies and Travellers, and other black 
and brown ethnic minorities.  
 [A] The stigma machine of fascism  
To understand the current return of fascistic nationalistic politics, it is helpful to examine Europe’s 
still obfuscated colonial reign of terror on the African continent in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. As Hannah Arendt reminds us, 'the seeds of [Nazi] totalitarianism can be found in 
the period of colonial rule in Africa'.493   
German South-West Africa, modern-day Namibia, was a colony of the German Empire from 
1884 until 1915. Within areas under German control, all Africans over the age of eight had to wear 
metal passes around their necks, which were embossed with the imperial crown, the magisterial 
district, and a number. As in other pass systems, such as those developed in India, the US and South 
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Africa, this badging was a form of penal stigmatisation that was intended both to humiliate and to 
facilitate control over captive labour. When people resisted this badging, for example by ridding 
themselves of the metal tags during escape attempts, a system of ink tattooing was proposed.494  
In 1904, uprisings by the Herero (and Nama) people against the colonial administration, led 
to the adoption of an extermination policy in the region. What followed was described by the then 
commander of German forces in South West Africa, Colonial General Lothar Von Trotha, as ‘a racial 
war’.495 By 1906, the German colonists had murdered 65,000 Herero people out of a total population 
of 80,000, many dying of thirst when, encircled by German troops, they were forced to flee into the 
Kalahari Desert.  
Some of those who surrendered were tattooed or branded with the letters ‘GH’ (Gefangene 
Herero, meaning 'imprisoned Herero'), before being dispersed as slave labour on the farms of 
German settlers.496  Alongside the use of penal tattoos, this genocide saw the development of 
concentration camps in the region. German scientists used the camps to gather evidence to support 
the now blossoming field of ‘racial sciences’ (inspired by men like Cesare Lombroso).  
Thousands of Herero body parts were collected in the concentration camps, and shipped to 
the Germany. It is estimated that ‘3,000 Herero skulls were sent to Berlin for German scientists to 
examine for signs that they were of racially inferior peoples’.497 Many of the experiments on Herero 
and Nama body parts were overseen by Eugen Fischer. Fischer had spent time undertaking field 
research on mixed race children in German South-West Africa, and his research led to a 1912 ban on 
interracial marriages in the German colonies. Adolf Hitler was an admirer of Fischer’s research, and 
drew on his book, Principles of Human Heredity and Race Hygiene (1921) in his vision of a 'purified' 
Aryan race in Mein Kampf (1925).  
The genocidal activities of the Germans in Africa in the early twentieth-century were not 
hidden. These events were debated in parliament, reported in newspapers, and a popular German 
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postcard from this period depicted soldiers posing with the skulls of Herero (which the Army forced 
captives to clean before they were sent to German Universities). In 1906, the German socialist 
satirical magazine Der Wahre Jacob published a cartoon depicting the skeletonised remains of 
Herero spread across an expanse of the Kalahari Desert; the caption reads: ‘Even if it hasn’t brought 
in much profit and there are no better quality goods on offer, at least we can use it to set up a bone-
grinding plant’.498  
As Hortense Spillers notes, ‘if the twentieth century would witness, at the midpoint, the 
terrifying spectacle of the totalitarian regime’ then its technologies of terror were ‘adumbrated in 
the long centuries of unregulated violence against black people’, and specifically Africans. 499 
 
German colonial methods of racial classification were further innovated when, as Frantz Fanon puts 
it, ‘Nazism transformed the whole of Europe into a veritable colony’.500 Indeed, the Nazi drive to 
‘build an empire in the East’ was classically colonial in that it was characterised by ‘imperial 
expansion, settler colonialism and racial genocide’.501 The Nazi project to ‘cleanse and colonise’ 
Europe involved the creation of a vast, bureaucratic stigma machine for the classification of ‘racial 
enemies’ (i.e. Jews, Gypsies and Slavs), ‘asocial’ elements (i.e. the ‘work-shy’, criminals, sexual 
deviants), and ‘useless eaters’ (disabled people and the mentally ill). The identification of these 
‘aliens to the community’ and ‘pests harmful to the nation’ was the first step in the implementation 
of the ‘racial hygiene’ project envisaged by Eugen Fischer and his colleagues. Indeed, Fischer’s 
experiments on the bodies of slaughtered Herero and Nama people was the ‘evidence base’ which 
underpinned the 1935 Nuremberg laws (for ‘the Protection of German Blood’ and ‘the Protection of 
German Honour’), which banned inter-racial marriages and removed German citizenship from Jews 
(and later Roma and African-Germans).  
During the Nazi regime, Fischer and his colleagues continued to experiment on body-parts as 
they sought to evidence their eugenic theory of racial hierarchy, but now they used the dead bodies 
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of Jews, Roma Gypsies, African-Germans. Some of the human research material for Fischer’s 
laboratory was supplied by his former student, Josef Mengele, at Auschwitz.  
In order to distinguish ‘racial enemies’, the Nazi regime introduced laws that forced Jews to 
wear distinguishing badges, most often a yellow star, in public places.502 At labour and extermination 
camps, an elaborate system of badging was developed to distinguish different classes of prisoners. 
Those designated for slave labour at camps, rather than immediate death, were often stamped with 
ink signs on their forehead, and labour numbers were also frequently inked on the skin. At the 
Auschwitz complex, stigmatisation extended to the ink tattooing of serial numbers on Jewish inmates 
selected for work. The first experiments in tattooing used a metal stamp, which perforated the skin 
(on the left breast), and ink was rubbed into the wound.  This developed into a more sophisticated 
system of needle tattooing (on the left arm). At least 400,000 people were tattooed in this way. The 
Czech holocaust survivor Ruth Elias recalls how she survived near-starvation in the Jewish ghetto of 
Theresienstadt near Prague, but it was only when she lined up to be tattooed at Auschwitz that she 
understood that she was longer considered a human being: ‘The numbers on our forearms marked 
our depersonalization’.503 
As Primo Levi describes in This is Man (1947), the replacement of your name with a tattooed 
number was your ‘initiation’ into a ‘great machine’ which sought ‘to reduce us to beasts’.504 Bauman 
terms this ‘categorical murder’ a process through which ‘the concrete individual’ is erased, and 
people are made into ‘an abstraction’.505 The abstraction of people into things through stigmatising 
classifications underpinned the operations of the entire fascist machine. Indeed, it was the 
cumulation of practices of dehumanisation which enabled the stigma machine of the slave labour 
camps to be transformed into ‘gigantic death machines’.506  
 
[A] Public humiliation and pillory  
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These penal technologies of dehumanisation were prefigured by a debate amongst prominent legal 
experts about the efficacy of penal stigma as a judicial punishment. In the 1930s leading Nazi legal 
scholars, such as Georg Dahm, proposed the reintroduction of ‘shame sanctions’ as part of the 
establishment of a new authoritarian legal system. Dahm’s basic argument was ‘that where liberty 
had been the highest good of the old liberal order, honour was now the highest good of the new 
Nazi order. Shame sanctions, which deprived offenders of honour, should accordingly be the Nazi 
punishment of choice’.507 In short, he called for a redesign of the German judicial system to support 
the implementation of the illiberal racial order of the Nazi regime.  
While Dahm’s proposals for an overhaul of the German legal system were not implemented 
in full, by the mid 1930s the Sturmabteilung (the Nazi Party's first paramilitary arm) had already 
reintroduced pillory and other public shame sanctions as part of a Nazification project. These stigma 
practices involved subjecting people to public humiliations such as sign-wearing, head-shavings, 
public beatings and lynchings. For example, photographs from Austria during the Anschluss in 1938, 
depict Jewish women being exhibited in a public square with signs hung around their necks which 
read 'I have been excluded from the national community (Volksgemeinschaft)' (see figure 4). These 
stigma practices proliferated and intensified as the Nazi’s colonised Eastern Europe. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 near here] 
 
[Caption] Figure 4: ‘Kristallnacht Shame': Jewish women in Linz, Austria are exhibited in public with a 
cardboard sign stating: 'I have been excluded from the national community (Volksgemeinschaft)', 




The use of stigma punishments was accompanied by massive state propaganda campaign primarily 
targeting Jews but also other racial and political enemies of the Aryan state, including disabled 
people, prostitutes, and the mentally ill. This Nazification movement included poster campaigns, 
anti-Semitic newspapers (such as Der Stürmer), films, theatre, radio broadcasts and ‘degenerate art’ 
exhibitions. For example, the anti-Semitic ‘Eternal Jew’ exhibition, which opened in the German 
Museum in Munich on November 8, 1937, and was then toured in Vienna and Berlin, consisted of 
hundreds of artworks, photographs and objects designed to represent the sub-humanity of Jews. 
This touring exhibition was accompanied by a catalogue, a lecture series and theatre performances. 
In 1940, the pseudo-documentary film Der Ewige Jude (1940, dir. Fritz Hippler), was one of a 
collection of fascist films toured across Germany, and later compulsorily screened in occupied cities 
and towns across Europe. Nazi police reports approvingly note a correlation in anti-Semitic feeling, 
street harassment and violence in the wake of these propaganda art exhibitions, screenings and 
cultural events.  
Der Ewige Jude was made ‘mandatory viewing for police and SS-units, special units of the 
Wehrmacht, and guards at concentration and extermination camps, since it was thought that the 
film would ward off any scruples people might feel about the merciless persecution and annihilation 
of the Jews’508 
 
[A] The death of the scaffold? 
 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault famously argued that the introduction of more ‘subtle’ 
punishments, such as imprisonment in place of physical torture reflects a broader historical shift 
away from the ‘visible intensity’ and ‘horrifying spectacle of public punishment’. As he writes, ‘the 
spectacle of the tortured, dismembered, amputated, symbolically branded on face and shoulder, 
exposed dead or alive to public view’, begins to die out in Europe at the end of the eighteenth 
century.509 There is historical evidence in support of arguments that technologies and mechanisms 
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of social discipline and punishment are transformed within Europe in this period. There is a shift, for 
example, from the spectacle of public executions, to judicial sentences which involve hard labour, 
including imprisonment and transportation --the last public execution in Lancaster took place in 
1865.  
However, Foucault’s claim that ‘the body as the major target of penal repression 
disappeared’ is significantly overstated.510 It wasn’t that ‘the spectacle of the scaffold’ vanished; 
rather it was outsourced, as European colonialism spread its ‘arsenal of horrors’ and penal practices 
across the world, (indeed, public lynchings increased in the US after the emancipation of the 
enslaved in 1863).511 Public spectacles of violence spectacularly blew back into Europe with the rise 
of fascism, which inaugurated a new European dawn of public spectacles of violence. This was the 
mid-twentieth century Nazi regime under which Foucault grew up in Vichy France: a regime of 
badging, public pillory and shaming rituals, torture and deportations which, it seems, he couldn’t 
bear to look upon closely.  
The use of penal stigma erupted across Europe in post-war backlashes against Nazi 
collaborators, as seen in shaming punishments meted out to women alleged to have slept with 
German soldiers. Over 2,000 women are thought to have been subject to these public humiliations 
in post-war France, which involved head-shaving, face-marking, being stripped, spat, jeered at and 
being paraded through the streets, in ways which echo ‘the riding of scolds’ centuries earlier (See 
Figure 5). It is significant that once more, it is women who are targeted for these humiliations, and 
that women’s bodies are made to bear the stigma of the wider community (here the public shame of 
collaboration with the Nazi occupiers), underscoring one more that we can rarely, if ever, 
disentangle stigma power from regimes of patriarchy. 
  
 
[Insert Figure 5 near here] 
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[Caption] Figure 5: ‘Post-War Shaming Punishments’: women being paraded in a Paris street in 
August 1944, barefoot, their heads shaved, and their foreheads and cheeks marked with swastikas.  
 
One argument of Stigma  is that in order to understand the periodic intensification of judicial and 
wider social and cultural practices of public stigmatisation and shaming practices, it is critical that we 
approach these phenomena not as the appearance of something ‘new’, but rather as the 
‘reappearance of something very old’.512 For example, the lines of arguments advanced by Nazi 
shame advocates in the 1930s resonate with those taking place amongst ‘shame advocates’ in legal 
scholarship and wider public culture today. Public shaming and pillory is on the return, and is central 
feature of the current global authoritarian turn.  
 
[A] The return of shame sanctions 
Since the 1990s, the United States has witnessed the proliferation of legal shaming penalties, as part 
of a broader regime of ‘alternative sanctions’ which seek, in the words of one US judge, to ‘inflict 
disgrace and contumely in a dramatic and spectacular manner’. 513 Stigmatising penalties are now 
widely employed by US federal judges in lieu of prison sentences. These shame sanctions include 
practices such as forcing convicted petty criminals to hold placards stating ‘I am a thief’ outside of 
shopping malls and county courts, the enforced use of automobile bumper stickers to declare a 
driving infraction, being compelled to place newspaper advertisements or billboards detailing your 
crime, being made to wear a T-shirt pronouncing your guilt, and the public broadcasting of the 
names of convicted offenders on community-access television channels (Figure 6).514 As the legal 
scholar David Skeel explains, these shaming punishments are ‘designed to elicit moral disapproval 
from the offenders' fellow citizens’; in short, they employ stigma in order to advertise and reinforce 




[Insert Figure 6 near here] 
 
Figure 6: ‘I Stole from Walmart’: found photograph of a woman undertaking a shaming punishment 
in the US in 2007.  
 
James Whitman argues that these kinds of shaming sanctions are cruel, violate human 
dignity, and are dangerous as they cultivate ‘lynch-mob mentalities’.516  Certainly, there are 
instructive lessons in the recent fascist history of penal stigma for those concerned about the 
resurrection of stigma penalties in ostensibly liberal judicial systems across Europe and the US today. 
Others argue that while stigmatising individuals should be discouraged, shame should be cultivated 
as a practice with respect to corporations – such as companies who evade tax or pollute the 
environment. This argument is taken up and developed by Jessica Jacquet in Is Shame Necessary?: 
New Uses for an Old Tool (2016), which advocates for the efficacy of shame sanctions as a 
mechanism through which to nudge corporations into acting with more social responsibility. 
However, the extensive debate amongst ‘shaming enthusiasts’ and ‘shame detractors’ is beyond the 
scope of this book. Where these debates overlap with the concerns of this book is in terms of what 
these practices reveals about the persistence of punitive practices of social stigmatisation, and in 
particular what this renewed intensity of stigma production reveals vis a vis wider regimes of state 
power, and mutating regimes of racial capitalism.  
The current intensification of penal stigma isn’t restricted to formal systems of punishments 
but, as Loïc Wacquant has argued, is symptomatic of a much broader ‘theatricalization of penality’ in 
neoliberal societies. As he argues: 
 
In the past quarter-century, a whole galaxy of novel cultural and social forms, indeed a 
veritable industry trading on representations of offenders and law enforcement, has sprung 
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forth and spread [migrating] from the state to the commercial media and the political field 
[…] Everywhere the law-and-order guignol has become a core civic theatre.517 
 
The word ‘guignol’ originates in French puppetry, and is used as an adjective to describe forms of 
popular entertainment which features repugnant characters. Indeed, entire media genres, notably 
reality television, are today dedicated to the staging of public shaming rituals—in this twenty-first 
century televisual guignol it is most often working class women who are publicly puppeteered as 
figures for derision.518  
While shaming sanctions have long been employed in authoritarian regimes around the 
world, the enthusiastic re-endorsement of ‘humiliation sanctions’ in the judicial systems of Western 
liberal democracies is indicative of the new illiberal state order being forged by world leaders like 
Orbán, Modi, Trump, Putin and others. What these political actors have in common, is that they seek 
to reassert older caste, racial and gendered hierarchies of person value as a means of garnering 
political capital, and in service of profit-seeking projects of capitalist exploitation.  
 
[A] Tipping back into authoritarianism  
Across the twentieth century, ‘state racism’ has been the primary source of social conflict from 
which national sovereignty has generated its legitimacy. Racism is the primary mechanism through 
which capitalist elites assuage discontent about social and economic inequalities ‘at home’: crafting 
racism to generate divisions within the working class, to garner political capital and legitimate 
exceptional measures. However, I want to argue that in the current conjuncture there is a more 
profound rupture taking place. In the last interview he gave before he died, Stuart Hall stated that 
multiple crises which characterise the state we are in is not ‘just a swing of the intellectual 
pendulum, not just the usual ins and outs of politics’ but represents a profound shift in the 
machinations of racial capitalism.519As Hall suggested, if ‘authoritarian populism’ is the way in which 
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‘the current crisis of capitalism is resolved’, then we face the most significant global crisis since the 
Second World War.  
Certainly, the reactivation of historical forms of stigma power – tried, tested and reworked 
strategies ‘of domination, dispossession, expropriation, exploitation, and violence’ – is a signal that 
the political organisation of capitalism is tipping ever further from the egalitarian promise of 
democracy towards repressive and oppressive forms of authoritarian rule.520 As Hall writes, unlike 
‘classical fascism’ this authoritarianism ‘has retained most (though not all) of the formal 
representative institutions’ and ‘has been able to construct around itself an active popular 
consent’.521 It is the argument of this book that stigma power is key mechanism through which 
popular consent is forged. We are now seeing the emergence of a new kind of fascism, which Alain 
Badiou terms ‘democratic fascism’ (because we are voting for it).522 The response of European 
governments to the refugee crisis marked a tipping point in this broader fascistic return, and I will 
now return to these events moment. 
 
[A] ‘A gigantic wave of racist state propaganda’  
 
In 2015, Hungary had considerably more applications for asylum than the Czechia, around 174,000, 
yet as part of the proposed EU quota scheme it was only asked to accept 1,294 asylum seekers. 
Despite the small scale of this request, on 2 October 2016, the Hungarian government held a 
nationwide referendum on the proposed European Union quota system. As the Hungarian 
philosopher Gaspr Tamás noted, what was most significant about this referendum was the ‘gigantic 
wave of racist state propaganda’ that proceeded it. This ranged ‘from giant billboards to new 
elementary school textbooks, from the internet to hundreds of thousands of personal phone calls 
civil servants were forced to make to mobilize for the “no” vote’.523 Across Hungarian cities and 
major transport routes, and in public squares, parks and thoroughfares, giant billboards appeared 
with messages that included: ‘Did you know that since the beginning of the immigration crisis more 
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than 300 people have died as a result of terror attacks in Europe?’; ‘Did you know that Brussels 
wants to settle a whole city’s worth of illegal immigrants in Hungary?’; ‘Did you know that since the 
beginning of the immigration crisis the harassment of women has risen sharply in Europe?; ‘If you 
come to Hungary don't take the jobs of Hungarians!’; ‘If you come to Hungary, you have to keep our 
laws.’ As Lydia Gall has detailed, this propaganda campaign ‘cost Hungarian taxpayers the equivalent 
of over $18 million’ – approximately $13,500 per asylum seeker that Hungary had been asked to give 
refuge to.524  This print propaganda was amplified by television stations which: 
 
…used newsbreaks during the European Football Championship, in June and the Olympic 
Games in August, to devote frequent airtime to ‘anti-migrant news items’, depicting asylum 
seekers and refugees as criminals, terrorists and people who come to mooch on Western 
welfare systems.525 
 
This was an exercise in state-funded racism on a scale and with an intensity not witnessed in Europe 
since the Nazi propaganda against Jewish citizens in the 1930s and 1940s – and it went viral. 
 
[A] Fascism online: transnational racist responses to Břeclav 
The British right-wing tabloid newspaper, the Daily Mail, hosts the most visited news website in the 
world, the MailOnline, which attracts an international readership of 12 million people a day. On 2 
September 2015, the MailOnline featured Zehl’s photograph of the child being inked by the Czech 
police in a news story titled ‘Fury as Czech police write numbers on arms of migrants “like 
concentration camp prisoners”’. This story attracted 4,000 readers’ comments, extending over 23 
pages, with comments from readers in the UK, Ireland, USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Spain, 
and Singapore. Some readers responded – as invited by the use of scare quotes around ‘concentration 
camp’ in the title – with outrage at the suggestion of any analogy between the inking of refugees’ 
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hands and concentration camp regimes, insisting, for example, that, ‘it’s no different than having your 
hand stamped as you enter a night club’. Many more suggested that more permanent and graphic 
forms of penal stigmatisation should be used to manage refugees at Europe’s borders:  
They should write the id numbers on the forehead instead! 
You could inject them with an RFID tag, at least you could track them! 
Rubber stamp their foreheads instead!  
They should be made to wear a yellow badge so that members of the public know who they 
are and know to stay well away from them.  
With the numbers involved and the desperate deceit used by many of these people tattoos 
would be a more effective option. if they behave well give them a yellow star to wear too 
Pigs ears are clipped and tagged #justsaying  
Just because the J E W S don’t like it we must comply!  
Dig pits and machine gun the lot of them – Cheaper to use gas.  
Well done Czech police … I’d brand them like cattle with a massive M on their foreheads!  
Good idea – tattoo everyone with a barcode – easier to track  
They should all be fingerprinted, DNA samples taken and photographed before tattooing 
i11eg@1 on their fore head [sic] 
 
While it is easy to dismiss or disregard these kinds of discussion threads, they are important archives 
of everyday stigmacraft in contemporary media cultures. Our task, as Les Back suggests, is to 
‘develop a radical attentiveness’ to racist speech, to understand the ‘resonance and reach’ of racist 
sentiments and conversations.526  The imagined anonymity of Internet forums, and devices such as 
the use of fabricated user names, offer users a licence to break social taboos on racist speech, and 
an opportunity to craft racism in extreme and virulent ways. Reading this discussion thread, it is 
evident there is enjoyment in provoking outrage, an intense pleasure in being racist with others in a 
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community setting and by evading the censorship of forum moderators by, for example, placing 
spaces between letters in words like ‘JEWS’. While some of the readers responded negatively to 
racist comments, for the majority the opportunity to be racist motivated their participation. As 
Kimberlé Crenshaw notes, ‘racism helps to create an illusion of unity through the oppositional force 
of a symbolic “other”. The establishment of an Other creates a bond, a burgeoning common identity 
of all nonstigmatized parties’.527 
The refugees arriving in Europe in the summer of 2015 are difficult to characterise in terms 
of a single religion, nationality or through racial colour lines. Perhaps, to account for the difficulty in 
fixing a singular ‘badge of race’, the racism against refugees in the MailOnline thread conjures 
multiple figures and names: Muslims, Jews, Niggers, Arabs and terrorists morph into one another. 
Most notably, Nazi-era anti-Semitic practices are repurposed as anti-Muslim racism: ‘I’d brand them 
like cattle with a massive M on their foreheads.’ The graphic character of this online racism is 
striking, with many posts imagining different ways of stigmatising refugees. Signs and words are 
imagined impressed, branded, tattooed upon migrant bodies, stressing the relationship between 
racism, writing and wounding uncovered in the genealogy of penal stigma. Also striking are the 
many calls for the segregation and confinement of these ‘waste populations’ in concentration 
camps: ‘No one invited them to the Czech Republic!’; ‘Like roach infestation’; ‘Let the Germans set 
up some of their “special” camps in Poland for them’. 
 
[A] Scene two: Bělá-Jezová immigration detention centre, Czechia, 31 August 2015 
 
Because Czechia receives so few refugees, there are only three immigration detention centres in the 
country. Coincidentally, on 31 August 2015, the very day that the refugees began the train journeys 
that ended at Břeclav, Anna Šabatová, the Czech government’s Public Defender of Rights, made an 
unannounced visit to the Bělá-Jezová detention centre, a former Soviet Army Barracks. Šabatová’s 
subsequent report offers insights into the abject conditions that would be faced by those refugees 
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bussed from Břeclav to camps. Indeed, the situation she describes at Bělá-Jezová is so disturbing 
that it triggered a response from Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.  
When she arrived at Bělá-Jezová, the chief of the Czech Alien Police at the centre tried to 
refuse Šabatová, and the four lawyers and two interpreters accompanying her, access, and 
attempted to remove the cameras they had brought to document conditions, despite that the 
unannounced inspection of prisons and detention centres is a regular part of the role of Public 
Defender of Rights.528   
Šabatová begins her inspection by noting that Bělá-Jezová had increased its capacity from 
270 to 700 beds in a period of six months. During her visit on 31 August, 659 people, including 147 
children, are being detained. Šabatová describes how a constant ‘demonstration of force’ is 
maintained throughout the centre by the ‘presence of uniformed private security guards, police 
officers, riot police unit and police dogs’.  
The refugees relay their feelings ‘of utter humiliation’. They tell Šabatová that some of the 
police officers ‘handled them roughly, or spit in front of them’, and that private security guards call 
them terrorists. 
 Šabatová notes that people are frequently handcuffed and that others, including children, 
have insufficient clothing and shoes to keep warm and clean. Detainees describe being given 
mattresses that were filthy and infested with lice. Some of those she spoke to had no hot meals, but 
were surviving on rations of bread and cheese. Some have no direct access to toilets or running 
water, and have to rouse guards to be released from the rooms in which they were locked each time 
they need the bathroom. People also tell her of humiliating strip and body cavity searches in front of 
families and children, ostensibly to make sure they are not hiding valuables; mobile phones, 
watches, shoelaces, belts and money were confiscated on their arrival.  
The anxiety of being detained in these abject conditions was ‘intensified by the fact that 
they are unable to contact their relatives. Many have no way to contact loved ones back home to tell 
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them they are alive, or the means of finding family and friends with whom they become separated 
on their journey, or deliberately segregated from in detention.529 People don’t know when they will 
be released and some don’t even know which country they are in.  
Despite the claims of police at Břeclav that people were being inked as a means of keeping 
families together, Šabatová discovers that family members are frequently separated in different 
detention centres.530 Amidst this litany of details, she pauses to note in her report:  
 
Simple description of the situation cannot fully convey the conditions in which these 
[people] were held, nor their psychological condition. … They often come to believe they 
have been deprived of their humanity and treated as a ‘herd of animals’.  
 
In a shocking passage, Šabatová details her discovery of an annex in a forest behind the main 
detention centre: 
 
Out of sight of the main complex of buildings, additional housing is provided in housing 
containers in a forest accessible via a police-guarded pavement.  […] The container units are 
arranged in a rectangular, completely closed-off area. The area closed off by the containers 
is caged off and covered with welded iron mesh. The Facility management failed to explicitly 
inform me of the accommodation spaces outside the main area of the Facility. The container 
units in the forest were ‘discovered’ only at the very end of the inspection visit. 
 
She says when they forced access to this area of the detention camp, the people imprisoned began 
shouting out and raising signs and banners: ‘We are refugees, not prisoners! and ‘Help us, please!’ 
These people, she said, were caged liked animals.531 ‘I am appalled’, Šabatová writes, ‘by the degree 
of dehumanisation present in the system of detention of foreign nationals in the Czech Republic, as 
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well as the degrading treatment which the Facility’s management tolerates and the living conditions 
in which children are held in the Facility’.532 
To add to their humiliation, detainees are charged for their stay: ordinarily imprisoned for 90 
days at a cost of €10 per person, per day. These charges are ‘levied’ from their confiscated cash and 
valuables. Many leave without any money left in their possession and are presented with a bill for 
their outstanding debts to the Czech state. This is a ‘final deterrent’ as it is illegal to claim asylum in 
Czechia if you are financially indebted to the government.  
The refugees are frequently released without prior warning, without even a map, directions 
or transport to the nearest train station. Left ‘destitute in front of the gate of the camp, in the 
middle of the forest’, they rely on assistance from the Czech migrant activist community to continue 
on their journeys to safety. 533 Perhaps, as one Czech activist wryly notes, on the very same train 
‘from which police dragged them two months ago in Břeclav’.534 
 
[A] Spectres of fascism  
With regards to Czechia in 2015, the United Nations concluded that its violations of the human rights 
of migrants were neither isolated nor coincidental, but systematic: an integral part of a policy 
package designed to deter migrants and refugees from entering the country or staying there.535 As 
Daniel Trilling writes, for migrants arriving in Europe today, racist violence takes many forms on the 
ground, from ‘the violence carried out by uniformed police or prison guards, the violence of 
indifference in the face of a refugee crisis, or the violence of neglect as people waste years of their 
lives waiting for the European bureaucracy to answer their pleas’.536   
This chapter has sought to demonstrate the role of a multi-faceted ‘stigma machine of 
racism’ in enabling this violence, examining the ways in which practices of stigmatisation 
dehumanise people to the point that it becomes possible to keep children caged in shipping 
containers in a Czech forest. The penal practices of stigma I have described are also a reminder that 
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it is impossible to imagine or think about race and crisis in contemporary Europe without recourse to 
history. The tattooing of refugees, their removal from trains at night, the fearful and racist responses 
of local communities, the comments of MailOnline readers, with their calls for yellow stars, tattoos 
and gas chambers, the humiliating practices of strip-searching refugees, confiscating all their 
valuables and goods, and the abject and hidden conditions in which they are held, evoke ghosts of 
Europe’s recent fascist past. 
 One argument of this chapter is that contemporary political struggles over borders in 
Europe pivot on ‘the seething presence’ of ghostly processions of twentieth-century refugees – 
whether in calls from the far-right to detain the Břeclav refugees in Theresienstadt, or in claims that 
migrants are enacting ‘white genocide’, or in more liberal forms of memorialisation that seek to 
freeze ‘real racism’ in the past – or in ‘the East’.537  As Avery Gordon argues, the thing about 
haunting, is that it an ‘animated state’ that ‘alters the way we normally separate and sequence the 
past, the present and the future’, allowing a ‘repressed or unresolved social violence’ to make itself 
known.538 The processions of people arriving at the borders today are entrapped at the same railway 
stations, waiting rooms, platforms and train tracks, and are even detained in some of the same 
camps and prisons, where refugees were concentrated in the 1930s and 1940s.  
 
Undertaking the research for this chapter, tracing the genealogy of penal stigma and border 
struggles in Europe, has involved being haunted by histories of violence. Racism is haunting. Yet 
reckoning with these ghosts is important because they have something valuable to tell us about the 
high stakes of Europe’s current racist crisis. Indeed, the ways in which we confront these spectres is 
a matter of life and death. While the political conditions for the industrial scale genocide of the 
1940s do not currently exist in Europe, we are returning to a violent, divided and illiberal past. A past 
in which many millions were murdered, and many fought hard and were killed repelling.  
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, we are seeing the proliferation of walls, cages, 
and camps around the world, from the concentration of an estimated 1 million Uyghur Muslims in 
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China (which has seen to date little in the terms of an international response, from the United 
Nations or other intranational bodies), and the much publicised caging of thousands of migrants at 
the US-Mexico border, including the segregation of children from their parents. The enclosure, 
detention and imprisonment of people is not a new phenomenon, but the mass concentration of 
people on the basis of citizenship status, religious, ethnic or racial difference in ways which openly 
flout international laws and human rights protections established after the Second World War is an 
alarming trend. 
In Europe in 2015 photographs and television footage of migrant arrivals, of rescues at sea, 
of overloaded boats, discarded life-jackets, lost objects and dead children on Mediterranean 
beaches became commonplace horrors; more than half a million people desperately paddled 
towards the shore on overloaded dinghies that year, while tourists sunbathed amongst the flotsam 
of failed crossings. At least 3,770 drowned making the crossing: ‘They were murdered. Actually, they 
were massacred. The policy stipulated they should be left to die. So they died’.539 As a Lampedusa 
fisherman told a BBC journalist in 2015, ‘We often pull up skulls and bones in our nets.’540 When 
people are stigmatised to the extent that they are no longer seen as human, it seems we can’t 
comprehend the violence, we longer see it, or we simply don’t care. ‘Fuck the refugees,’ a teacher 
makes a passing remark to the Czech writer and film-maker Andre Vltchek on a train from Prague. 
‘Those niggers should stay where they are.’541       
 
[A] Scene three: Břeclav train station, 11 March 1938  
At midnight on 11 March 1938, a train carrying refugees was halted at Břeclav station. Drawing on 
eyewitness accounts, the British journalist George Gedye described how events unfolded that night. 
Earlier that evening, Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg had resigned, surrendering Austria to 
annexation by the Nazi German government. Jews, Communists, Catholics, Anti-Fascists, artists and 
intellectuals scrambled to get on the last train from Vienna to Prague in order to escape before the 
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German army entered the city. The train was supposed to leave at 11.15 pm, but by 8 pm ‘thousands 
of people were pushing each other, squeezing themselves into the train while demanding to depart 
immediately’.542 Before it was able to pull out of the station, Nazi Stormtroopers boarded ‘running 
through the carriages, armed with dog whips’, looting and terrorizing passengers. Finally, the train 
departed. Then, 20 minutes into its journey, it was stopped in the middle of the countryside by the 
SS who proceeded to ‘go through the train with a fine-toothed comb’. Men, women and children 
were dragged out and herded into vans. Gedye describes how: ‘Those who remained were 
plundered quite openly of everything in their possession – money, jewellery, watches and furs.’ 543 
After some hours, ‘the trembling survivors found themselves moving off towards Břeclav 
and safety’, every moment ‘an agony for those who feared to be held up again’. Finally, they could 
see the lights of Břeclav; they had reached the safety of Czechoslovakian territory. The Czech police 
boarded and announced that all passengers with Austrian passports were to leave the train. The 
refugees were moved to a guarded waiting room, where they saw from a window that the train they 
had arrived on was departing for Prague without them. After some hours, Břeclav’s Chief of Police 
came into the waiting room and announced that all Austrian nationals were to be returned to 
Vienna. As Gedye notes, ‘one of those who was there and managed by a ruse to escape told me later 
in Prague that the scenes that followed this announcement were too painful for him to recall’.544 
Some of those forcibly returned to Vienna that evening, escaped by departing at Austrian 
towns en route, taking off on foot into surrounding forests. The rest arrived back in Vienna, where 
they were locked in a waiting room at the train station for twelve hours, and were subject to 
interrogations by the SS. Some were later released, others went ‘straight to Dachau’. 545 In August 
1938, Anschluss was complete, and the Eternal Jew Exhibition was installed within Vienna Railway 
Station. By the autumn of 1938, Břeclav was annexed to Nazi Germany. Renamed Lundenburg, its 
local Jewish population was soon expelled. Its railway station became a node on the transnational 
train network used to deport Jews to Theresienstadt and extermination camps in Eastern Europe. 
Over the next few years, refugees halted at Břeclav on 11 March 1938 would return to this border 
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[CH] 4. The Stigma Machine of Austerity 
 
'Stigma teaches children that accepting charity is a disgrace. Stigma makes people ask 
whether the help is really that essential. Stigma discourages dependence.'  
 Charles Murray, political scientist, 2009 
 
'Austerity was a political choice. Cutting services instead of raising taxes was a choice. To 
make it stick, they used stigma as a weapon.' 
Paul Mason, writer and journalist, 2017 
 
 
Friday 6 July 2018. I am at the public launch event for the Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth Commission 
at Lancaster Town Hall. It's one of 14 such commissions running across the UK, which are attempting 
to find local solutions to poverty in the wake of a decade of 'austerity' –  ‘the deepest and most 
precipitate cuts ever made in social provision’ in the history of the British state.546 Around 150 people 
have gathered inside the fading grandeur of Lancaster’s town hall for the launch of our local 
commission: an assortment of local business people, charities, food bank and citizen’s advice 
volunteers, homelessness workers, religious leaders, members of refugee and migrant organisations, 
police officers, firefighters, addiction and mental health workers, GPs, teachers and teaching 
assistants, local city councillors,  food bank managers, community workers, church leaders, a number 
of medical practitioners and public health professionals, city counsellors and one of our two local 
Members of Parliament. We have been invited into this civic space, a seat of local government and 
decision-making for over a century, to listen to the testimonies of a dozen local people about the 
poverty, hunger, homelessness, mental distress and physical ill health which have followed in the 
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wake of a decade of cuts to state and local welfare provisions. It has taken six months of intensive 
support by community workers to enable these testifiers to find the courage to talk in public about 
personal experiences which involve extreme suffering and distress.  
It is the turn of David, a young man in his early twenties, to speak. David makes his way 
tentatively to the centre of the large stage, supported by Jane, a community worker. He is visibly 
nervous and Jane places her hand in the small of his back, reassuring him, whispering words of support 
we cannot hear. This is an extract from his testimony:547 
 
I was one of nine kids – my mum felt forced to drug deal, it was the only way she could feed 
us. The stress on her not knowing where the next meal was coming from – it all rubbed off on 
us kids. Kids absorb things like that, it’s really hard living like that. The only thing that held us 
together was the community – the people on our estate. Everyone would chip in to buy food 
for a month for people like us who didn’t have enough.  
 
Nana was the heart of the estate, she took all the kids out, taking us on minibuses for days 
out. Out of her own pocket at first. So we had something to do cos we had nothing. And 
parents could have one day without worrying about feeding kids. Then she started running 
the community centre. The place was heaving with kids all the time. It was a tiny hut in the 
car park of our school. Everything happened there – it was all we had, all anyone had. We had 
parties there as kids; it was amazing, magical, a place of no worries. There was meals there 
too that was so important. If it wasn’t for my nan and all she did for me and all the other kids, 
I would have killed myself. 
 
Ten years ago the youth workers from the council came and did a project – a massive music 
gig with all the lads and girls from the local council estates. It was amazing – all us kids from 
same background, all in poverty, and without that project we’d just have ended up scrapping 
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and gang wars cos it was the only way we had of releasing all the anger we had. The project 
brought everyone together. It stopped all the fighting, and gang crimes. It was the best thing 
I’ve ever done ever – it was amazing – everyone said that. Then the funding was taken away 
from us, and we were left with nothing.  
 
Our school was good – I had no bullying there. Many of the kids had serious difficulties – 
ADHD, Asperger’s – you weren’t judged, they treated you like family, they got to know your 
parents, they went to appointments with you. You felt accepted there. They’ve …you’ve … 
shut that now too. 
 
Then when you have nowhere to go and nothing to do, you get bullied – kids aged 13, 15 
whatever, young kids, the main drug dealers get you to sell heroine and crack – you’re so 
afraid of what will happen to you if you don’t do it – and there’s nothing else. If all the youth 
stuff hadn’t been taken away we wouldn’t have been pulled away to the streets… to these 
men. A few of me mates had to hide guns for them. They pay you – and when you have 
younger brothers and sisters needing to be fed its stressful trying to make the right decision. 
I thought my mum never knew where we was getting the money from, I had a paper round, 
and pretended it was that I gave her.  
 
I hold the councillors who made these decisions responsible for what happened to me. They 
don’t understand what they destroyed by taking those activities away. It was the only freedom 
we had, and it was taken away. We were just a number to them. 
 
Then everything goes from worse to worse, my family gets evicted, we are moved to another 
area where we don’t know no one. Then when your property needs work doing to it and the 
landlord won’t do it, it’s condemned and you’re moved on again –– same thing happened 
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again, condemned, moved on. It didn’t matter if my mum had to live in her mate’s one bed 
flat and sleep on the floor with my brothers and sisters. Nobody cares. 
 
When you’re in poverty you end up with nothing cos it’s all taken away and nobody cares. I 
became homeless – but they said I was not a priority need as I was 24. Street homeless, the 
council tells me I am not a priority need. The council don’t help you if you’re homeless and 
young – it’s all the charities and the churches. The council just tell you if you’re sleeping at a 
charity shelter you’re not sleeping rough. You have no hope. It feels like the government are 
trying to make a superior race – the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. That causes the 
poor to do crimes like robbing to feed their kids. How can this be fair? 
 
The government believes in money more than human beings. All they do is take, take, take. 
They worship money instead of heart. 
 
They give me a number – when you speak my name that means you want to talk to me. I am 
David John Roberts. When you give me a number – my national insurance number, my NHS 
number, my tax code – you just want to talk money. My name is David John Roberts. If I had 
one thing to say to the government, it would be treat me as you want to be treated. See me 
as a person, not a number. See me as living. I am flesh and blood. 
 
The impact of David’s testimony is palpable on those congregated in Lancaster Town Hall. All around 
me people are sobbing as he speaks. Passing tissues to each other to wipe away tears as they listen 
to his account of dispossession and dehumanisation. In the space of a decade, David saw the 
strangulation of all the vital life-lines, the support mechanisms and collective practices of care that 
made his childhood on a deprived social housing estate in this small Northern English city liveable: 
the closure of the 'magical' local community centre set up by his Nana; the evisceration of youth and 
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other outreach services; the shutting down of the kind, caring and inclusive local school; the eviction 
of his family from their home and community. 548 The snuffing out of all these lifelines made David 
increasingly vulnerable to exploitation: the drug-dealing he felt compelled to undertake to feed 
himself and his siblings, the manipulation, violence and abuse he suffered at the hands of predatory 
criminal men, his own eventual addiction and street-homelessness.  
David’s testimony offers a damning critique of material consequences of the radical 
contraction of the welfare state. His biography tracks a decade of decision-making by local civil 
servants and politicians, as they search for savings, butchering social provisions, redistributing 
resources, wealth, opportunities and value upwards – and away from working-class children and 
young people like him. He forces us to consider the ways in which austerity becomes embedded 
within communities, corroding social bonds, enclosing and closing off common goods and resources: 
‘All they do is take, take, take.’ 
 If public finance is a form of politics which is ordinarily ‘hidden in accounting columns’,549 
David’s story opens a window through which we can glimpse some of the effects of the erosion of 
the post-war welfare state in Britain, and the terrible price paid by children and young people for 
decisions taken by 'people with power' in buildings like Lancaster Town Hall.  
David is also a theorist of stigma power. He details the relationship between the attrition of 
his own life chances and the mechanisms through which austerity was implemented, describing 
some of the stigmatising practices through which he found his ‘flesh and blood’ life reduced to 
numbers on a spreadsheet of cuts. The fact that his age, 24, is the number which determines that he 
is not a 'priority need' for shelter when he becomes street homeless. The eight months he was 
'sanctioned' for by a Department of Work and Pensions job coach for missing an appointment not 
long after he gave his testimony: eight months without recourse to any public funds; and the reason 
he missed his meeting at the job centre was because he had picked up a few day’s work. David 
experiences these governmental practices of numbering as violent, humiliating and dehumaning 
forms of objectification. Forms of badging which exemplify the incremental subordination of his life 
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to the logic of financial capitalism, a logic in which lives like his are deemed to be of little value. A 
market driven society from which he has found himself progressively shut out, eventually 
abandoned to the streets. Austerity is lived by David as an endless fracking of security, opportunity, 
resources and hope. 
In bearing witness, David asks those gathered in the town hall to really look at him, to 
recognise through him – with him – the profound cruelty affected by this regime of 'fiscal discipline'. 
He asks us to acknowledge the ways in which austerity is embodied as he is badged as undeserving, 
devalued, made to feel like human waste, an object, a thing. David’s testimony is also an accusation, 
for he is directly addressing those 'with power' seated in front of him, asking them/us to take 
responsibility for his dispossession and despair: ‘I hold the councillors who made these decisions, 
responsible for what happened to me.’ You did this to me. 
After David has finished speaking, there is a brief moment of silence. Then the congregation 
in Lancaster town hall start to stand up one by one. Soon the whole room is standing, and people 
start to clap. What I experience in this spontaneous response is a community witnessing David’s 
social abjection.550 An admission of the shameful truth which David has described, and a collective 
recognition of him as a person ‘with heart’. It was an extraordinary enactment of what Sylvia Wynter 
describes as ‘being human as praxis’.551  
‘I am David John Roberts.’  
 
 
[A] The austerity state  
 
In November 2018, Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights, visited Britain on a fact-finding mission to ascertain the impact of a decade of 
austerity. In his interim (2018) and final report (2019), which draw on a substantial body of 
independent evidence, Alston describes that what he witnessed was nothing less than the 
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‘disappearance of the post-war British welfare state’. As he writes, ‘although the United Kingdom is 
the world’s fifth largest economy, one fifth of its population (14 million people) live in poverty, and 
1.5 million of them experienced destitution in 2017’.552 Alston draws particular attention to the 
disproportionate impacts of this ‘disappearance’ of the welfare state on those already on the losing 
end of the British class society: working-class children and young people, low-paid women, 
especially working-class women of colour, disabled people, and those living at the margins of 
Britain’s increasingly punitive citizenship and residency regimes, including precarious migrant 
workers and asylum-seekers.  
The effects of the evisceration of state welfare has been well evidenced by academics, 
journalists, and charitable organisations. As my friend and colleague Chris Grover summarises, the 
‘cuts and changes to social provision’ made by the British government in the wake of the 2008 global 
financial crisis ‘have contributed to increased poverty rates; falling living standards; the expansion of 
precarious wage; deepening disabilised, gendered and racialised inequalities; a colossal increase in 
homelessness and rough sleeping, and food and fuel poverty’.553 In short, the austerity state is 
characterised by the inability of increasingly large swathes of people to access the basic resources of 
shelter, food, heating and healthcare which they require to adequately sustain the lives of 
themselves, their children, disabled and elderly relatives. What this state-crafted, government-
planned and managed programme of ‘disaster capitalism’ has left in its wake is an immense crisis of 
social reproduction.554 I use the word ‘disaster’ advisedly here, for what this near decade-long 
government programme of reform has effected, is levels of precarity and vulnerability so dire, that 
some poorer communities face circumstances of deprivation that resemble those found in the 
aftermath of wars and natural disasters.  
The violent outcomes of this ‘decisive break with the postwar consensus’ and the ‘profound 
reshaping of social life’ it has set in motion are not hidden.555 Nobody living in Britain in the last 
decade can have failed to have notice the profound social changes effected by austerity. As Alston 
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concludes, the social catastrophe precipitated by austerity ‘is obvious to anyone who opens their 
eyes’.556 Indeed, it is difficult not to see the effects of this programme of reform. For example, the 
growing numbers of people begging and sleeping rough on the streets of British towns and cities, in 
parks and playing fields. Rough sleeping, the smallest but most visible tip of the homelessness crisis, 
has risen by 165% in England since 2010. Many local authorities have attempted to erase traces of 
rough sleeping and begging in public and commercial settings: by criminalising homeless people; 
through the forced movement of people from town and city centres; by introducing punitive bylaws, 
fines and sanctions, and in London and Liverpool through collusion with homelessness charities and 
the central government Home Office to deport non-national homeless people from the state 
itself.557 Despite these efforts the scale of the homelessness crisis is impossible to hide.  
Other symptoms of austerity, such as hunger and mental distress, are less acutely visible, 
and here both quantitative evidence and qualitative data is essential in enabling us to build a picture 
of what this ‘disappearance’ of the welfare state means.  For example, we know that austerity 
reforms of the benefits system targeted working-age adults, and that this has had a particularly 
pronounced impact on levels of child poverty. Britain’s leading independent microeconomic 
research institute, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, has detailed how austerity has wiped out the 
legacy of all previous attempts and political promises to eradicate child poverty. Indeed, child 
poverty, whether assessed via relative or absolute measures, has been increasing unremittingly 
since 2011. By 2023 to 2024 the proportion of children living in relative poverty (after housing costs) 
is on course to hit 37%’.558   As Alison Garnham, chief executive of the Child Poverty Action Group, 
states: ‘It’s increasingly evident, particularly to people working with children, that we’re in a child 
poverty crisis. And it is primarily to do with the massive cuts to benefits.’559  
A 2019 survey conducted by the National Education Union (NEU) among 8,600 school 
leaders, teachers and support staff, revealed that 97 per cent of staff in state-funded schools had 
seen a dramatic increase in poverty in schools, and were regularly required to feed and clothe 
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children in their care. When asked to describe the impacts of this planned impoverishment, ‘three 
out of four respondents said they saw children suffering from fatigue (78%), poor concentration 
(76%) or poor behaviour (75%); more than half said their students had experienced hunger (57%) or 
ill-health (50%)’.560 Further, more than a third of those surveyed said children in the schools in which 
they worked had experienced stigmatised bullying as a consequence of poverty.  Austerity is creating 
a hostile environment for children living in poverty in British schools.  
While austerity cuts have been implemented with haste, many biosocial symptoms of 
austerity are slower to reveal themselves. Deprivation accumulates in bodies over lifetimes. 
Nevertheless, health professionals have already documented ‘growing evidence of conditions not 
only exacerbated by poverty, but caused by it'.561 For example, national level data reveals rates of 
malnutrition amongst people admitted to hospital have doubled in the last decade, and there is an 
evidenced rise in diseases associated with poverty.562 This striking phenomenon has been dubbed, 
by both medical practitioners and journalists, as marking the return of 'Victorian Diseases'. For 
example, there has been a rise in reported cases of tuberculosis (an especially acute disease 
amongst homeless populations), scarlet fever, whooping cough, gout, and Vitamin-D deficiency 
(linked to anecdotal reports from multiple health professionals of a rise in cases of childhood rickets, 
and osteomalacia – the adult form of the disease).563  
That austerity is making people physically ill is underscored by the fact that life expectancy 
rates are declining amongst some population groups. In 2018, the National Office for Statistics 
published data that revealed that the predicted lifespan of deprived women in Britain had fallen for 
the first time since the 1920s, and that ‘the gap in life expectancy between the poorest and most 
advantaged’ women in England had reached a record high ‘now standing at seven years and 
five months’.564 Several subsequent studies have also suggested correlations between austerity cuts 
to adult social and elder care and rising excess mortality rates. In short, all the scientific evidence 
suggests that the ‘disappearance of the post-war British welfare state’ is foreshortening working-
class lives; and the lives of others, the elderly, the disabled, without the necessary accumulated 
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reserves of wealth to defend themselves or their loved ones against the grinding effects of the 
erosion of the social state.  
In his interim and final report, Alston draws our attention to the now familiar economic 
origin story of austerity, noting how these ‘far-reaching changes to the role of government’ were 
‘sold’ to the British electorate as ‘being part of an unavoidable program of fiscal “austerity”, needed 
to save the country from bankruptcy’.565 However, as Alston concludes, ‘the driving force’ behind 
austerity was not economics; rather austerity is a political project underpinned by an ideological 
‘commitment to achieving radical social re-engineering’.566  Alston notes that ‘the experience of the 
United Kingdom …. underscores the conclusion that poverty is a political choice’:   
 
Austerity could easily have spared the poor, if the political will had existed to do so. 
Resources were available [which] could have transformed the situation of millions of people 
living in poverty, but the political choice was made to fund tax cuts for the wealthy 
instead.567 
 
If the economic rationale for austerity as a necessary debt-reduction programme is fantastical, there 
was nevertheless considerable capital to be made through its implementation. In the case of 
austerity, the shock of the 2008 global banking crisis was seized upon as an opportunity not only to 
turn off the redistributive tap, but to frack the social state for profit by privatising public assets and 
services. In this regard, austerity, like previous historical rounds of capitalist enclosure, is a political 
ruse which has protected existing ‘concentrations of elite wealth and power’.568 Austerity has 
witnessed the whole-sale harnessing of financial and legal mechanisms of deregulation, extracting as 
much value as possible from Britain’s 'social estate', redistributing wealth, resources and land 
upwards.569 The winners under austerity have been the financial and corporate elites, who have not 
only emerged with ‘fortunes intact’ but ‘holding a larger than ever slice of the cake’.570 This has led 
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to the conclusion that 'austerity' is a proxy term for 'class war': a war of breath-taking cruelty waged 
against the poorest, the most disadvantaged and vulnerable members of British society.571  
 
[A] Austerity as enclosure  
 
Austerity is a 21st-century enclosure movement. By this, I mean that it is a political programme that 
involves the fracking of public goods by those in the service of capital, in ways which are designed to 
upend the customary forms of social provision cemented in the mid-twentieth century. The 
programme of austerity which began in 2010 was characterised by the rapid closure of local 
hospitals and clinics, public libraries, local museums, post offices, children’s nurseries, community 
and youth centres, day-centres and residential care homes for disabled people and pensioners, and 
the enclosure of common land, including parks and playing fields. The amount of services, facilities, 
buildings and land once held in common by local communities, now sold by cash-strapped local 
authorities to developers, or simply abandoned to decay, is staggering. The speed with which this 
expropriation has been undertaken has been shocking to witness. To take the just one small 
example, in 2019, West Sussex county council, a relatively wealthy area of South East England, 
announced that it was cutting the budget ‘it spends on housing support services for rough sleepers, 
victims of domestic abuse, care leavers, and frail older people in the county’ from £6.3 million to 
£2.3 million. Implementing this budget cut entailed dismantling ‘an entire social infrastructure of 
hostels, drop-in centres, and floating support teams built up over years’.572  
What we are witnessing in austerity Britain is the enclosure of local 'welfare commons', 
namely those public goods and services established by local communities through long histories of 
philanthropy, charitable and worker contributions (e.g. local taxation) and grassroots agitation. 
Entire material infrastructures, buildings, services and land – including those hospitals and schools 
that local communities campaigned for, and often paraded through the streets for in the nineteenth 
century – are disappearing.  
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The local patchworks of welfare institutions and services built up over centuries were first 
absorbed into the British welfare state in the 1940s and 50s. For the majority of citizens, the mid-
twentieth century 'statification' of welfare provisions brought significant improvements in terms of 
fairness of access, greater equality of treatment, and the national pooling of expertise and resource. 
Through privatisation, the British state is now expropriating these communal assets from the 
communities who originally fought for and financed them. Seen from the perspective of this longer 
history of welfare, austerity is nothing less a government-orchestrated programme of theft.  
It is not just buildings, essential services, material resources which have been enclosed in 
this process, but generations of public sector knowledge and expertise. Indeed, austerity has seen 1 
million workers in the public sector lose their jobs.573 Some statutory services have been contracted 
out to for-profit private sector organisations, where employment contracts are more precarious, 
work lower paid and conditions of work less protected. Swelling numbers of unpaid voluntary 
workers have attempted to keep services going, but after a decade of cuts many volunteers are 
burning out.  
As social safety nets are cut away, people are falling through the gaps in the emergent 
uneven, fragmented patchwork of state and charitable provisions. The enclosure of the 'welfare 
commons' has accelerated what charities have described as an epidemic of social isolation and 
loneliness. Elderly people and disabled people have been enclosed in their homes. Children with 
special and complex needs can’t get the support they require in school settings, and increasing 
numbers of children are now outside of formal education altogether. Young people like David are 
sleeping on the streets. Women are forced to remain with abusive partners as domestic violence 
shelters have been closed down. As Sisters Uncut, a collective ‘fighting against budget cuts to 
domestic and sexual violence organisations and services in Britain’ put it: ‘They cut, we bleed.’574  
 
[A] ‘The political violence of the state is becoming normalised’  
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It is estimated that 10 per cent of the British population is now ‘food insecure’: a situation defined as 
‘experiencing hunger, inability to secure enough food of sufficient quality and quantity to enable 
good health and participation in society, and cutting down on food due to financial necessity’.575 
Foodbanks and other mass forms of charitable emergency food provision were almost unknown in 
Britain between 1950 and 2010. Now every city and town in Britain has a foodbank, and some have 
several. In every deprived neighbourhood, networks of food clubs, food banks and other emergency 
feeding centres have sprung up. Every supermarket in every British town and city has an emergency 
food donation point near the checkouts. Special signs have been designed and printed for use on 
supermarket shelfs, which direct shoppers to the non-perishable food and provisions most useful 
and/or urgently required by local foodbanks. Staff at the university where I work are now 
encouraged to donate monthly to our local food bank through a 'salary sacrifice' scheme. Students 
regularly hold collections for the local food bank.  
I could go on – examples of the ways in which austerity has seeped its way into new forms of 
charitable giving is endless. My point is that the emergence of these new social and cultural 
infrastructures of alms-giving are inescapable in the everyday lives of all citizens, and in this respect 
the depth and scale of the poverty inaugurated by austerity is quite literally on public view. Yet, as 
Vicki Cooper and David Whyte suggest, after a decade of cuts we seem to have become so 
‘accustomed to the ease with which people are evicted and made homeless’, the foodbanks, the 
street-begging, and the mental health epidemic, ‘that we do not make the most obvious of 
observations; that the age that we live in is one in which the political violence of the state is 
becoming normalised’.576  
 
[A] Unseeing austerity 
 
One effect of the normalisation of austerity is that the depth and scale of the impoverishment it has 
effected is both hyper-visible, on every street corner and at every supermarket exit, and unseen or 
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perhaps unseeable. Indeed, despite mountains of social scientific and statistical evidence of every 
form, kind and shape, the devastating effects of austerity are repeatedly denied by the politicians 
who implemented this programme of reform, by some, not all, of the journalists who report on it, 
and by 'ordinary' members of the public; for example, readers of a 2019 Daily Mail newspaper story 
on child hunger in Britain typically responded in online comments: 
 
There is not one single kid in poverty in this country. Not a single one. Having a 360 instead 
of an Xbox One isn't poverty.  
 
Parents are given benefits and they do not spend it on their children. Parents have the latest 
phones, large TVs, smoke do drugs whilst children go hungry. 
 
This poverty delusion is just unreal problems fabricated by the left wing media. What I see is 
virtually full employment anybody that really wants a job has one. Lots of well-fed if not fat 
people not looking very hungry.577 
 
The disavowal was underscored by the response of government ministers to the Alston report. 
While I was writing this chapter, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond, was interviewed 
on Newsnight, the BBC’s flagship television news programme, and summarily dismissed Alston’s 
report as ‘nonsense’: ‘I don’t accept the UN rapporteur’s report at all,’ he stated. ‘Look around you, 
that's not what we see in this country.’578 Certainly, Hammond’s claim that the Alston report is 
untruthful because he cannot 'see' the effects of austerity is both disingenuous and chilling. Indeed, 
we might recall here Arundhati Roy’s description of the erasure of the lived realities of caste 
discrimination in contemporary India as a ‘Project of Unseeing’.  
For neoliberal dogmatists like multi-millionaire Hammond, who, as he puts it ‘believe that a 
market economy is the way to deliver a prosperous future for Britain’, austerity isn’t the problem. 
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There is nothing wrong, he says, with ‘the theory of how a market economy is supposed to work, in 
generating and distributing wealth’, because this is ‘the way that the text books tell us it will work’. 
Rather, the problem is that people are currently not ‘experiencing’ this economic doctrine in the 
right way. What Hammond seems to be suggesting is that international experts on poverty such as 
Philip Alston need to be tutored in perceiving the effects of austerity differently, they need to unsee 
poverty – or perhaps to perceive deepening pockets of poverty, illness, homelessness, hunger and 
avoidable deaths effected by austerity as a necessary stage in the implementation of market-based 
solutions to 'the problem' of state welfare itself.  
Philip Alston notes that when he read about this ’total denial of a set of uncontested facts’ in 
the British government responses to his report, he thought he might be reading ‘a spoof’.579 I know 
what he means, because the responses reminded me of Jonathan Swift’s satirical ‘A Modest 
Proposal’ (1729), in which Swift famously suggested that if we retrain our gaze we might see the 
rising tide of beggarly Irish infants not as a problem, but as an opportunity; indeed, a source of 
revenue if fattened up as meat for the tables of the rich. The economist and statistician Howard 
Freidman draws on ‘A Modest Proposal’ in a satirical take on US advocates of extreme 'fiscal 
discipline', writing that ‘the incessant whining of the poor for food, shelter, education, and other 
such extravagances has raised the decibel level so high that it’s scarcely possible to enjoy a polo 
match or savor a glass of Château Lafite in peace’.580  
The serious point is that in a political context where expert evidence about the effects of 
austerity, including evidence collated by the government’s own official accounting bodies, can be so 
swiftly denied as ‘nonsense’, how might those concerned with rising levels of poverty in 
contemporary Britain articulate the evidence? This dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that poverty 
is often experienced as deeply shameful. People often go to great lengths to conceal the scale of the 
difficulties they are facing from others, including from their own families and friends. As Stephanie, 
whose story opened this book notes: 
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I was always taught that everything stays within 'these four walls'.  The more debt I had, the 
more I had to isolate myself from everybody, because I couldn’t go out with the same 
people or even share conversations with the same people. My life experience started to 
radically diverge from that of former friends… we weren’t going out anymore, going on 
holidays, buying things. We were living off food bank parcels and struggling to keep a roof 
over our heads. There was nobody I would have discussed my situation with. I desperately 
tried to hide it. The shame was overwhelming.   
 
[A] Seeing austerity 
Poverty Truth is a grassroots social movement is grounded in the following principles: that those 
with lived experiences of poverty need to have voice and agency in social and political decision 
making; that people in poverty are not the problem, that poverty is everybody’s problem; and that 
effecting change begins with attitudinal change. At the core of the poverty truth movement is an 
understanding that stigmatising public beliefs about the causes of poverty are a block to social 
change, and that the sharing of lived experience is the first step in devising collective solutions. 
Poverty Truth is an anti-stigma movement.  
The Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth Commission (currently) covers a geographical area in 
North West England that includes the small city of Lancaster, the neighbouring seaside town of 
Morecambe and surrounding rural villages. The Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth Commission is 
composed of around a dozen people who have experienced or who are experiencing poverty, and a 
similar number of civic decision makers. Out local experts of experience represent some of those 
who borne the brunt of the grinding effects of a decade of cuts. They include David, whose 
testimony opened this chapter, and Stephanie, whose words opened this book. There is also Ian, an 
ex-soldier, a man in his late 50s who suffers from post-traumatic stress and physical disabilities 
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which mean that he is unable to work. Ian has previously been street homeless and with help from a 
charity he has now found a home, but has to choose between heating his home and feeding himself 
because the state benefits he is entitled to fall below the income required to be both warm and 
adequately nourished.  
Then there is Jack, a dad to four children, who is in full-time but low-paid work. Like four 
million workers in the austerity state, Jack is in caught in 'in-work' poverty, meaning his income 
(wages and 'top-up' benefits) do not meet the basic needs of his family. Jack tells me how, at the 
end of each summer, he is reduced to ‘begging and borrowing’ from family and friends to pay for his 
children’s school uniforms and school shoes.581  
There is also Mark, an ex-addict who has turned his life around, and now works helping 
others in a local addiction treatment centre; Tiffany, who has long-standing physical disabilities and 
has struggled negotiating changes to the disability welfare system; and Saskia, who is in long-term 
treatment for severe and enduring mental health problems. Patricia, from our local Irish Traveller 
community, who is concerned her family and community will be evicted from their homes, as the 
local authority plans to sell their Traveller site as part of austerity cuts.  
There is also Isla, a child poverty commissioner in her teens. In her testimony at the launch 
event in July 2018 at Lancaster Town Hall, Isla described how she felt ashamed at not being able to 
afford the £1 donation to charity on non-school uniform days, and how she suffered a breakdown 
when she and her mum faced eviction from her home – ‘thinking what was the point in living 
anymore if I couldn’t even look after my own mum.  I kept sinking and sinking. Until I couldn’t 
physically move with the weight of these feelings.’  
Alongside people living in poverty, the Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth commission includes 
many front-line workers, health professionals and charitable volunteers, who are working tirelessly 
to forge new networks of support to catch those now free-falling through the gaping holes left by 
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the erosion of previously tax-funded structures of social provision and care. For example, a local 
firefighter describes to us the intensification of psychological distress in his team, a consequence of 
the fact that they are now so frequently called out to attempted suicides, and a police officer relates 
how people in our local area commit petty crimes in the hope of getting arrested, as being held in 
custody is their best hope of accessing mental and physical health services – a snapshot of 
desperation supported by nationwide evidence from police forces across the UK (see Conclusion). A 
senior GP shares his concerns about colleagues ‘burning out’ from the stress of trying to treat 
patients with physical and mental health conditions caused by deprivation – problems with causes 
they can’t treat or solve. A youth worker relates how the teenagers he works with regularly admit 
that they are forced to steal from shops to feed and clothe themselves. A head teacher from a local 
primary school describes how children routinely arrive at her school hungry and who describes 
finding children rifling through rubbish bins for food between lessons, eating discarded fruit cores. 
She tells us about an episode in which a parent passed out in her school hall ‘through doing without 
meals’ and describes the cumulative impact on staff of having to comfort ashamed and tearful 
mums at the school gates; mums who have no means of adequately feeding their children, of their 
washing clothes, of heating homes.  
Working on the poverty commission has allowed me to forge new relationships with a wide 
range of people who have been impacted by the evisceration of the welfare state. It was through 
listening to the stories from the poverty commission that I fully came to appreciate the depth of 
despair and suffering which austerity has augmented within my local community. Community 
commissioners, and others with lived experiences of austerity cuts to welfare, health and social care, 
have taught me a vast amount about the fear, the shame and gnawing anxiety that accompany a 
hand to mouth existence in a society without secure safety nets. I have learnt also about the ripple 
effects of 'austerity trauma' on public sector workers and charitable volunteers.  
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The accounts of these different experts of experience are of critical importance in deepening 
our understanding of what the disappearance of the post-war British welfare state means in practice 
in peoples everyday lives. Together, they provide a documentary picture of the current crisis of basic 
social provisions of health, education and housing effecting so many within the British state. More 
than this, their experiences grants them the ‘difficult double vision’ that comes with living through a 
period of rapid social change.582 What I mean by this is that in their various roles as 'service users', 
professionals, welfare workers and volunteers, they have had a front seat in the unfolding of this 
dramatic decade of social change. They have witnessed, and in many cases participated in, the 
practices through which the transition from functioning welfare systems to a denuded austerity 
state has been enacted.  
 
[A] Austerity in my own life 
 
I know the geographical area covered by my local Poverty Truth commission well, intimately in fact. 
This is the region in which I was born, grew up and was educated. I have lived in Lancaster for 24 
years, almost all of my adult life. I work at Lancaster University as a sociologist, teaching and 
supervising students, and increasingly undertaking senior management and administrative work. I 
have brought up two children in this small city, one of whom still lives at home and attends the same 
local school as Isla. I am also the adult daughter of ageing, sick and disabled working-class parents 
and step-parents who live nearby. Like many adult children of sick or ageing parents, I am drawn 
continuously into engagements with health and social care providers as my family navigates 
depilated, complex and increasingly punitive systems of welfare, health and social care. Indeed, 
while I was writing Stigma, I spent a lot of time trying to access help and support for my parents, and 
experienced first-hand how austerity is accumulating in bodies, in families, in communities.  
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In May 2018, my stepdad, Mohamed, had a profoundly disabling stroke, which left him 
paralysed and wheelchair bound at the age of 63. Until his stroke, Mohamed had worked full-time 
on the minimum wage for a local furniture recycling charity. Navigating the welfare system to find 
appropriate care and support for him has been a challenge of Kafkaesque proportions. When we 
turned to a charity for advice on stroke rehabilitation and adult social care, we were told ‘there is no 
adult social care or community stroke support in this area anymore’. Mohamed suffers from post-
stroke psychosis, and we needed advice about how to interact with him in ways which wouldn’t 
exacerbate his distress. We were told that there were no longer any clinical psychiatrists employed 
in our local area due to NHS cuts. In desperation, I used social media to find a psychiatrist who I 
could ask for guidance on how we should manage his psychotic symptoms. Mohamed now lives in a 
care-home, and we are still struggling to access the support and rehabilitation services he requires. 
For example, we are currently trying to raise funds for an electric wheelchair to enable him to have a 
modicum of independent mobility, while he has been assessed as qualifying for an NHS wheelchair, 
we have been told there is three year waiting list. As my mum reflects, ‘It feels like they are just 
putting people like Mo in the dustbin, like human waste.'  
Half a mile away from the care home in which Mo now lives, my dad John lives in a small 
privately rented house with his disabled wife, Liz. They don’t live in poverty. They describe 
themselves as 'just about managing', with a household income made up of state old-age pensions, 
my dad’s small fire brigade pension, and a disability allowance (for Liz, who is severely crippled with 
rheumatoid arthritis). They have no savings and own no property. My dad has just turned 70. He 
began his working life at 14 on a turkey farm, and later spent 10 years as fire-fighter, before working 
as painter and decorator and builder’s labourer before he was forced by ill-health to stop work.  
My dad had a massive heart attack in his early 60s, and now has inoperable heart failure. He 
also has osteoarthritis so severe he is in permanent chronic pain with highly restricted mobility. His 
heart is too weak to undergo the knee and hip replacement operations that would have eased his 
suffering. He struggles to get up out of a chair. Once he is standing, he can walk gingerly with the 
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support of sticks, but he can no longer manage to climb the stairs in his home. Every evening he 
takes strong painkillers before he shuffles on his bottom up the stairs to get to his bedroom.  
The only bathroom in his home is upstairs, so during the day he resorts to weeing in a 
bucket downstairs. He is on a social housing waiting list for a bungalow as he urgently needs a 
downstairs bedroom and bathroom, hand rails and a walk-in shower. In the context of the current 
social housing crisis, it is likely to be a long wait – he is currently classified as being on the lowest 
band in terms of need. I helped my dad fill in the online application for adapted social housing. One 
of the questions asked what difference adapted housing would make to his life. When I asked him 
what to write, he said, ‘Just tell them I would like a little dignity.’ While I was writing this chapter my 
dad suffered a series of strokes and is currently, as he puts it with a smile, ‘just about alive’.  
As I shuttle back and forth, doing what I can to ease the lives of my disabled parents, I recall 
the ‘dispirited and exhausted’ words of the British sociologist Beverley Skeggs, who in a devastating 
account of her attempt to find adequate healthcare, social care and housing for her dying parents, 
concluded that this is a ‘destroyed system with so little humanity, only profit’.583  
 
[A] Actively disabling people  
 
Alongside forced movements of people, through evictions, displacement and homelessness, 
austerity immobilises people, as they find themselves progressively shut in, shut out and ‘left 
behind’. The immobilising effects of austerity enclosures are vividly illustrated through the impact of 
austerity measures upon disabled people who are living through the most severe cuts to state-
funded services of provision of any group at any time in the history of the modern welfare state.584 
To take just one example, the closure of a government fund called The Independent Living Fund (ILF) 
in 2015 saw ‘18,000 of the most severely disabled people in the country’ have the care packages 
which supported them to live independently axed.585 Set up in 1988, the ILF was a crowning 
achievement of the disability rights movement in Britain, allowing people with severe impairments, 
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on low incomes, to access care at home so that they could live outside residential settings – it was a 
direct outcome of the activism of people like Paul Hunt (Chapter Two). The government scrapped 
this £320 million fund completely, and devolved responsibility for care to local authorities, a process 
which has seen severe cuts in the care packages and allowances which enable people to live 
independent and dignified lives.  
As Mo Stewart has detailed, austerity was explicitly designed to contract disability as an 
administrative category, in order to reduce the ‘fiscal burden’ of disabled people.586 From 2010 
onwards, a punitive welfare machinery was erected which sought to reclassify disabled people as 
able (to fend for themselves). The process of reassessing disabled people’s ability to work involved 
the introduction of a testing regime called Work Capability Assessments – which was subcontracted 
to private multinational companies. Among many other consequences, this new testing regime has 
seen the removal of 75,000 adapted cars, powered wheelchairs and scooters from disabled people, 
leaving many quite literally enclosed within their homes.587  
My step-mum Liz has rheumatoid arthritis in her hands and feet so severe that she requires 
a specially adapted car to drive. Liz had previously qualified for a welfare benefit called the Disability 
Living Allowance (DLA) through which she was able to lease a specially adapted car through a 
government backed charitable scheme called Motability. While I writing this chapter Liz was 
reassessed for disability support under the new austerity points based system called Personal 
Independence Payments (PIP). Liz rang in tears to tell me that her adapted car was being taken 
away because she had missed the new criteria for ‘enhanced mobility support’ by 2 points. She 
considered an appeal, but an appeal meant losing a one-off bridging payment which would be 
essential in enabling them to afford to buy a second-hand adapted car.588  
Just as emergency food provision has become normalised over the last decade, public 
outrage over the violent expropriation of resources from disabled people quickly dissipated, and 
those humiliated and imprisoned through these cuts and changes were left to seek charitable aid -- 
many now crowdsource for adapted vehicles and wheelchairs online.589  
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The retrenchment of state support to disabled people not only signals a fundamental shift in 
governmental attitudes to ‘equal rights’, but signals a deeper shift in the political economy of 
dis/ability. For these cuts are not only adversely impacting on people with existing disabilities, but 
are actively disabling people, as those ‘struggling under the financial strain’, and the stress of 
proving their ‘deservedness’ within punitive systems of relief, become ‘ill, physically and 
emotionally’.590 For example, a 2014 National Health Service report revealed that 50 per cent of 
disabled benefit claimants have attempted suicide since the introduction of the work capability 
assessments.591 A 2016 academic study revealed that ‘each additional 10,000 people reassessed 
(using the WCA) in each area was associated with an additional 6 suicides, 2700 cases of reported 
mental health problems, and the prescribing of an additional 7020 antidepressant items’.592  
In 2016, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities visited 
Britain in response to information they had received from 2010 onwards from disability charities and 
civil rights organisations. This committee, which interviewed over 200 individuals, and collected 
3,000 pages of evidence, concluded that ‘that there is reliable evidence that the threshold of grave 
or systematic violations of the rights of persons with disabilities has been crossed.’593  Further, that 
the government ‘expressly foresaw’ the ‘adverse impact’ of austerity measures ‘on persons with 
disabilities’. The dismissal of these reports by the British government is an abject lesson in the fact 
that human rights, civil rights, legal rights and political rights have little traction in the absence of 
basic economic rights, namely the right to access the resources required for a liveable life.  
 
[A] The uneven geography of austerity 
 
Local perspectives on the impacts of austerity are particularly important because, as Alston notes, it 
is the local authorities ‘which perform vital roles in providing a real social safety net’ that have been 
most dramatically ‘gutted’ by cuts.594 The services provided by local authorities include education, 
housing, transport and leisure and statutory responsibilities for providing services to vulnerable 
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groups, including social care for the elderly, disabled adults and children. As recorded by the British 
government’s Public Accounts Committee, the scale of cuts to local authorities is truly staggering. 
Central government grants to local authorities, which used to be the primary mechanism for 
redistributing national taxation to local areas, have seen on average ‘a 49.1% real-terms funding 
reduction since 2010’, with an additional 77 per cent reduction being implemented at the time of 
writing.595 As Mia Gray and Anna Barford have detailed, ‘the politics of austerity “dumped” the fiscal 
crisis onto the local state’, effectively ‘devolving austerity to the local level’.596 What national level 
accounts of the impact of austerity invariably conceal are correlations between the depth of cuts 
and areas of already existing high rates of poverty and deprivation; for example, ‘within England, 
cities and local governments in the very north of the country saw the most severe cuts’.597 In short, 
the effects of austerity are radically geographically uneven, with disproportionate impacts in poorer 
regions, such as the North of England where my family and I live.598  
This is partly a consequence of a fundamental shift in the redistributive model through 
which local authorities are funded. Government grants to local authorities are being incrementally 
'devolved', and local governments are now increasingly required to raise much of their own income 
through local taxation (council tax and business rates) and the introduction of charges for services. 
This shift from a more universalist to a devolved funding model disadvantages poorer regions 
outside of the wealthier South East of England. In an attempt to manage this transition, local 
authorities are drawing on reserves; however, in poorer regions  ‘lower local property values mean 
there is less potential for local government to profit from renting or selling council assets, which 
could be used to buffer shrinking grants’.599 In the context of a the UK’s London-centric journalism 
and media coverage, these differences in the spatial geographies of austerity matter profoundly in 
terms of our ability to see the differential impacts of the disappearance of the welfare state. 
In 2018, a Midlands local authority, Northamptonshire County Council, declared itself 
bankrupt and central government-appointed commissioners assumed control over their budget: a 
process that saw ‘radical service cuts and halted all new expenditures except for statutory services 
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and the safeguarding of vulnerable people, and even these services have experienced cuts’.600 The 
National Audit Office (NAO) has revealed that one in ten county councils could run out of reserves by 
2021. If austerity continues (as currently planned), other local authorities will declare bankruptcy, as 
reserve funds are eroded and all existing assets sold off. The prospect of multiple bankruptcies in the 
public sector – which includes the bankruptcy of hospital and health trusts and schools, as well as 
local authorities – marks unchartered territory in the history of the modern British state.  
My own local authority, Lancashire County Council, is amongst those facing bankruptcy. On 
14 February 2019, in its latest attempt to balance the books, Lancashire County Council passed a £77 
million package of cuts to services for vulnerable adults and children, and committed to finding an 
additional £135m of savings in the four years leading up to 2021-22. As the council’s Labour 
opposition leader, Azhar Ali, stated, if implemented these cuts will 'sink communities' and 'lead to 
the loss of lives'.601 Protestors outside County Hall in Preston, the building in which elected local 
politicians gathered to vote on the latest proposed budget cuts, held up signs which said ‘Valentine’s 
Day Massacre’.  
My intention here isn’t to blame local authorities for cuts in budgets determined by national 
government. Nevertheless, it is important to draw attention to local fiscal responses to austerity, 
and to examine the ways in which the logic of neoliberal capitalism has become embedded within 
the structures of local government. As the housing and planning campaigner and scholar Michael 
Edwards argues, for some time local authorities have been encouraged, indeed compelled, to 
reimagine local resources and infrastructures (services, buildings, land) as financial assets, rather 
than as community resources whose value lies in their use.602 It is important to register also how 
state actors have increasingly, if sometimes unwillingly, become participants in the implementation 
of neoliberal projects of 'accumulation through dispossession'. Further, implementing these changes 
takes significant time and labour, and over the last decade, cutting budgets, demolishing services 
and enclosing local welfare commons has become the dispiriting day job of many civil servants and 
local politicians.  
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The devolution of austerity means in effect that people are unable to shape local decision-
making through elections, as the stripping bare of budgets means local politicians are effectively 
denuded of meaningful powers to change the situation faced by their constituents. At the same 
time, the outsourcing and privatisation of services and public goods have seen other structures of 
accountability fatally eroded – who do you hold to account if a for-profit service provider fails to 
provide safe or adequate care? For many, legal redress is no longer possible, as legal aid has also 
been closed off, as implemented in the 2012 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act. 
Unless you are wealthy enough to pay for legal representation, it is incredibly difficult to challenge 
decision-making around housing, family law, immigration, employment or welfare. It is no 
coincidence that legal aid was diminished at the same time as the government’s welfare revolution 
began.603 In short, the democratic tools through which individuals and communities might in the 
past have held local decision makers to account have been severely blunted.  
 
 
 [A] ‘We are completely beaten down by being dehumanised’  
 
If you work as a sociologist on issues of poverty and welfare in the austerity state, you will encounter 
stigma everywhere.  The word 'stigma' trips continually off tongues in everyday conversations about 
the experiences of those at the sharp end of the dismantling of the provisions, structures and 
institutions of the British welfare state.  Indeed, stigma was the red thread that connected all the 
stories told by people with experiences of poverty on the Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth 
Commission. At the heart of every single account of living in poverty I have listened to, were 
profoundly distressing experiences of being stigmatised, and the debilitating impact of the 
cumulative effects of stigma upon individuals' mental and physical health. As one commissioner 
describes it, ‘We are completely beaten down by being dehumanised’.  
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The experiences of people on my local Poverty Commission track a decade of an ongoing 
attempt by the British government ‘to permanently disable the protection state’604 – a programme 
of reforms which the former Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan Smith described in 2015 as 
‘nothing short of a revolution’: ‘the most ambitious programme of welfare reform for over a 
generation’, ‘a complete shift in the welfare culture in this country: no longer just pouring money in 
as Labour did, maintaining people in dependency’.605 Austerity sought, in the parlance of politicians, 
to 'change people’s behaviour', to make them more 'resilient' and 'less dependent'. This 'welfare 
revolution' rapidly saw the apparatus of the welfare state plunged into chaos; the privatisation of 
some services; a movement to online-only application processes; cuts to benefit payments; the 
introduction of workfare regimes; the use of psychometric testing regimes to assess applicant’s 
'attitude' and willingness to work, and a regime of punitive sanctions which saw benefits withdrawn 
for the slightest perceived infraction. Within a few short years, the government systematically 
redesigned the delivery of welfare provisions in ways that sought to humiliate people, a system of 
degradation rituals which sought to deter people from making a claim on the state for support. 
Stigma was used as a 'deterrent' ostensibly to force people off benefits and into work – an anathema 
in a social context of near full employment and where, for many, waged work is increasingly 
precarious and often no longer pays enough to meet basic needs.  
People on the Poverty Commission also describe the cumulative impact of living in a society 
where stigma frames political and media coverage and debate around welfare issues, and the ways 
in which this all-pervasive 'welfare stigma' shapes people’s attitudes towards them as scroungers, as 
fraudulent, as scum. Indeed, one of the things which working on the Poverty Commission has taught 
me, is that it is imperative that we theorise stigma on different scales and across multiple sites. If 
stigma is relational, it is a relation which not only exists between people in the immediacy of social 
interactions; stigma is a power relation which is exercised across the network of relations between 
people, society, media-culture and the state. In order to counter stigma, it is imperative to track the 
relations between people’s experiences of stigma in everyday contexts, and the governmental 
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production of stigma. When we theorise stigma as embedded within political economies – as the 
lubricant of neoliberal capitalism – we can begin to understand how stigma functions to devalue 
entire groups of people, with the purpose of fortifying existing social hierarchies, reproducing 
inequalities, and creating new opportunities for capital.  
 
[A] Welfare stigma as a rationing device  
 
Governing welfare through stigma production is not a new phenomenon. The cultivation of stigma 
has always played a pivotal role in the rationing of welfare, and in winning consent for periodic 
attacks on social provision.  As Robert Walker argues, ‘governments have over many centuries 
sought to employ stigma as a means of rationing benefits and encouraging personal independence’, 
for ‘reasons of ideology, opportunistic reactions to discriminatory public opinion, or pragmatic 
operational concerns’.606  In short, stigma is ‘a key mechanism in perpetuating the structures of self-
interest that support the unequal distribution of resources in society’.607 
 In 1970 the sociologist Robert Pinker set out to classify different ‘welfare systems’ according 
to ‘their stigmatising propensities’.608 Pinker was working in a liberal tradition of social policy 
scholarship, which approaches the question of social provision and wealth redistribution as a 
compromise between ‘the ethics of mutual aid’ and ‘the liberties of the free market’.609 He suggests 
that twentieth-century welfare settlements  – in liberal democracies such as Britain – operate on a 
sliding scale between socialist principles of mutual aid and reciprocity, and free market principles of 
capitalist enterprise, and combines both ‘therapeutic and stigmatising functions.’610 Stigma, Pinker 
argues, is ‘an administrative technique for rationing scare resources’.611  
The state cultivates stigma through deployment of particular cultural figures, such as the 
moral figure of the hard-working taxpayer and the abject figure of the welfare scrounger. This 
stigma production (from above) is employed to teach people to feel revulsion ‘for stigmatising 
dependency’, to habituate them ‘to a place of lowly social esteem’, to encourage them to accept 
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feelings of inferiority, and through this process to become adapted to poverty (as a 'natural 
condition' of their position in class society).612  
As I have highlighted throughout this book, stigma is a site of social and political struggle 
over value. Welfare stigma is not passively accepted by those it is impressed upon. It is a form of 
power characterised by coercion and resistance, and gives rise to intensive class struggles as people 
seek to defend themselves against shaming judgements. Pinker suggests that the ‘level and 
intensity’ of the class conflicts that follow in the wake of the periodic intensification of welfare 
stigma are ‘determined by the ways in which people learn’ or acquiesce to ‘their welfare roles’ and 
‘the extent to which the needful believe they have the right to demand from the privileged’.613  In 
what follows, I will consider why stigma power proved so effective in winning consent for austerity 
reforms. 
 
[A] Neoliberal welfare stigma 
 
Social policy scholars have argued that the rise of neoliberalism has been characterised by the 
deliberate restitution of stigma as a policy mechanism for reducing welfare costs and entitlements. 
This is not a trend confined to Britain, for example a research project titled ‘Shame, social exclusion 
and the effectiveness of anti-poverty programmes: A Study of Seven Countries’ (2010–-2012) led by 
Robert Walker at Oxford University, suggested that the heighted stigmatisation of redistributive 
programmes of state welfare is a global phenomenon.614  
In Good Times, Bad Times: The Welfare Myth of Them and Us (2015), John Hills draws on 
social attitudes data to examine links between the growing stigmatisation of working-age people in 
receipt of benefits and implementation of cuts to state welfare. Hills argues that during previous 
economic recessions, public support for welfare provisions has increased as poverty and hardship 
become visible in people’s everyday lives. In contrast, in austerity Britain there has been a 
demonstrable hardening of public attitudes towards welfare claimants, particularly working- age 
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benefits claimants. This is striking in a period of stagnating wages and insecure work, when welfare 
benefits have been diminishing, and poverty amongst groups historically seen as 'deserving', such as 
children and disabled people, has been rapidly increasing.615 To explain this hardening of public 
attitudes, Hills examines the 'welfare myths' that underpin public support for the austerity era 
welfare retrenchment. He suggests that successive governments have deliberately contracted the 
meaning of 'welfare' – that is, what ‘the welfare state’ includes, means, denotes – and that welfare 
has been reimagined as an unaffordable system of cash benefits doled out to ‘economically inactive’ 
people, rather than the mass services, such as health and education, on which the vast majority of 
citizens depend. As Hill observes, a central challenge is how to contest the hegemony of this anti-
welfare common-sense.616 It is the argument of this chapter that challenging welfare myths requires 
a deeper understanding of how welfare stigma operates as a form of power.  
Social policy research offers ample evidence for changes in public opinions about welfare. 
However, there has been less consideration of precisely how (and by whom) public opinion is 
formed.617 An attention to the precise mechanisms of welfare stigma, how it is produced and 
disseminated, is critical for understanding how the political project of austerity has been so 
effective. This involves examining how welfare stigma produced, by whom, how it is represented 
and circulated. It means scrutinising the 'stimulation of stigma' around specific policies, and the 
impacts of this intensification of stigma on people’s perceptions of themselves and others. It also, as 
I have detailed in previous chapters, involves a deeper historical analysis of the ways in which 
eruptions of stigma draw their energy from sedimented forms of classed, gendered, disablist and 
racialised othering and oppression.  
The implementation of austerity involved a concerted effort by different agencies of the 
state, notably politicians and those working in media industries, to re-story the 2008 financial crisis 
in the banking sector: first as a crisis of national debt, then as a crisis of the unaffordability of state 
welfare, and finally as a moral crisis which only a slash and burn approach to the social state could 
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purge. In short, the political economy of austerity was lubricated by a moral economy of un-
deservedness, and was fuelled by stigma power.  
 
[A] ‘Bring back the welfare stigma’ 
 
There is nothing hidden about the state production of welfare stigma as a governmental strategy. In 
the context of the global rise of neoliberal economic orthodoxy, right-wing commentators have 
openly called for the intensification of welfare stigma as a means of slashing the social state. For 
example, in 2009 the American eugenicist political scientist Charles Murray argued that stigma has 
been an essential component of the government of welfare in the US. Murray contrasts ‘the 
American Model’, in which stigma is employed ‘to discourage dependence’, with a ‘European model’ 
that ‘says that people should look upon assistance as a right’. According to Murray, ‘stigma is the 
way out’, the tool, the device, the machine required to break ‘a cradle-to-grave system of 
government-decided support’.618 In 2014, US Republican blogger and journalist Daniel Payne 
published a think-piece titled ‘Bring Back The Welfare Stigma’, in which he similarly stated: 
 
…look to Europe, where many countries have de-stigmatized their way into astronomical 
debt levels and widespread, chronic citizen helplessness. Keeping welfare firmly in the 
stigmatized realm is not merely a conservative crusade; it’s good policy, too.619 
Murray’s 1997 book, What It Means to Be a Libertarian, proposed that all social security be 
abolished, that government be reduced to the barest essentials (defence, law and order and 
environmental protections) and that state welfare provisions should be replaced by forms of 
‘localism’, by which he meant charitable and voluntary sector support. This manifesto is in effect a 
blueprint for the denuded British austerity state, and stigma, as Murray encouraged, was the 




[A] The war on welfare 
 
In 2011, the then British prime minister, David Cameron, declared a ‘war on welfare culture’: ‘The 
benefit system has created a benefit culture. It doesn't just allow people to act irresponsibly, but 
often actively encourages them to do so.’620 The architects of austerity knew that effective 
stigmacraft would be critical to winning public consent for welfare reform. In short, in order to 
implement a project on the scale of austerity, you have to be able to make the public feel that those 
in receipt of 'welfare' – now reimagined as cash benefits rather than all public services – are not 
deserving. This involved a collective effort by politicians, policy-makers and journalists to portray 
working-age people in receipt of benefits as ‘an illegitimate burden on society’.621  From 2010 
onwards, and peaking in 2014/15 when the main legislate plank of austerity, the Welfare Reform Act 
2014, was being enshrined in law, an orchestrated alliance of political, civil society and media actors 
combined forces to craft a moral panic about welfare dependency.  
This war on welfare culture took the form of massive propaganda exercise in which an 
alliance of political and media forces combined in the production of a welfare stigma machine. This 
stigma machine churned out an abject cast of figures of dependency, who functioned as character 
props in the political storying of a welfare crisis. The three figures who organised this 
representational field were the hardworking taxpayer, the profligate scrounger, and the conniving 
migrant. These figures were repeatedly weaponised in political speeches, reality television 
programmes and newspaper headlines, to manufacture grievances about the social and economic 
injustice of ‘welfare dependency culture’.622 ‘This is a fight. We are really going to go after the 
welfare cheats,’ the austerity chancellor George Osbourne declared in 2010. ‘A welfare cheat is no 
different from someone who comes up and robs you in the street.'623   
This project was extraordinary for its scale, the diversity of mediums and instruments it 
orchestrated, and its consistency in political messaging. Key themes about the need to root out the 
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evils of benefit dependency were reproduced in every conceivable media and cultural form. For 
several years, the menace of welfare-dependent people was maintained as rolling news by 
politicians, government officials, think tanks, media executives, journalists and television producers. 
Most notably, there was ‘an explosion’ British reality television programmes that centred on the 
everyday lives of people claiming benefits, a new genre that was dubbed ‘poverty porn’.624 Reality 
television producers churned out hundreds of hours of prime-time television programmes about 
'real life' feckless, immoral, undeserving and deficient welfare claimants. A stigma feedback loop 
emerged in which the characters these television programmes makers constructed, and the 
storylines they scripted, would circulate across the public sphere, to be captured as 'evidence' for 
the necessity of austerity reforms. Consider, for example, the following parliamentary debate in the 
House of Commons on 13 January 2014: 
 
Philip Davies (Conservative MP): Has the Secretary of State managed to watch programmes 
such as Benefits Street and On Benefits & Proud? If so, has he, like me, been struck by the 
number of people on them who manage to combine complaining about welfare reform with 
being able to afford to buy copious amounts of cigarettes, have lots of tattoos, and watch 
Sky TV on the obligatory widescreen television? Does he understand the concerns and 
irritation of many people who go to work every day and pay their taxes but cannot afford 
those kinds of luxuries? 
Iain Duncan Smith (Secretary of State for Work and Pensions): My hon. Friend is right, many 
people are shocked by what they see. That is why the public back our welfare reform 
package, which will get more people back to work and end these abuses. All these abuses 




[A] Benefits broods 
 
In ‘“Benefits broods”: The cultural and political crafting of anti-welfare commonsense’ (2015) Tracey 
Jensen and I tracked the passage of the Welfare Reform Act (2012) through Parliament.626 One of 
the most controversial elements of this legislation was ‘the household benefits cap’ which sought to 
restrict the total income a family could receive from state benefits. What we noted is that the 
passage of this act was accompanied by the intensive stigmatisation of what politicians termed 
‘welfare dependent families’ and newspapers called ‘Benefits Broods’, namely poor families that 
included an above average number of children.627 Across multiple genres of media production – 
reality television, tabloid and broadsheet newspapers, social media, political speeches and policy 
publications – the public were tutored to feel revulsion towards large families in receipt of state 
welfare benefits. Indeed, we mapped a stigma relay in which politicians would cite highly selective 
and often fictionalised media stories about families on benefits as empirical evidence in support of 
cuts to benefits. The crafting of representations of highly salacious, scandalous stories about 
‘Benefits Broods’ operated as a moral device through which broader 'anti-welfare sentiments' could 
be fomented.  
What this case study revealed is the central role that the media crafting of welfare stigma 
played as a mechanism of consent for austerity – particularly when austerity cuts targeted those 
traditionally considered deserving groups, such as children. As Pinker suggested, the ‘imposition of a 
stigma by the privileged’ is a mechanism through which the public is incited to condemn the so-
called excessive ‘demands of the poor’ in ways which allowed them to preserve ‘their own sense of 
moral rectitude’.628 
The role of governmental stigmacraft in winning legitimacy for a state-led initiative of 
enclosure, destruction and dispossession on the scale witnessed in austerity Britain cannot be 
understated. The production of welfare stigma was the mechanism through which public 




[A] ‘To you we’re just human waste’  
This welfare stigma machine churned through wider society, settling in institutional forms, 
embedding in the design of social policies, and infecting the culture, practices and attitudes of 
welfare workers. It changed the ways in which the public made evaluative judgements about 
inequality, welfare, poverty and need. It tutored the public to believe that people living in poverty 
were lazy or feckless, and that the forms of distress which followed in the wake of austerity were 
deserved – a consequence of people’s own poor behaviours, bad choices and indiscipline. Indeed, it 
incited calls for harsher punishments.  
These ideologies ‘matter profoundly’ because, as Antonio Gramsci argues, they become 
‘organic’ to the life of society, they acquire ‘a validity which is psychological; they organize human 
masses and create the terrain’ within which we move and act, and through which we ‘acquire 
consciousness’ of our position.629  As Leeds Poverty Commission put it in their 'Humanifesto': 
When you’re experiencing poverty, what really grinds you down is the way other people 
perceive you. The media often portray low-income families in unsympathetic and sometimes 
insulting terms. Feckless. Scroungers. Skivers. And this leads the public to think that the 
hard-up have only themselves to blame, and they treat them with disdain.630 
The all-pervasive stigma-optics of austerity transformed ways of seeing poverty, hardening people’s 
feelings to the suffering of those around them: those queuing outside the foodbanks springing up in 
every town and city, those bodies accumulating on every street corner and doorway. This changed 
how people related to each other, eroding structures of care, corroding compassion. ‘People don’t 
care about each other anymore,’ Stephanie says. As another member of my local Poverty 
Commission said to me, his face flushing with anger and shame: ‘To you we’re just human waste.’  
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[A] ‘One constant cycle of judgement’ 
This welfare stigma machine also changed how people thought about themselves. I opened Stigma 
with Stephanie’s story, which highlighted the ways in which the welfare stigma saturates and 
permeates everyday encounters in the austerity state. Stephanie recounted a decade of stigmatising 
encounters with corporate agencies, banks and debt companies, and agencies of the state, job 
centre officials, the private sector medical professionals employed to assess her ability to undertake 
paid work. As she moves through the increasingly punitive landscape of austerity, Stephanie finds 
herself needled with stigma at every turn. It is inescapable, seeping incessantly into her world, 
through the discussions on the radio as she drives her car, the television programmes she watches 
with her daughter. Caught within the vice-like grip of the welfare stigma machine, she is increasingly 
unable to fend off the weight of stigma pressing down on her. She comes to anticipate stigma. She is 
enclosed by stigma:  
You only have to watch any programme and there is evidence there that your kind are 
hated. These people are stealing your taxes and you’re thinking 'that is me they are talking 
about'. It is yet another channel into you. Trapped in this cycle of being hated by everybody. 
It keeps coming, it keeps on coming. It's relentless. Never ending. One constant cycle of 
judgement. Until you are ashamed to do anything. 
 
While official statistical data provides evidence of austerity’s effects, it doesn’t fully capture how 
austerity gets under the skin.  As China Mills argues, ‘austerity is lived and felt as affective force and 
atmospheric fear, a pervasive psychological and bodily anxiety, shame, and anger, differing in 
intensity at different times, and fatiguing the body – physically and psychologically wearing it out.’ 631 
The violence of austerity is written on the skin, it digs itself into the flesh – an epidermalization of 
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stigma which reverberates with the much longer penal history of stigma power. The stigma machine 
of austerity leaves permanent marks ‘on the bodies of those condemned by the logic of the market 
never to prosper’.632  
Stephanie carves welfare stigma into her skin. A practice of self-stigmatisation which, as she 
explains it, is an attempt to articulate and express the shame she feels – has been made to feel. By 
cutting the stigma which has been pressed upon her into her skin, Stephanie turns herself into a 
stigma object, as though if she can become the thing which the stigma machine of made her, if she 
can express the depth of her own self-loathing, she can say ‘enough already’ and break the cycle of 
stigma and shame.  
There are many austerity stories like Stephanie’s; there is nothing unusual about it, apart 
from how succinctly it compresses the links between crushing experiences of being stigmatised and 
the incessant force of mechanised top-down stigma production from above. Stephanie’s austerity 
story is an indictment of those who crafted the welfare stigma machine. Her body is a witness 
statement. The scars and psychological wounds she bears testify to how stigma emerges within 
wider degrading systems of social classification.  
The welfare stigma machine, which was crafted and designed to implement the political 
project of austerity, destroys people’s mental health. Alongside the ‘slow deaths’ which can be 
attributed to austerity, Mills draws our attention to ‘austerity suicides’. As she writes, in 2013 
suicides reached a 13-year high in the UK, ‘with population-level data linking this increase to 
austerity policies’.633 Mills documents the entangled relationship between this marked increase in 
mental distress and the ‘economy of the anxiety caused by punitive welfare retrenchment’, the 
internalisation of market logic that assigns value through ‘productivity’. As she writes:    
It is not a coincidence that some people deemed a ‘burden’ by neoliberal market logic would 
end their lives. People are killing themselves because they feel exactly the way the 
government is telling them they should feel – a burden. Put another way, people are killing 
 188 
themselves because austerity is killing them. Austerity suicides may be read as the ultimate 
outcome of the internalisation of eugenic and market logic underlying welfare reform driven 
by austerity. Such deaths make visible the slow death endemic to austerity.634  
As Mills cogently argues, attention to the psychic life of austerity is critical for understanding the 
threads of connection between the cumulative effects of stigma as lived experience and the 
governmental exercise of stigma – the relation which is at the heart of the reconceptualisation of 
stigma as power in this book.  
Steve Tombs argues, ‘austerity is a story about social inequality and avoidable business-
generated, state-facilitated violence: that is, social murder’.635As Chris Grover reflects, Fredrick 
Engel’s term ‘social murder’ is appropriate in the context of austerity because the ‘detrimental 
consequences’ of this programme are ‘both known and avoidable’.636  This diagnosis of ‘social 
murder’ echoes Ruth Gilmore’s definition of racism as ‘state sanctioned and/or extralegal 
production and exploitation of group differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death'.637 Certainly, 
austerity seems designed to enact ‘the unequal distribution of life and death’.638 Indeed, in the 
austerity state any form of life that cannot ‘produce values according to market logics’ is ‘ferreted 
out and strangled’.639   
 
[A] Unsettling the Welfare Settlement  
 
In Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (1971), Frances Fox Piven and Richard 
Cloward caution us against romantic and nostalgia accounts of the welfare state(s).640 As they argue, 
the longer history of state welfare ‘belies the popular supposition that government social policies, 
including relief policies, are becoming progressively more responsible, humane, and generous’.641 As 
they note, ‘the historical pattern is clearly not one of progressive liberalization; it is rather a record 
of periodically expanding and contracting relief rolls as the system performs its two main functions: 
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maintaining civil order and enforcing work’.642 While national governments have frequently been 
forced to intervene to ameliorate the impact of the ‘untrammelled forces of the marketplace’, and 
while ‘social welfare programmes’ have periodically benefited ‘those at the bottom of the economic 
order’, impetus to action around poverty is as much guided by labour requirements as by charitable 
or moral imperatives, or indeed rights-based or social justice claims. Further, the British welfare 
state is not ‘a thing’, but a site of contradictory and contested institutional practices and policy 
formations. Welfare is a settlement between labour and capital which has always been 
compromised by gendered, classed and racialised inequalities. (We might usefully recall Jeremy 
Bentham’s plans for a carceral workfare welfare state at the juncture, and the fact that Britain’s 
welfare state was funded through colonial enterprise). 
 
Nevertheless, writing in the wake of a decade of austerity, where the most progressive aspects of 
the programmes of reform instituted by the post-war British welfare state are now in reverse gear; 
when the ‘assumption that the state should play a redistributive role in ameliorating the 
consequences of capitalism’ has been upturned; when the political architects of austerity have 
consigned democratic welfare dreams to the rubbish dump of history; when so much of the state 
infrastructure of social provision and care has been laid to waste; when those who seek access to 
state benefits and entitlements are, once more, deeply stigmatised, it is imperative to recall the 
powerful social effects of (partly) de-stigmatised welfare provisions.643  
 
[A] Welfare disinheritance 
Welfare settlements represent a ‘distinctive site of connection between people, politics and policies, 
constructing relationships, practices and identities of “citizenship”’.644 Beveridge’s welfare state 
provided not only safety net, but was a structure of care and a site of imaginary investments which 
transformed the lives of people in post-war Britain.  
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The social historian Carolyn Steedman was a working-class child in the 1950s, a period when, 
as she writes, the state was practically engaged in making children healthy and literate’.645 For 
Steedman, growing up during that first utopian blush of the post-war welfare settlement involved 
concrete material benefits. As she writes, ‘It was a considerable achievement for a society to pour so 
much milk and so much orange juice, so many vitamins, down the throats of its children, and for the 
height and weight of those children to outstrip the measurements of only a decade before.’ 646  What 
the broadly egalitarian welfare state era also bestowed was a new value system; as Steedman 
describes: ‘My inheritance from those years is the belief (maintained always with some difficulty) 
that I do have a right to the earth.’ She notes: ‘I had a right to exist, was worth something.’647 
The welfare inheritance so movingly described by Steedman has been stolen. The 
compromise between labour and capital which the twentieth-century welfare state represented in 
Britain no longer holds. Indeed, we are currently living through a period of dis-inheritance. If 
twentieth-century welfare capitalism transformed class relations in Britain, austerity is upending 
class society once more. Steedman’s belief that she ‘had a right to exist’ and ‘was worth something’ 
has become Daniels’ cry of despair and rage: ‘You have no hope. It feels like the government are 
trying to make a superior race – the rich get richer and the poor get poorer’. 
It is not only that the current neoliberal assault on the welfare state has led to ‘deepening 
inequalities of income, health and life chances’ on ‘a scale not seen since before the Second World 
War’, but that those very groups who gained most from the British post-war settlement – women, 
children, disabled people and the multi-ethic working class – are now those most deeply impacted 
by deepening inequalities unfolding from its dismantlement.648 Indeed, the historical inequalities 
and stigmatising classifications latent within systems of social provision are the stigma fault lines 
which have been fracked by the enclosure architects of austerity, and mined as a source of 
discontent through which to generate social divisions.649 To obscure the political origins of the 
welfare crisis, the stigma machine of austerity purposefully generates class factions – the irony being 
that the undoing of the welfare settlement impacts (unevenly) on everybody, from cradle to grave. 
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[A] The unsettling of the welfare settlement 
 
Austerity is an anti-social and an anti-democratic movement which signals a deeper unravelling of 
the social contract between citizens and the state. That is, if British citizens are no longer collectively 
willing to meet the basic needs of children, disabled people, the elderly, and other vulnerable 
citizens – to shelter, care and education through state organised systems of wealth redistribution 
(taxation) – then what kind of state we are in? Can a state with only skeletal social provisions, a state 
in which the provisions which exist are so unequally distributed by geography, be called democratic?  
What kind of state is a state without a functioning welfare state?  
In place of the 'big state' envisioned by architects of the British welfare state in the mid-twentieth 
century, what is emerging is an uneven patchwork of social provision. A depilated, stretched and 
stressed health and public sector pegged together by armies of unpaid charitable volunteers, 
combined with the emergence of new private for-profit health, social care and educational 
provisions for those who can afford to pay. Indeed, in terms of widening economic, social and health 
inequalities, the austerity welfare state increasingly resembles that of the first decades of the 
twentieth century, when much welfare was dependent on philanthropists.650 Many of Britain’s 
poorest citizens are already reliant on the charity of the individuals and corporations whose 
predatory capitalism (and tax-avoidance) contributed to the crisis we are in.  
There are more than echoes of early historical periods of social provision in the austerity 
state, and it is with historical warnings about the abdication of the state, the erosion of democracy 
and the return of charity in mind that I want to conclude this chapter by returning to a final time to 
Lancaster Town Hall, and to a period before the post-war welfare state. 
 
[A] Ashton Hall, Lancaster Town Hall 1909 
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The public launch event for the Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth Commission on Friday 6 July 2018 
was held in Ashton Hall, the largest room within the town hall. Lancaster town hall was opened in 
1909, and was privately financed by a local industrialist, ‘Lino King’ James Williamson (1842–1930). 
Bestowed the title Lord Ashton in 1895, Williamson employed an estimated 25 per cent of 
Lancaster’s working-age population, men and women and teenagers in his Linoleum (oil cloth) 
factories, cotton mills and quarries.651 Lancaster’s principal industry in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was linoleum manufacture, a commodity which consisted of coating cotton to 
produce table-cloths, floor-coverings, tiles and wall-coverings. The Linoleum industry involved 
largely unskilled and semi-skilled manual labour, and was completely dominated by two employers, 
Williamson (Lord Ashton) and the Storey family. Williamson’s Lune Mills factory complex was so vast 
that in 1894 it boasted that it was ‘the largest manufactory of its class in the world’: ‘we may say, 
without any fear of contradiction, that the mammoth works on the banks of the Lune, at Lancaster, 
are the most extensive in the universe, that are owned and controlled solely by one individual'.652 By 
the time he died, James Williamson, was one of the richest men in Europe. He was also a ruthless 
capitalist, an autocrat and a tyrant.   
The sociologist Alan Warde argues that two features made Lancaster distinctive during its 
industrial heyday was its predominately unskilled and semi-skilled working-class population (the 
absence of either a large skilled working class or a significant middle-class), and the striking 
‘quiescence of its working class’.653 Indeed, this was a town notable for the absence of any significant 
recorded history of working class struggle, its workforce remained largely un-unionised and neither 
of the Linoleum manufactures saw any significant strike in their histories, which spanned over a 
hundred years. Indeed, Williamson and the Storey family collaborated in their domination of the 
local labour market, refusing to employ workers who were sacked by the other, only recognising 
very small number of unions (craft unions and no general unions), and secretly collaborating in 
setting local wage levels. 654 This left the vast majority of the town’s workers without any political 
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representation or bargaining power in the workplace. The domination of these firms over the local 
labour market continued into the 1970s.  
In the 1970s, Elizabeth Roberts, a pioneer of oral history who studied and worked at 
Lancaster University, captured the views of many working-class people in Lancaster about 
Williamson’s reign of terror over the town. For ‘up to sixty years…up to 1930 we lived in fear,’ one 
local man told her. ‘You daren’t open your mouth in Lancaster to criticise Lord Ashton.’655 A former 
cotton mill worker, who began working for Williamson as a child of fourteen – while the town hall 
was being built – recalled a labour practice which subcontracted the work of unskilled trainees to 
skilled weavers, which made the weaver responsible for paying wages. In practice this meant that 
some weeks she didn’t get paid at: ‘You see, after all was said and done it was slave labour. The 
manufactures got an awful lot of work for nothing. No wonder they got rich,’ she said.656 Another 
former employee describes how Williamson treated his workers ‘like dogs’, recalling how the 
stonemasons employed in his quarry regularly died from silicosis: ‘their life expectancy was 35 to 40, 
then they were finished’.657   
Lancaster’s working class simmered with resentment towards the 'philanthropy' bestowed 
on them by Williamson. It angered them that Williamson used the profits from their labour to fund 
the lavish town hall, parks and monuments, yet failed to do anything to address the low wages and 
slum conditions in which many of his workers lived. One of Roberts’ interviewees, a local 
government worker said: ‘As an employer of labour and living in Skerton and knowing of a lot of the 
slums in Skerton, if he’d had the interest of the town at heart [think] how many houses he could 
have built’.658 The interviewee goes on to explain how it would have been ‘a flea bite to him’, and 
‘he could have got his money back in rent in years and that would have been something for the 
town.’ Indeed, entering some of the districts in Lancaster in the first decades of the twentieth 
century was, as his wife described it, ‘like going into the depths of despair’– houses with ‘no back 
way out, lack of fresh air ventilation, flue ventilation, small windows, even the window panes would 
be small squares and you could almost smell the atmosphere’.659 These interviewees are at pains to 
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stress that those living in these slum conditions were often ‘very, very respectable’ people; working 
families who had inadequate water supplies (sharing communal taps and outdoor toilets).660 The 
lack of proper sanitation and the forced use of shared rubbish tips (middens) led to regular 
outbreaks of food poisoning, disease and high levels of child mortality. As a local doctor interviewed 
by Roberts recalls, ‘The children were thin and skinny and very often anaemic. The parents had very 
poor wages. They go together, poverty and disease. Lack of hygiene, lack of opportunity.’661  
Williamson was ‘reputed to use a telescope at home to watch workers arriving at work in 
the mornings’ and kept ‘a black book’ to record ‘miscreant behaviour among his workforce’.662 He 
also operated a sophisticated local surveillance network of informants who reported on the activities 
of local trades union activists and socialists: ‘He used to have his spies out in the pubs.’663  Through 
his networks, Williamson also extended complete control over local and national level political 
representation, controlling local municipal elections and determining who would be the local MP; as 
one of Robert’s interviewees put it: ‘You had to be very careful who you talked to about who you 
voted for.’664 During the period that Lancaster Town Hall was being constructed. Williamson was 
incensed by reports from his spies that local socialists and members of the Independent Labour 
Party (formed in 1893) were blaming him for high levels of in-work poverty. Williamson categorically 
denied that he paid poverty wages and furiously complained about socialist activists, who, as he 
wrote in a letter to a supporter, ‘describe me as a thief and a robber’.665   
The political struggle between Williamson and the working-class residents of Lancaster came 
to a head during local elections in 1911 in Skerton, a slum district where many of Williamson’s 
workers lived, and close to where Williamson lived in a large Georgian stately home called Ryelands 
House. Williamson was incensed when the Liberal Party candidate (fielded by Williamson) only 
managed to hang on to his Skerton seat against the Independent Labour Party candidate by a single 
vote (which was the casting vote of the returning officer). The punishment Williamson meted out on 
his workers for this political betrayal made international news headlines. 
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On 11 November 1911, the New York Times, under the headline ‘Ashton Warns Workers: 
Tells Employees He Will Close Shop Rather Than Raise Wages’, reported on what it described as ‘one 
of the most remarkable developments in the struggle between capital and labour’ in modern times.  
666 A short time after the local election Williamson posted a notice at Lune Mills, which stated there 
was to be an immediate cancellation of a previously agreed rise in wages. It said that ‘we would 
rather close the whole works down tomorrow … than allow for dissent’, and that ‘in the future’ he 
would only employ those men ‘who are loyal to their employer’. Williamson then proceeded to sack 
all those with a known association to the Labour party.  
He then turned his revenge on the wider town, making it clear he would also cease all future 
philanthropic investment in Lancaster. The Mayor of Lancaster convened a special meeting in the 
new town hall, and a range of speakers were called upon to beg Williamson’s forgiveness publicly – 
but to no avail. Williamson was then a particular kind of capitalist philanthropist, a man with a 
virtual monopoly over wage labour, who ploughed some of the profits, the surplus value created by 
working-class labourers, into the development of a town’s civic and welfare estate. He expected 
absolute loyalty and gratitude in return for acquiesce to below subsistence level wages.   
   ‘In 1909 when the town hall was opened’, one man recounts how people sang, ‘Linoleum, 
one pound and three, that is what I pay my men you see’, in mocking reference to Williamson’s 
poverty wages.667 To celebrate the opening of the town hall, Williamson’s wife, Lady Ashton, 
distributed special boxes of chocolates to the local school children. The children of Skerton 
'returned' their chocolates, throwing them uneaten in their celebratory boxes over the wall into 
Williamson’s Ryeland’s estate.668  
It is important to understand the current period of austerity in the context of local histories 
of struggles for living wages and decent housing – struggles against multi-millionaires like James 
Williamson. It is a history engrained in the town hall in which I and another 100 people gathered in 
2018 to listen to the testimonies of a dozen local people about the return of in-work poverty, hunger 
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and homelessness. Lancaster is again a place in which too many people find their wages don’t meet 
their living costs, who are reliant on tax credits, charitable and emergency food provisions. A place 
where medical practitioners document the return of diseases of poverty and want. These histories 
matters because we are returning to a state of unrestrained free market capitalism, run by 
unrestrained free-market capitalists, who either cannot see or do not care about the austerity, 
suffering, pain and death by which they are surrounded. A state of charity. A state of fear.  
 
[A] Resisting the new enclosures 
Understanding the history of austerity through the history of enclosures, and understanding the 
wounds of austerity as social and political injuries can assist in the forging of intersectional networks 
of care and solidarity, a praxis which Sita Balani describes as ‘the kinship of the fucked over’.669 As 
Silvia Federici notes, ‘in a social system committed to the devaluation of our lives the only possibility 
of economic and psychological survival resides in our capacity to transform everyday practices into a 
collective terrain of struggle’.670 Grassroots social movements like the Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth 
are a testimony to the ways in which communities are creating new systems of care and solidarity 
through which they can defend their families and communities against the stigma politics and 
pauperisation that the enclosure of the welfare commons has set in motion.  
Whilst this chapter has focused on Britain and state welfare, the struggle for the future of 
welfare is necessarily an international one, a struggle for alternative economics, and for systems of 
redistribution which can also safeguard a planet which has been devasted by the history of colonial 
capitalism. As Federici argues, for resistance against the new enclosures to be sustainable the real 
challenge is how we ‘deprivatize our everyday lives and create cooperative forms of reproduction’ 





[CH] 5. Shames Lives on the Eyelids 
 
‘the autobiographical example is not a personal story that folds onto itself … it’s  about 
trying to look at one’s own formation as a window onto social and historical processes … to 
tell a story capable of engaging and countering the violence of abstraction.’   
Saidiya Hartmann, scholar of African-American literature and history 671 
  
‘Kevin told me they weren’t zoo exhibits or museum relics for people to come and gawp at. 
He wasn’t having me going around telling tales about him and his mates for ten more 
offcomer wankers to laugh at and come and see…’  
Nigel Rapport, British Anthropologist672 
 
‘Why are you so interested in stigma?’ a friend asked when I was beginning the research that 
became this book. I didn’t answer. At least not then. In the years which followed, this question came 
to press heavily upon this project, upon me. I confess that at times it returned me to ‘regions of my 
past’ so painful that it threatened to unravel me completely.673 To be sure, in terms of its intended 
contribution to knowledge, I felt clear about the purpose of this book. Namely, to enrich existing 
understandings of stigma by directing attention to histories of stigma power, and sites of stigma 
production, with a focus on how stigma is crafted and deployed ‘to produce and reproduce social 
inequalities’.674 However, researching stigma and talking about experiences of stigma with others, 
particularly through my work with the Morecambe Bay Poverty Truth commission, has involved 
examining stigma scars of my own. Indeed, my friend’s invitation to be attentive to stigma’s 
particular hold over me, led me to reflect on the more personal motivations behind this project, to 
dwell on my own history and the stigma injuries I have accrued in my own journey from a rebellious 
teenage girl who began her working life as a cleaner in an English village pub to the highly-privileged 
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position of a middle-aged Professor of Sociology at an English University, the authorial voice adopted 
in this book.  
While I worked on Stigma proper, I began to write about my ‘personal troubles’ with stigma. 
This shadow stigma project initially compromised autobiographical fragments, but subsequently 
expanded in several directions, including a full-blown ancestral research project, and a local history 
project which I have drawn on throughout this book in returning repeatedly to Lancaster and the 
North West of England, the region I am from. Over time, this other stigma project became an 
increasingly important component of the research process, promoting new lines of inquiry and 
providing new perspectives on the materials on poverty, class and welfare stigma, on slavery and 
colonial histories, which I was gathering for the book. Slowly, I came to understand that this closet 
stigma project was at the heart of Stigma. That is, I began to understand my personal experiences of 
stigma as deeply entangled with my scholarly interest in stigma power and with the broader 
contribution Stigma seeks to make to intersectional forms of social analysis.  
Sociological and social-scientific writing on ‘the stigmatised’, often, despite its best 
intentions, reproduces the stigma it ostensibly seeks to document, analyse or give an account of. 
This is evident, for example, in Goffman’s writing on stigma, which not only occludes the struggles of 
black citizens against the humiliations and violence of racial stigma, but actively silences the 
testimonies and voices of the stigmatised in his writing. In order to trouble the power of stigma, we 
need to take great care in how we draw on the voices and experiences of others in our work. 675 Not 
least, as many of the methods available to us for undertaking research we have inherited from 
European modernity; and as we saw in the case of eugenicist roots of criminology (see Lombroso, 
Chapter One), these methods were forged in racist, classist, misogynistic and disablist belief systems. 
In short, many social scientific methods emerge out of stigmatising systems of knowledge 
production. Which is why, as Christina Sharpe writes: ‘Despite knowing otherwise we are often 
disciplined into thinking through and along lines that reinscribe our own annihilation, reinforcing and 
reproducing what Sylvia Wynter has called our “narratively condemned status.”’676 More than this, 
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Sharpe adds, ‘The methods most readily available to use sometimes, oftentimes, force us into 
positions that run counter to what we know’. 677   
This chapter reflects on how we might draw on our own stigma injuries and stigma struggles 
to research and write about stigma in ways which don’t reproduce or naturalise existing stigmatising 
social hierarchies. The personal troubles with stigma I have chosen to share here are ordinary 
experiences, banal even in the context of British class society, but they are nevertheless experiences 
of the kind which we are expected to subdue, swallow or jettison in assuming what the sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu termed ‘the scholastic doxa’, of ‘those whose profession it is to think and/or speak 
about the world’.678  
 
 [A] Mob cap and piny  
 
I was 13 years old when I got my first regular paid job cleaning the toilets and bar of a pub (let’s call 
this pub The Eagle) in the small remote village in the Yorkshire Dales in England where I lived with 
my family (let’s call this village Wanet). Early on Saturdays and Sunday mornings I would pitch up at 
the backdoor of the pub and collect the mop and bucket from the stone steps. Once inside I would 
pick up the cleaning caddy of bleach, polish and rags, pull my tabard off its peg and put on a pair of 
yellow rubber gloves. My work began in the toilets, picking cigarette butts out of the urinal, wiping 
piss from walls, scrubbing shit from toilet bowls, emptying sanitary bins, and mopping tiled floors. I 
then moved into the bar area and the gloves came off. I collected discarded glasses, emptied 
ashtrays, wiped and polished the tables, before turning to the long wooden bar counter, where I 
removed damp towel beer mats and discarded any sticky, picked at and doodled on cardboard beer 
mats, before wiping down and finally polishing the long beer-sticky wooden surface. Making the bar 
shine was my favourite part of the morning. I would then hoover the pub carpet, carefully arrange 
clean beer towels and mats on the bar and tables, before spraying the entire pub with an aerosol air 
freshener, a celebratory signal that all was clean and ready for lunchtime opening.  
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Before the front door of the pub was ceremoniously unlocked, other staff would appear 
from their various tasks in different parts of the building to gather in the bar for a morning brew: 
sweet milky tea, instant coffee, and biscuits from the corner shop. There would be chat about the 
day’s work to come and gossip about any ‘goings on’ the night before. I enjoyed this work, it was 
satisfying and I was good at it.  
In time, I picked up an additional weekend and vacation job at a craft centre a mile or so 
outside the village, and for while I would begin my weekends scrubbing urinals, spend the middle of 
the day serving tea and cakes in the craft centre café, before heading back to the pub for an 
evening’s work as a glass collector in the bar and washing up in the kitchen. During school holidays, I 
worked continuously between pub and craft-centre, earning enough money to pay my mum towards 
‘my upkeep’. By the time I was 16, I had saved enough to buy a second-hand motorbike which 
meant I could avoid the time-lag of having to hitchhike my way between pub and craft centre.  
The craft centre was in a refurbished eighteenth-century hay barn, and sold hand-crafted 
goods carefully chosen to curate a particular version of rural life: knitted jumpers with sheep on; 
landscape paintings; photographic books depicting dales life; rustic pottery which celebrated the 
rough contours and colours of the dales landscape; key-rings made of old wooden printing blocks; 
egg-timers made out of recycled bobbins from Lancashire mills – the waste products of a former 
industrial heyday.  
The owners of the craft centre asked me to wear a uniform, a white lace pinafore and 
matching mob cap that signalled something between milkmaid and Victorian domestic servant. I 
suspected that this costume had been purchased specifically with me in mind. I don’t remember 
anybody else being required to wear it. It was an attempt, I imagined, to make me respectable by 
taming my teenage appearance, then somewhere between a rocker and a mod with shaved hair, 
jeans and motorbike boots. An effort to better satisfy the imagined ‘tourist gaze’ of the urban 
weekend walkers and holiday-makers who strayed into this remote dale, by making me fit amongst 
the crafts, an historical drag act in which I played the part of ‘authentic local wench’.679 I resisted the 
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deferent servitude this uniform implied by applying thicker eyeliner, brighter lipstick and wearing 
larger earrings – and engaged in ‘foot-dragging’ practices which included extended toilet breaks to 
smoke cigarettes.680 Shameless defiance.  
Don’t get me wrong, I largely enjoyed my teenage jobs: I exercised choice and I didn’t 
consider the work I undertook to be demeaning. Nevertheless, I was reminded of my hatred of this 
mob cap when I was undertaking historical research for this book. The historian Selina Todd 
describes how in the early decades of the twentieth century ‘caps and aprons’ became ‘deeply 
unpopular signs of servants’ difference from most other waged workers, and a mark of an 
employer’s control over their employee’s body, as well as their time’.681  While domestic service was 
still the largest category of female employment in the inter-war years in Britain, being ‘in service’ 
was an increasingly stigmatised form of work, ‘associated with poverty, lack of liberty and the 
broken promises of the Great War’.682 In particular, working-class women from areas that had had 
high levels of skilled or semi-skilled female employment, such as Lancashire and Yorkshire mill 
towns, considered going into domestic service to be a demeaning step down. As the historian Lucy 
Lethbridge writes, ‘Factory girls did not have to endure the daily petty humiliations of being at the 
beck and call of a condescending mistress; of having no set hours to call their own, of having pitifully 
few opportunities to meet men (or even other women).’683 While conditions of domestic 
employment varied greatly, increasing numbers of young women resented what Margaret Powell, in 
her memoir about being a domestic servant Below Stairs (1968), described as ‘the feeling of being 
owned’, and the ‘enormous inferiority complex’ this inculcated.684  
Upper and middle-class politicians, writers and newspaper columnists became preoccupied 
with the ‘servant problem’, and with the wider implications of this increasing resistance to domestic 
service for the future of British class society.685 Todd points us to a 1919 government pamphlet, 
authored by Lady Ellen Askwith, which stated that ‘domestic service must be reinvigorated in order 
to secure the future of the British race’.686 The eugenicist understanding of class differences which 
underpinned this literature implied that the future of the better classes was dependent on the 
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labour of working-class women (as nannies, care-workers, domestic servants). It also points to a 
deeper fear, namely that the freedom of young working-class women posed a degenerative threat 
to ‘the English stock’. That is, without the moral discipline and often severe social restrictions which 
constrained the lives of working-class women who spent their lives caring for others while living 
under the roof and beady eyes of their middle- and upper-class employers, working class women 
would be more likely to marry young and have more children of their own.  
For many amongst the upper and middle-classes, working class servitude was imagined as a 
moral good which bound together British class society in ‘co-dependent harmony’.687 Indeed, the 
most evangelical advocates for the preservation of class and gendered hierarchies in this period 
understood domestic service to be akin to a form of salvation which rescued young working-class 
women from the vices and squalor of working class urban life. The bucolic social order of the 
traditional English village was central to this conservative social imaginary of service and servitude. 
As Lucy Lethbridge documents, social campaigners and philanthropists in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, such as Harriet Barnard and Dr Barnardo, created residential village 
communities into which they interned working-class girls to train them for lives in domestic service.  
Amidst the heightening tensions and the growing demands of the wider labour movement 
(which led to a general strike in 1926), ‘defiance below stairs’ grew and young women increasingly 
‘refused to adopt the subservience demanded of them’.688 Confined in private households, domestic 
servants lacked the organisational and bargaining power of unionised workers, and Selina Todd 
describes how their revolt often took the forms of small refusals; Powell describes how, when she 
graduated from housemaid to cook, her employer ‘wanted me to wear a cap, but I wouldn’t. It 
always struck me as a badge of servitude’. 689  Resistance also took the form of vicarious pleasures 
such as dressing up in their mistresses’ clothes and jewellery and ‘taking tea in the parlour’ when 
their employers were out.690 
By the 1920s the British government had begun designing penal workfare policies in an 
attempt to press working class women into service, setting up government funded institutions to 
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train girls to acquire both the skills and subservient demeanours necessary for domestic work, and 
withholding dole (unemployment relief) from young women who refused to enter these new 
industry houses.691 These workfare programmes were widely supported by the British press who 
‘lamented the abuse of the dole’ by women ‘for whom domestic service is obviously a suitable 
employment’.692 
 
[A] The façade of the English pastoral 
I grew up in a large working class family in the 1970s and 1980s, decades dominated by the radical 
social changes and upheavals precipitated by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government (1979–
1990). Many others have written about Thatcherism and the ways in which it inaugurated  the 
neoliberal programme of reforms which led us to the current British austerity state. Thatcher’s 
capitalist crusade was underpinned by an authoritarian turn in law and order, and by the pitting of 
what she termed ‘Victorian Values’ against the social and sexual permissiveness 1960s and 70s.693 As 
Stuart Hall argued, what was novel about Thatcherism is the ways in which she tethered the values 
of free market liberalism – 'individual responsibility, self-reliance, enterprise, competition, choice’ – 
to  conservative themes of ‘family and nation, respectability, patriarchalism and order’;  Hall termed 
this conjuncture ‘authoritarian populism'.694  
In the 1980s, the English village with its residual stratified agrarian order of local aristocratic 
landowners, middle-class vicars, shop-keepers, retired professionals, well-to-do farmers, working-
class labourers and domestic servants, became a key imaginary resource for Thatcherite 
nationalism.695  Indeed, in an interview for the Walt Disney corporation in 1989, Thatcher revealed 
that her favourite film was Mrs Miniver (1942), an American financed and Hollywood made romantic 
drama which depicts the stoic suffering of a well-to-do middle-class housewife (who has a live-in 
house-maid and cook) in an English village during the Second World War. Mrs Miniver centres on the 
ways in which shared suffering forges a cross-class solidarity between local aristocrats, the middle-
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classes and the working poor. This romance of resilience epitomised what Thatcher described as ‘the 
spirit of the village’.696  
During the Thatcher years, heritage industries flourished.697 As Lucienne Loh argues, the 
social and cultural reconstruction of the English pastoral and its bucolic social order in the 1980s was 
fuelled both by economic policies aimed at regeneration and wider ideological efforts ‘to revive 
imperial pride through a return to popular perceptions of the “local past” as a means to recreate a 
populist English nationalism’.698  As Loh details, ‘the countryside, along with its architectural icons—
churches, abbeys, villages, cottages and manor homes’ was imagined as ‘a tangible record of past 
greatness inherently coded through white and imperial ideologies’.699 This embrace of heritage 
culture saw the English countryside marketed to tourists as spaces of ‘reprieve from the turmoil’ of 
Britain’s multi-ethnic cities (punctuated by riots throughout this period), white spaces from which 
long histories of migration and migrant labour were erased from view.700 At the same time, those 
who lived in English rural communities were encouraged to imagine themselves and their culture as 
uniquely indigenous, a status ‘underpinned by a shared allegiance to whiteness’.701  
The social effects of Thatcher-era heritage culture, which formed one strand of a wider racist 
nationalism, were palpable growing up in a rural community in the 1980s.  Shane Meadows’ film This 
is England (2006), set in an unidentified suburban town in the English midlands in the 1980s, 
examines the ways in which English nationalism infiltrated working-class youth culture. Like 
Meadows, who is the same age and from a similar background to me, I experienced first-hand the 
ways in which local skinhead and mod youth cultures (of which I was a part) were penetrated by 
racist politics of the far-right. Teenage friends and school mates flirted with far-right fascist groups 
such as the British National Party and the National Front; re-lacing their Dr Marten boots with red 
laces to show their affiliation with white supremacist politics, and furtively listening to the neo-Nazi 
Lancashire band Skrewdriver in their bedrooms.702 As unemployment, precarity and poverty grew in 
the 1980s, ‘the class which was called upon to bear the brunt of a deepening economic crisis’ was 
increasingly ‘divided and segmented – along racial lines’.703 
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While Thatcher romanticised the highly-stratified class society of the English village, by the 
late 1980s rural communities in the North of England had suffered from a decade of the 
Conservative party’s devastating policies: the devastation of mining communities, rising 
unemployment, the decline of manufacturing jobs, the erosion of the welfare state, the closure of 
local schools, the end of subsidised bus routes, the selling off of council houses and a steep increase 
in second-home ownership in rural areas (which saw working-class people priced out of local 
housing markets). In these straitened economic circumstances, tourism had become an increasingly 
vital economic life-line. There were keen incentives to satisfy the voyeuristic desire of urban visitors 
for nostalgic experiences of the English pastoral, an olde worlde rural idyll in which, it was imagined, 
the certainties of older classed, gendered and racialised hierarchies persisted. In the village where I 
lived and worked in my mob cap and piny, everybody who depended on tourism for their livelihood 
participated in elements of the staged performance of class distinction and rural authenticity. 
Are you really from here? Do you really live here? What is it like? visitors would regularly ask 
us local kids— as though we didn’t also live in the 1980s, listen to the same music on the same radio 
stations, watch the same television programmes, shop at the same supermarkets as them. As 
though the village and those of us who lived in it were mummified in the imaginary historical time of 
Mrs Miniver. 
Growing up under the weight of this kind of tourist gaze resonates with Édouard Glissant’s 
description of the ossifying effects of the ethnographic gaze which fixes ‘the object of scrutiny in 
static time’.704 While compelled to labour for the tourist gaze, the community in Wanet employed a 
‘small arsenal’ of strategies to defend against ‘the scorn of outsiders and the stigma of being seen as 
old-fashioned’.705 Despite the indignities labouring for tourists could involve, and the real class 
conflicts it masked, there was a shared understanding of the urban tourist as a gullible figure; we 
poked fun at tourists, and called them ‘swivel heads’ because of their habit of peering through our 
cottage windows and enquiring into our lives.  
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 [A] Moving Away 
When I was 18 I left my village to do a degree at a Higher Education college in a large northern 
industrial town a few hours’ drive away. Higher education was then still free in England, and was in a 
period of mass expansion which prefigured the full marketisation of the sector. There were no fees 
to borrow at extortionate interest rates and the remnants of a maintenance grant system meant 
young people from working-class families could access financial support. The grant I received wasn’t 
enough to cover basic living costs, so I worked in pubs at evenings and weekends, further developing 
the defined right-sided arm-muscles, keen observational and conversational skills, and advanced arts 
of sexual self-defence required to work in the night-time economy. Sexual harassment, as I had 
learnt working in the village pub, was an unrelenting feature of bar work, and my skills at breaking 
up bar fights and speedily emptying a bar at closing time led to a lucrative stint as a bouncer.  
My degree course in English Literature and Philosophy was taught in both day and evening 
classes on the site of a slightly dilapidated teaching training college. The college had begun life as a 
Mechanics Institute in 1824, and by the late 1980s was a sprawling amalgam of an art college, a 
technical college and a teaching training college, expanding over a 150 years to meet the practical 
training needs and the intellectual and artistic aspirations of northern mill workers. The majority of 
my fellow students were middle-aged working-class women, who having brought up families and 
worked all their lives in modest part-time jobs, had sought out evening access courses to ‘better 
themselves’, a path which had led them onto part-time degree courses. Amongst these women 
where a sprinkling of unemployed men, and numbers were made up by a small group of mainly 
working-class teenagers like myself, misfits whose poor school grades meant they hadn’t been able 
to gain places at the grander elite red-brick universities in nearby cities.  
 I was comfortable in this milieu, with no tiered lecture theatres, just small flat school-like 
classrooms with plastic chairs. Short lectures about philosophy and literature were followed by 
 207 
animated class discussions which sometimes continued late into the night in a nearby working men’s 
club. It was in this easy college environment with familiar, bright and kind people around me that I 
discovered a deep craving for ideas, for learning, for reading. I didn’t want to stop, to go back to the 
village, get an ordinary job and ‘settle down’. I wanted to learn more. It felt unquenchable, this thirst 
for reading, for books, for knowledge.  
 
[A] People like you 
Armed with enthusiastic references from my college lecturers, I applied for funding from a 
government research council to do a master’s degree and made an application to a university 
several hours further south. I got an interview and scraped together money for the train fare. In 
retrospect, I don’t know how I plucked up the courage to go. I can remember trembling with fear as I 
navigated my way to and around the grand buildings of the university campus. I knocked on the 
office door where I had been instructed to present myself. ‘Enter,’ said a voice behind the door. The 
professor who led the MA programme had her eyes lowered on my application on the desk in front 
of her. Eventually she looked up, appraised me and said, ‘We don’t get many people like you here.’  
At the time of my interview I didn’t fully comprehend what this phrase ‘people like you’ 
meant. I understood that I was an unusual applicant, a young woman educated at remote rural 
secondary modern school and without ‘a proper’ university degree, but I hadn’t fully grasped the 
class politics of the highly-stratified British university system. It was only after a term spent in the 
same professor’s class – in which she shamed my contributions to discussions by insisting on 
correcting my pronunciation, it was only when I received the feedback on my first essay on which 
she scrawled a single comment – ‘illiterate, please seek assistance at the writing support centre’, 
that I began to understand that the remark, ‘people like you’, was a value judgement about the way 
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that somebody like me appeared to somebody like her – a Cambridge-educated Professor of English 
Literature.  
People like you. It took a long time for me to understand that ‘people like you’ was a way of 
‘signalling class through euphemism’.706  That ‘people like you’’ was spoken in ‘the historical-
representational moralizing, pathologizing, disgust-producing register attached to working-class 
women’.707  That ‘people like you’ was a value judgement about the ways in which working-classness 
was etched into my clothes, my body, my then thick Northern accent, my colloquial speech, my 
grammatical mistakes, my direct manner, my naivety, earnestness and shameless yearning. I was 
undisciplined. I was out of place. I was being shamed into place. Mob cap and piny.  
People like you. A phrase that would follow me around as I later attempted to carve out an 
academic career. Words still tattooed into my skin. Encounters which left scars. Welts which still itch 
and burn. ‘People like you are the reason women shouldn’t get PhD funding’: the words used by a 
professor, a PhD supervisor, when I told him I was pregnant as I sat weeping with shame before 
them. ‘You do know that somebody like you will never get a job at a university like this one’: the 
advice of a friend, a middle-class academic, who discouraged me from applying for a post at the 
university where she worked. ‘You do know that people like you are only here to do the teaching in 
this department’: the Head of Department who stalled on signing off my first application for a 
research grant.  I could go on. 
There is nothing exceptional about the gendered and classed stigma I am relating here. 
These are ordinary humiliations which structure the lives of people from working-class backgrounds 
in their encounters with middle-class professionals, and in this case with elite British universities. 
Stories of these kinds have been related in autobiographical sociological writing for generations, are 
increasingly the subject of sociological research  – and even some largely half-hearted policy 
initiatives around the inclusion of working-class students in ‘top’ universities.  
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What I learnt from these experiences is that there are ‘people everywhere waiting for you to 
slip up, to show signs of dirtiness and stupidity, so that they can send you back to where you 
belong’.708  But what being stigmatised also gifted was a class consciousness that grew into a hard 
knot of shameless defiance. 
 
[A] Shameless defiance 
 
In her searing memoir Landscape for a Good Woman: A Story of Two Lives (1986), the British 
historian Carolyn Steedman writes about the hidden injuries, ‘the sad and secret stories’ of social 
class.709  Her memoir is about ‘two lives’ in multiple senses. It is an account of Steedman’s mother’s 
life and her own life, the entangled relationship between them, and the significant inter-
generational changes in class relations effected by the post-war welfare state in Britain. In it also an 
account of Steedman’s own two lives, her adult life as a ‘bourgeois’ career academic, and the life of 
the working-class girl that she carries with her, within her: the girl who is engraved in her skin and 
whom she carries on her back.  
Landscape for a Good Woman opens with an account of a deeply stigmatising exchange 
between her working-class mother and a middle-class health visitor, who deems their barely 
furnished home as a place unfit for rearing a child. Witnessing her mother being shamed by the 
health visitor is a formative moment in Steedman’s life. As she reflects: 
 
I will do everything and anything until the end of my days to stop anyone ever talking to me 
like that woman talked to my mother. It is in this place, this bare, curtainless bedroom, that 
lies my secret and shameful defiance. I read a woman’s book, meet such a woman at a party 
(a woman now, like me) and think quite deliberately as we talk: we are divided: a hundred 
years ago I’d have been cleaning your shoes. I know this and you don’t.710 
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Experiences of stigma can provoke a doubling of consciousness through which you see yourself 
through the eyes of others. In this respect, working-class consciousness is an awareness of your 
involuntary placement within a social hierarchy which is contingent on economic and social injustice 
and exploitation. A sense of placement which emerges when people ‘put you in your place’,  
experiences through which you suddenly inhabit a place from where you can perceive your ‘person 
value’. As Steedman reflects, ‘I think now of all the stories, all the reading, all the dreams that help 
us to see ourselves in the landscape, and see ourselves watching as well.’711 .  
As Beverley Skeggs argues, ‘conditions for personhood come into effect through regimes of 
value’.712 However, the dominant values that a given society, organisation or ideology seeks to press 
upon you don’t always have purchase; in fact, imposed values are often refused, reworked and 
returned. Skeggs emphasises the ways in which the working classes frequently fail to feel or embody 
the shame which (middle-class) social and cultural practices of class stigmatisation seek to inculcate. 
Stigma gives rise to resistance as people defend themselves against the shame which stigmatisation 
seeks to instil. Which is why the working classes, and especially working-class women, are so often 
decried for being shameless.   
 
[A] Class shame 
Landscape for a Good Woman, like all truly insightful writing on social class in Britain, is sensitive to 
historical and generational twists and turns of class making. Steedman is critical of the tendency 
towards romantic accounts of working-class authenticity, which obfuscate understandings of class as 
historically contingent and relational forms of social classification. She describes the stories told by 
‘a whole generation of social escapees’ in the 1930s who entered professional positions that allow 
them ‘to speak of their working-class origins with authority’.713 She argues that for men in this inter-
war generation class was often worn as a badge of honour, and class mobility imagined as a heroic 
‘kind of accomplishment' – memories of their former working-class lives are frozen in the past, 
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‘ossified’, like insects in amber or coal in the mine. What is often obscured in these kinds of stories 
about social mobility, is that ‘class is a relationship, and not a thing’.714 
Steedman argues that there is also a gendered dimension to these classed ‘escape 
stories’.715 As she writes, ‘the attribution of psychological sameness to the figure in the working-class 
landscape has been made by men, for whom the transitions of class are at once more ritualized than 
they are for women, and much harder to make.’716 By way of contrast, Steedman’s account of her 
working-class childhood is framed not by ‘the monolithic story of wage-labour and capital’, nor told 
in that genre in which ordinary lives are transformed into soap operas, ‘with each the picaresque 
heroine of her own hard times.’717 Rather, Steedman focuses her account of growing up as a 
working-class girl in the 1950s on familial relationships and on the home – a workplace of unpaid 
labour which is for women often a site of intensive class-conflict and struggle.  
I am from the generation after Steedman, not a post-war scholarship boy or girl, or part of 
that post-war grammar school generation schooled in the arts of class passing. I was schooled at 
secondary moderns and comprehensives. I didn’t experience poverty growing up, but sometimes we 
struggled to get by – my family income meant that I was entitled to free school dinners, school 
uniform vouchers, and when I went to college I qualified for what remained of a full government 
maintenance grant.   
My parents came from different class backgrounds: my dad was from a large working-class 
family, he was brought up on council estate, his mum worked in a fish and chip shop, and his dad 
worked in a hardware shop; my mum was the only child of middle-class professionals (school 
teachers who later had careers as a librarian and a college lecturer), and she was brought up in a 
large house on the better side of town. My mum got pregnant as a teenager and my parents had a 
shot-gun wedding in the late 1960s.   
My middle class-grandparents were a significant presence in my childhood, furnishing my 
siblings and me with books, occasionally taking us on trips to visit stately homes and to see plays and 
concerts. When we were children we were tutored to be on our best behaviour when they visited. 
 212 
They were a loving but sometimes disapproving presence. When I was growing up, I thought of my 
grandparents as ‘posh’, but they had been working-class scholarship kids who, very much like 
Steedman, had gone to grammar schools and became school teachers after the war. They styled 
themselves as educated and middle-class professionals – and worked hard to cloak their working 
class roots through the acquisition of cultural capital.  
My ‘posh’ grandma had begun her life as the illegitimate child of a hairdresser in a Yorkshire 
seaside town. She changed her name from working class Ivy to the middle-class Elizabeth, when she 
left her childhood home in the 1920s to do a degree course in the 1930s (an extraordinary class 
transition for a woman from her background at this time). She never spoke about her childhood or 
background, and my sense is that her illegitimacy, and her modest roots were an enduring source of 
shame. Before she died, she burnt the diaries she had carefully kept and written all her life.  
In his memoir Returning to Reims, the French sociologist Didier Eribon describes ‘the 
discomfort that results from belonging to two different worlds, worlds so far separated from each 
other that they seem irreconcilable, and yet which coexist in everything that you are’.718 As he 
writes, ‘whatever you have uprooted yourself from or been uprooted from still endures as an 
integral part of who or what you are … the traces of what you were as a child, the manner in which 
you were socialized, persist, even when the conditions in which you live as an adult have 
changed’.719 When I read Returning to Reims what resonated was Eribon’s description of the ‘intense 
experiences of shame related to class shame’.720 The melancholia which accompanies a ‘spilt 
habitus’, the feelings of sadness which often accompany a dislocating sense of lost roots and 
belonging.721   
 
[A] Being the anthropological object 
 
By the time I finished my master’s degree and returned North, my parents had divorced and had set 
up new homes with new partners, which eventually saw them move away from the village. 
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Homeless and unemployed, I headed to Manchester where my younger brother had started a 
furniture-making course and he and his girlfriend let me sleep on their sofa for a while. The rest of 
that year was one spent hanging onto the periphery of the academic margins by my grubby 
fingernails. Alongside work in bars, I managed to pick up odd bits of teaching on university access 
courses. One evening I was invited to a dinner by an academic who wanted me to meet his friend, an 
anthropology PhD student, who had just returned from a year’s fieldwork in Papua New Guinea. It is 
important to note that at this juncture I had no idea what anthropology was, or what fieldwork 
might entail. Being invited to dinner at an anthropologist’s was both a terrifying and exotic prospect.  
The evening began with a slide-show. We sat in the dark drinking wine while our host 
projected photographic slides from a carousel slide projector onto the wall of her apartment.  
Images of the people she had studied and lived with for a year began to appear before us, sound 
tracked by the whine of the projector fan and clicks as each new slide slotted into place. Sometimes 
the anthropologist appeared with the people she had lived with, scenes straight out of a colonial 
scrapbook.722 When the evening drew to a close, the host tried to include me in the conversation by 
asking me where I was from. When I told her the name of my village, she gasped and gazed at me 
open-mouthed, before exclaiming, ‘I don’t believe it, my PhD supervisor did his fieldwork there!’  
That night I dreamt about the images projected onto the anthropologist’s wall, the whirr of 
the fan, the carousel rotating, the moment of darkness before the click which announced a new 
image – and suddenly there projected on the wall is the farmer who threatened to shoot our 
straying dogs, click, the ladies who ran the post-office, click, the drunken pub-landlord, click, the guy 
who grew weed up the valley, click, the local bikers gathered for their Sunday ride, click, the school-
friend who concealed her pregnancy, click, the back seat of the school bus, click, weekend walkers in 
boots and anoraks, click, fights at the village disco, click, the fell run at the summer fete, click, 
flooded fields, click, teenagers drinking cider in the graveyard, click, kids swimming in the river, click, 
bringing sheep down from the fells for lambing, click, my friends beating pheasants for the local 
aristocrats, click, my dad painting a cottage, click, my brother skinning a rabbit for the pot, click, my 
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mum riddling the stove; and there I am, a gangly teenager at the edge of one of images, punk hair, 
heavy eyeliner, smudged mascara, click, there I am being dragged by my hair to the headteacher’s 
office at school for misbehaviour, click, there I am again scrubbing the urinals, click, evading groping 
hands in the pub, click, smoking cigarettes with my friends, click, serving café tables in mop cap and 
piny.  
The dinner guests don’t recognise that I am in the images. They talk about the culture of the 
rural community; they share comments, offer analysis, make judgements. It is impossible for them 
to imagine that the object of the fieldwork might be right there with them in the room and on the 
wall at the same time, in the same space and historical time. Served up on the wall to be consumed 
at an academic dinner party. I shrink into the chair. I make myself as small as possible. I want to 
disappear. I feel I should confess that I am one of the natives on the wall. That I am the ethnographic 
object. But my mouth is full of wool. There is no position from which to speak – the figures in the 
slide show are silent; they are artefacts to be gazed at, spoken for and about. I am caught in ‘the 
spy-glass of anthropology’.723 I am overwhelmed with shame. I radiate shame.  
The sociologist Helen Merrell Lynd argues that shame is most acutely felt when it is 
unanticipated, when we are taken by surprise, ‘caught off guard’.724 Lynd describes this as the 
‘astonishment of seeing different parts of ourselves, conscious and unconscious, suddenly coming 
together, and coming together with aspects of the world we had not recognised.’ 725 The shock of 
finding myself caught in the gaze of another, of being captured in shame, was particularly 
heightened in this, my first encounter with the ethnographic gaze. It is a scene of shame which 
remains burnt into my eyelids.726 
When my friend asked me why I was interested in stigma, I was immediately transported 
back to the scene in the anthropologist’s living room and to this dream, in which the colonial theatre 
of anthropology was transposed into the class theatre of my childhood. 
 
 [A] Telling practices 
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A few years later I tracked down a copy of a book by the anthropologist’s supervisor, Nigel Rapport. 
It was called Diverse World-Views in An English Village (1993) and I discovered that Rapport had 
undertaken an ethnographic study of the village in which I had lived, a village he names Wanet. 
Diverse World-Views, as I might introduce it now to my students, is a micro-social analysis of social 
interactions and kinship relations in a remote rural village in the North of England between 1980 and 
1981. It is often cited as one of the foundational texts of a subfield of anthropology called ‘the 
anthropology of Britain’, and it has been praised by sociologists of rural Britain for its ‘acute 
sensitivity’ to the diversity of the ordinary lives it depicts.727  
As an ethnography employing classic observer-participant methods, Diverse World-Views in 
An English Village is reminiscent of Erving Goffman’s PhD thesis Communication Conduct in an Island 
Community, an ethnography undertaken in Unst, in the Shetland Islands between 1949 and 1951. A 
study which became the basis for Goffman’s first and most famous book, The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday life (1956), for which he received the American Sociological Association's MacIver award in 
1961. The most striking similarity between these studies is that both Goffman and Rapport 
undertook their research surreptitiously, employing covert methods and adopting a feigned persona 
to study local people.  
In a rare reflection on ethnographic methods – a talk which was, ironically, furtively 
recorded against his wishes and published after his death – Goffman shared his ‘rules of the trade 
about getting into a place’ to conduct (undercover) ethnographic research. As he explained, ‘You 
have to anticipate being questioned by the people whom you study so you engage in providing a 
story that will hold up should the facts be brought to their attention. So you engage in what are 
sometimes called “telling” practices.… I like a story such that if they find out what you are doing, the 
story you presented could not be an absolute lie.’728 Goffman told the residents of Usnt he was 
studying the local economy and Rapport told the villagers in Wanet he was studying local history. 
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In Diverse World-Views Rapport reveals (to his reader) the ‘telling practices’ he employed to 
explain to local people what he was doing in Wanet: ‘having used the term “anthropology” once or 
twice … and being received with a polite but alarmed silence, I realised that history…was a more 
acceptable subject’.729 Rapport reveals that this deception was counselled by his doctoral supervisor 
who advised him to be ‘extremely careful’ in ‘how he explained himself’, ‘to be discrete and 
cautious’, to ‘give little away’, to avoid ‘the accoutrement of formal sociological research: camera, 
note-books, tape-recorder for these smacked of the outsider’ and to dissociate himself from ‘the 
tourist, the visitor, the second-home owner’.730  Under the guise of a history student looking for 
casual work, Rapport describes his attempts to ‘penetrate’ the community in Wanet by taking on 
jobs, first in a café, then as a farm labourer, all the while making regular field trips to a village pub, 
which he calls The Eagle.  
In chapter titled ‘The Ethics of the Research’, Rapport considers his decision to choose a 
remote northern rural village as the field site for his research and the ‘natives of Cumbria’ as his 
‘informants’. 731 He offers an account of himself in his early twenties as a naïve young man, eager to 
embark on his PhD fieldwork. He reflects also on his limited vantage point as a public-school boy, a 
Cambridge graduate, from a privileged middle-class background.  
 
I had had a comfortable upbringing and had looked out over a large back lawn onto on to 
the cramped housing estates beyond but I espoused a deep empathy with the have-nots 
who had to achieve by struggling and did not inherit with grace.732  
 
Thus, it was constrained by what he terms ‘the archetypal idioms of the middle-class Anglo-Saxon 
academic’, that Rapport arrived in Wanet with ‘a vision of ethnography as both scientifically 
demanding and heroic’.733  
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I was a scientist about to gain ‘his’ people, his fund of private data with which to 
address academic debate. Mine…would be a British empire: an ethnographical 
fortress in England not in some remote and backward area of Africa or South East 
Asia. Studying the natives of Cumbria, I felt, was not the perpetuation of a harmful 
act so much as a pilgrimage; or, at least a chance for me to partake in a joint 
celebration of our Britishness…. It was true I was going to Cumbria to gather 
information on them but my feelings were of friendship, modesty, respect, even 
longing.734 
 
This was the first ethnography I had ever read and despite the opening claim that ‘my informants 
and their valley homes appear in this book in disguised forms’, I could immediately identify all of the 
people in it. They appeared before me as cardboard cut-outs of the flesh and blood people I had 
grown-up with, figures through which the reader is invited to voyeuristically peer into village life, 
‘close-up but always from the outside looking in’ and ‘through a glass darkly’.735  
Jack Katz notes that, ‘Much of the market for ethnography is built on a sense of a radical 
difference, distance between the “them” about whom the ethnographer writes and the “us” to 
whom ethnographic texts are directed’.736 Clearly I wasn’t the intended reader of Diverse World-
Views in An English Village. Indeed, when I first read this book in my early twenties, I read it from a 
reading position which wasn’t invited or available within the text itself. I read it as one of those he 
‘gathered information on’. One of the natives who Rapport had sought to collect as ‘his fund of 
private data’. I read this book as the anthropological object.  
As I read, I searched for traces of my former life. I went to school with the children of his 
informers, friends and classmates, old boyfriends. I ate meals with the family he lived with and 
whose conversations he secretly memorised, transcribed, edited. Private intimate conversations, 
words spoken in confidence. I waited tables in the cafes he frequents, I cleaned the toilets he pissed 
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in, polished the brass and worked behind the bar of the pub in which he drank. As I read, I watched 
the anthropologist watching us.  
Brian and I were leaning on the bar, sharing a pint and eyeing up the bevies of tourist 
women who frequently seemed to fill the pub on holiday weekend.737  
As I read I pictured him in The Eagle, busy, as he puts it, ‘chatting up everything on two legs in a skirt 
– and, no doubt through short-sightedness, a few things that were not.738 I feel his gaze on my back 
as I wiped down the tables in the craft centre cafe, and cheerily serve customers in my mob cap and 
piny. I pictured myself in these scenes, a vulnerable young working-class woman, waiting on tables, 
pulling pints, and evading the unwanted sexual advances of older men. I felt, I feel ashamed. 
As the historian Ruth Leys notes, ‘shame is an emotion that is routed through the eyes’ and 
‘the logic of shame is a scene of exposure (this is true even if the scene is only an imagined one and 
the observer is not an external spectator but an internalized other)’.739 Shame is a feeling of being 
exposed to a gaze which produces a view of yourself which you cannot control.  More than this, 
shame ‘is held to concern not your actions but who you are, that is, your deficiencies and 
inadequacies as a person as these are revealed to the shaming gaze of the other’.740  
Rapport didn’t reveal that the reason he was in Wanet was to study us. He didn’t tell us that 
he was memorising our conversations, ‘secreting notes’ about his person and ‘writing up my journal 
at night’.741 Planning the thesis he would write about us, dreaming of publishing that thesis as a 
book, a book that he seemingly never contemplated that people like them, people like us, people like 
me would read. He promised, however, to reveal insights into the native point of view.  Rapport 
writes, ‘What I was up to felt rather like snooping’.742 But he ‘banishes’ these thoughts, consoles 
himself that his research was ‘for the advance of understanding and the betterment of science’, and 
justifies his unease in not explaining ‘my project in its own terms’, by the labour he provides in local 
café and farms. 743  
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I was aware of the basic inequality inherent in the whole exercise—I had not asked to study 
them and they had not invited me—but by accepting their aggression, granting them daily 
superordination, and adopting uncomplainingly whatever lowly statuses the chose to accord 
me, I tried to salve the sore of my writing them up later.744  
 
As Karen Jacobs notes, ‘the dirty little secret of the participant-observer method is the masking or 
denial of the complexity of the intersubjective encounter between fieldworker and native, as well as 
the power relations that result from this encounter’. 745  
 
 [A] Speaking back 
In 1979, the anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes published an ethnography of a remote rural 
village in Ireland titled, Saints, Scholars and Schizophrenics: Mental Illness in Rural Ireland. When the 
book was reviewed in the Irish press, journalists were quickly able to identify the village she had 
undertaken her research in, and the local community she had studied soon bought and read her 
book. As a consequence, Scheper-Hughes found herself embroiled in public controversy about the 
ethics of her research. In the preface to the 2001 paperback edition of the book, Hughes describes 
making a return visit in 1981 to the community and being met with hostility. As she reflects within 
‘the traditional fieldwork paradigm our once colonized subjects remain disempowered and mute’, 
now she has to face ‘the native reader’ – they are hurt and they are angry.746 The villagers confront 
her and question the ethics of her research, they tell her that ‘There is quite a difference between 
whispering something beside a fire or across a counter and seeing it printed for the world to see’… 
‘It becomes a public shame’.747 In response to her insistence that she had carefully anonymised their 
words, they reply: 
 
You think we didn’t, each of us, sit down poring over every page until we had recognised the 
bits and pieces of ourselves strewn about here and there. You turned us into amputees with 
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hooks for fingers and some other blackguard’s heart beating inside out own chest. How do 
you think I felt reading my words come out of some Tom-O or Pat-O or some publication’s 
mouth?748 
 
While Rapport concealed his real purpose for being in Wanet, he reveals that some local people 
don’t believe the reasons he gives for being there. I suspect they never did, attuned as they are, and 
as I was, to living under the weight of the tourist gaze. Rapport makes several references to the ways 
in which he was challenged in the field: ‘Sid cornered me behind a table in The Eagle, and told me he 
had made phone calls about me and saw through my lies’… “aren’t you gonna go and write about 
your experiences here? Aren’t you studying something like sociology?” 749 Rapport writes: 
 
Just before I left the field, I remember phoning a good friend in Cardiff and telling her how 
fed up I was with the fieldworking and the roles I had adopted in Wanet. ‘Look on the bright 
side,’ she said, ‘Soon you’ll be leaving those country bumpkins behind, and what they think 
won’t matter anymore’.750  
 
While Diverse World-Views in An English Village promises the reader ‘diversity’ in ‘world views’, the 
central difference which comes into view is that between the anthropologist, his imagined reader 
(liberal, educated, academic) and those ‘country bumpkins’ whose voices he steals, ventriloquises 
and picks through: what they think won’t matter anymore. 
 ‘I question, in hindsight’, Rapport writes, ‘the ethics of my behaviour in adopting the 
persona of observing-participant’ but ‘I feel that my constructions of the people they were and the 
relations they shared one year quite a while ago do not harm them now’.751 What is the measure of 
harm? 
When I read Diverse World-Views today, now reading it as a middle-aged sociology professor 
with significant cultural capital, it still provokes a painful and shameful sense of splitting – as I 
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encounter myself and my childhood community as written for and written about.752 I don’t know 
whether my old-school friends, work colleagues and neighbours would care about what is written in 
this book, whether they would feel angry, exploited or ashamed if they read the intimate and private 
conversations Rapport transcribed, or care about his views about their parent’s marriages, the 
publication of gossip about love affairs, details of family disputes, ill-feelings about business 
dealings, the presentation of them as xenophobic, illiberal and narrow-minded. I felt when I first 
read this book – and still feel – that this ethnography is an unkind picture of the small, isolated rural 
community in which I grew up in the 1980s. A series of ‘brutal .... sketches of other people’s lives … 
assimilated to the perspective of the participant-observer’.753 
Alongside the problematic ethics of covert ethnography, what also struck me when I reread 
Diverse World Views, is its lack of sociological imagination. What I mean by this, is the absence of 
any sustained attempt to link the personal troubles of the people it studies to broader systems of 
power and government. Instead, they, we, are imagined as existing in an ‘interactional microcosm 
severed from its institutional moorings and seemingly devoid of material determinism and power 
vectors’.754  
 
[A] Sociological Imagination  
 
In The Sociological Imagination (1959), the American sociologist Charles Wright Mills famously 
stated that ‘no social study that does not come back to the problem of biography, of history and 
their intersections within a society has completed its intellectual journey’.755  Indeed, the promise of 
sociology is the critical sensibility which it cultivates when we tease out ‘the public issue or problem 
contained in the private trouble’.756 This forging of connections between the personal and the 
political, between individual biographies and the histories that shape them, is particularly urgent 
today.  As the sociologists Nicholas Gane and Les Back argue, ‘in a neoliberal world which seeks to 
tear asunder private troubles from public issues, and thereby turn social uncertainty into a personal 
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failure that is divorced from any collective cause or remedy, the linking of biography and history is a 
vital part of a sociology that is both politically and publicly engaged.’757  
C. Wright Mill’s understanding of sociology as an imaginative practice which ties individual 
biographies to history has its roots in the extraordinary body of work produced by the sociologist W. 
E. B Du Bois (1868–1963).758 For Du Bois, being a black man in America ‘at the dawning of the 
Twentieth Century’ bestowed on him a ‘double-consciousness’, which he describes as being ‘gifted 
with second-sight of seeing yourself’. 759 It is ‘a peculiar sensation’, he writes, ‘this sense of always 
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that 
looks on in amused contempt and pity.’ 760  In The Souls of Black Folk, a collection of essays published 
in 1903, Du Bois puts this gift of double-consciousness to work as a sociological method, deftly 
weaving together autobiographical experiences, the ‘Sorrow Songs’ of black spirituals, social history, 
and economic and statistical data into a shattering account of the ‘studied humiliations’ of anti-black 
racism. 761  
Stigma is a distinctly psychosocial concept. What I mean by this is that it is a concept which 
describes the traffic between the individual and the social world, between personal troubles and 
social, political and economic forces. Stigma power is an analytic that allows us to examine the relay 
between practices which impress stigma upon people, and how these impressions affect the ways in 
which people perceive themselves and others. It is important to pay attention to stigma precisely 
because it captures the movement between external and internal processes of de/valuation. Stigma 
is a productive force that marks out and classifies people as a means of subjugating them; a 
disciplinary form of power that seeks to change people, to change attitudes and behaviour, and how 
people make value judgements about others. It is a dehumanising force of power that infiltrates, 
pierces and deflates your sense of yourself. Stigma functions through subjection; it makes people 
abject.762  
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Yet, as Du Bois suggests, being stigmatised can provoke a consciousness of the ways in which 
we are ‘figured against the backdrop of history’.763 The doubling of consciousness effected by social 
stigma – between experiences of being devalued or dehumanised by others and an awareness of 
oneself as human and valuable nonetheless – makes us wakeful. Resisting stigma generates what 
the poet Dionne Brand describes as a ‘shimmering alertness’ to ‘what things come together to make 
us up at a particular moment’.764 It stirs an awareness of how power is written on our skin, 
awakening us to the relationship between our biographical lives and the stigmatised positionalities 
scripted for us by others.  Indeed, I made the decision to include some autobiographical fragments 
from this shadow stigma project in this chapter, precisely because my experiences of being 
stigmatised, including the formative experience of discovering myself caught in the anthropological 
gaze, have been such important critical gift in my subsequent work as a sociologist, a teacher, a 
writer, a poverty commissioner, an activist.  
 
One of the arguments of Stigma is that the double-consciousness being stigmatised effects is 
a resource for resistance and change. That is, being aware of how we are ‘figured against the 
backdrop of history’, makes us question those systems of economic injustice, practices of political 
domination and stratified social hierarchies which we might otherwise simply absorb or passively 
accept as inevitable or deserved.765   As the poet Dionna Brand puts it, ‘One enters a room and history 
follows; one enters a room and history precedes’. She goes on: 
 
History is already seated in the chair in the empty room when one arrives. Where one 
stands in a society seems always related to this historical experience. Where one 
can be observed is relative to that history. …  How do I know this? Only by self-observation, 





 [CH] Conclusion: Rage Against the Stigma Machines 
 
Stigma (noun): Ineffaceable stains of blood, supposed to remain on the floor of a room 
where a murder has been committed  
Oxford English Dictionary 
 
In spring 2016 three members of the British Royal Family, Prince William and his wife Catherine (the 
Duke and Duchess of Cambridge) and Prince Harry launched Heads Together, ‘a new campaign to 
end stigma around mental health’. 767 Heads Together is an umbrella organisation for eight existing 
UK-based mental health charities that together have ‘decades of experience in tackling stigma, 
raising awareness, and providing vital help for people with mental health challenges’. 768 Bringing 
these charities together under one organisational ‘brand’, Heads Together seeks to harness the 
significant media power of the popular younger members of the Royal Family.  
The publicity for this campaign states that while there has been progress ‘in recent decades’, 
stigma remains a ‘key issue’ in preventing people with ‘mental health challenges’ in accessing the 
help and support they need. As Prince William puts it, ‘people can’t and won’t seek help because 
they are ashamed about what people might think’.769 To this end, Heads Together is focused on 
eradicating stigma as a barrier to help-seeking, through initiatives that centre on promoting 
individual disclosures of mental distress. As they describe it, ‘shattering stigma on mental health 
starts with simple conversations. When you realise that mental health problems affect your friends, 
neighbours, children and spouses, the walls of judgement and prejudice around these issues begin 
to fall’.770  
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To facilitate these conversations, Heads Together has mobilised an array of communications 
technologies, developing a website, harnessing social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter and 
Instagram), and devising hashtags, such as #oktosay and #thereforme, under which people can share 
their experiences. To illustrate the stigma-shattering potential of disclosure the Heads Together 
website has also published a series of short films, featuring celebrities and public figures in 
conversation with family and colleagues: these include the American pop star Lady Gaga discussing 
her mental health with Prince William (over Skype), the ex-footballer Rio Ferdinand talking with his 
agent about bereavement, and the ex-New Labour Communications Director, Alastair Campbell, 
discussing his cyclical depressions with his partner, the journalist Fiona Miller. Alongside these well-
known pubic figures, there are films featuring ‘ordinary’ members of the public, such as ambulance 
drivers talking about experiences of mental distress in the aftermath of stressful events at work. 
Through this accumulation and dissemination of individual conversations, Heads Together aims ‘to 
help change the national conversation on mental health’, effecting a transformation in British public 
attitudes.  
Since the publication fifty years ago of Erving’s Goffman’s Stigma: Notes on the 
Management of a Spoiled Identity (1963), there has been ‘an explosive growth’ of research and 
social action around stigma.771 Stigma has become a way of seeing, describing and understanding a 
vast array of discriminatory social attitudes and practices. We have become accustomed to thinking 
about stigma as a problem of restrictive or oppressive social norms that can alleviated through what 
Goffman termed ‘benevolent social action’.772 Indeed, much stigma research is motivated by a 
concern with changing attitudes and behaviours; through, for example, increasing peoples 
‘tolerance’ for particular stigmatised conditions, or devising strategies that assist the stigmatised in 
managing the responses of others. This research has had a significant impact on health and social 
policy, in the form of proposals, models, strategies and professional training programmes for stigma 
management. Indeed, anti-stigma initiatives have become central to charitable and public health 
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campaigns aimed at ‘raising awareness’ and ‘combatting stigma’ in a vast range of social and 
institutional settings.773 Heads Together emerged from this paradigm of stigma thinking.  
There is much to be admired about the values and ambitions of Heads Together, including 
the candour of Princes Harry and William about their own struggles with mental distress following 
the death of their mother, Diana. As William Davies writes: 
 
Harry’s admission that he had ignored his own emotional distress for several years before 
eventually having counselling was a valuable contribution, from a figure more commonly 
associated with laddish machismo. William’s focus on male suicide statistics was also a good 
use of his celebrity.774 
 
Further, all the existing evidence supports the claims of Heads Together that ‘unresolved mental 
health problems lie at the heart of some of our greatest social challenges’.775 Indeed, negative 
attitudes around mental health problems are not only damaging and discriminatory but often 
exacerbate mental distress. As clinical psychologist John Read and his colleagues argue: 
Negative attitudes…lead to discrimination in many domains, including the workplace and 
housing, and to rejection by family and friends. They can also lead, via anticipated and actual 
discrimination and internalized stigma, to decreased life satisfaction and self-esteem, and to 
increased alcohol use, depression and suicidality.776 
However, while Prince William states that ‘[it’s time] to feel normal about mental health, it's the same 
as physical health', psychologists like Read have begun to question the effectiveness of the ‘mental 
illness is an illness like any other’ approach embraced by anti-stigma programmes.777 Indeed, research 
suggests that the embracing of biogenetic rather than social explanations of mental distress, risks 
amplifying the very stigmatising attitudes and discriminations which these campaigns ostensibly seek 
to eliminate. So while, as Davies argues, the ‘idea that one is simply “unwell”’ might provide comfort 
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‘to people wrestling with their own depression or anxiety’, it simultaneously veils over ‘a whole host 
of more fundamental cultural, political and economic questions regarding the distribution of distress 
in our society – the sorts of questions that the Duke of Cambridge would be less likely to grapple 
with’.778 
 
[A] ‘Hands off our stories’ 
 
There is also concern amongst mental health survivors and activists about the impact that anti-
stigma campaigns that solicit, share and publicise personal stories of mental distress might have on 
individuals, given the facts of discrimination against people with diagnosed mental health 
conditions. For example, in terms of potential consequences, there are substantive differences 
between a prince or a pop star sharing their struggles with mental distress to the public in carefully 
curated publicity, and a precarious worker disclosing to an employer, or a young person sharing 
online. Indeed, the recent and significant increase in the sharing of mental distress in online spaces 
encouraged by these kinds of anti-stigma campaigns obscures an entire host of potentially negative 
impacts, likely to be highly determined by your relative social position and status.  
In 2012, a group of Canadian scholar-activists affiliated with ‘Mad Studies’ published an 
account of a community event, ‘Recovering our Stories: A Small Act of Resistance’, which sought to 
trouble the ‘appropriation’ of personal experiences of psychiatric distress by mental health 
organisations and charities.779 As they detail, while the sharing of testimonies has long been a 
central strategy of grassroots mental health activism, particularly in struggles against psychiatric 
authority, what concerns them is the ways in which these strategies have been increasingly adopted 
(co-opted) by charitable and governmental bodies.780  In particular, they are apprehensive about the 
commodification of personal stories of psychiatric distress and recovery in ‘wellbeing marketplaces’ 
that are increasingly dominated by powerful corporate actors.781 As they argue, this market is often 
aligned with the interests of those organisations (state, commercial or third sector), rather than 
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those of ‘mad people themselves’. In this context, personal stories of mental health, they write, 
‘function to garner support from authority figures such as politicians and philanthropists, to build 
the organizational “brand” regardless of program quality, and to raise operating funds during times 
of economic constraint’.782 Further, they argue, there is a marked shift away ‘from the history of 
psychiatric survivor storytelling’ as means to question critically social norms and provisions, towards 
forms of storying that ‘solidify hegemonic accounts of mental illness’.783 This critique of mainstream 
anti-stigma campaigns draws attention to how ‘mad stories’ risk being ‘sanitised’ in ways that ‘do 
little to change the way that agencies function or to address broader issues such as poverty, 
unemployment and discrimination’.784 In short, in focusing on individual stories of disclosure and 
recovery, questions about the causes of stigma and mental distress are frequently airbrushed out of 
picture.  
In order to alert ‘the community to the dangers of storytelling’, the Canadian scholars and 
activists devised a project entitled ‘Hands off Our Stories’, which included the production of 
information cards and a humorous button badge ‘displaying the words patient porn stroked out by a 
red diagonal line’ and information cards.785 Designed to warn people of the risks of freely giving their 
personal stories to mental health organisations, these information cards had the following ‘tips’ 
printed on them: 
• Participation is voluntary. You can always say no. 
• Ask yourself, who profits from you telling your story? 
• What purpose does personal story sharing serve? 
• How do large organizations use stories to make material change? 
• Story telling as an exercise of labour/work. Do you get paid? 
• The internet lasts forever. Because of the technology available today, your interview or 
story will likely be accessible to the public for a very long time. That includes future 
employers and landlords.786  
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The ‘Hands off our Stories’ project is a salient reminder that stigmatisation arises in contexts that are 
shaped by unequal relations of power, and that stigma and anti-stigma initiatives are the site of 
intensive social struggles. Attempts to ameliorate social stigma (of any kind) are limited from the 
outset, if they fail to take account of ‘the political economy of stigmatization and its links to social 
exclusion’.787 
 
[A] The political economy of stigma 
 
In January 2017, the Heads Together campaign was lent political support of the highest order when 
the then British Prime Minister Theresa May stated in a speech to the Charity Commission that: ‘For 
too long mental illness has been something of a hidden injustice in our country, shrouded in a 
completely unacceptable stigma and dangerously disregarded as a secondary issue to physical 
health’.788 Alongside tackling stigma, May made a specific commitment to address ‘shortfalls 
in mental health services’, which she described as ‘plans to tackle the burning injustice of mental 
illness’.789 However, the promise that mental health funding would be a key priority of her 
premiership, her assurances of additional resources for mental health services, and her promise to 
create parity between state funding for mental and physical health conditions, were met with 
incredulity by many British health professionals – and failed to materialise.  
Mental health services in the UK are so ‘notoriously underfunded’ that they are ‘often 
referred to as a “Cinderella service”’.790 As Mary O’Hara details, mental health provision was also ‘hit 
hard and early by austerity measures and this pattern has continued’.791 Cuts to services have taken 
place in a context of rapidly increasing need. For example, in 2017 several regional NHS trusts 
reported a 60 per cent increase in the previous 12-month period in referrals to mental health crisis 
teams (a crisis referral is made in urgent cases when, for example an individual is in extreme distress 
and felt to be at risk of self-harm which may endanger their life or those of others). This surge in 
crisis referrals was likely, in part, due to people being unable to access first-tier services, such as 
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counselling, at earlier stages of need: One in ten people currently wait two weeks to get an 
appointment with a general practitioner, many thousands have to wait six months or more for 
mental health assessment or a counselling appointment. 
One consequence of the combination of a marked increase levels of mental distress and a 
correlative decrease in availability of support, is that the police (and the fire service) are becoming a 
de facto front-line mental health service. As Vikram Dodd notes, ‘The number of calls handled by 
the Metropolitan police [London’s regional police force] in which someone was concerned about a 
person’s mental health hit a record 115,000 in the last year: on average 315 a day, or about 13 an 
hour. Volumes have grown by nearly a third since 2011-12’.792 Dodd, a journalist, reports cases in 
which ‘ill people struggling to find help commit crimes to obtain treatment’, noting how one woman 
‘on crutches walked a mile to smash a shop window in Hereford, then called the police herself, 
believing that was the best way to get access to mental health services’.793 I have heard similar 
anecdotal evidence through my own work with the Poverty Commission. 
If one of the aims of Heads Together is to eradicate stigma in order that people are willing 
and able to access services, the timing of this campaign inevitably begs the question what kinds and 
what quality of services actually exist for those in need, both now, and if the current programmes of 
austerity cuts continues, in the future. Furthermore, it is important to note that while the charities 
supported by Heads Together lead important programmes of mental health support, the forms this 
takes is largely the provision of information, helplines and online forums and not the kinds of 
intensive counselling and/or acute psychiatric health services that many people in Britain (those 
without private sources of funding, or in private health care schemes) are currently having 
difficulties accessing. Indeed, it is imperative that we understand the erosion of mental health 
services in the context of the wider political economy of NHS reform.794  All of this isn’t to say that 
talking about mental distress with friends and families can’t lessen social stigma, but rather that 
anti-stigma initiatives which want to remove barriers to help seeking, but that don’t simultaneously 
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address either the erosion of public service provision or the deeper social causes of increased levels 
of mental distress will likely be limited in their impact.   
 
 [A] Neoliberalism makes you sick 
Let’s unpack this a little further. In the UK, it is not only that mental health services have been 
historically underfunded, but that cuts to services are taking place in a period in which there has 
been a significant and sustained increase in anxiety, depression and suicides.795 In Politics Make You 
Sick: Neoliberal Epidemics, Ted Schrecker and Clare Bambra detail the ways in which state adoption 
of neoliberal economic policies characterised by ‘reductions in workplace rights, job security, pay 
levels and welfare rights’ has ‘led to large increases in chronic stress across large parts of the 
population of many countries’.796 This governmental production of chronic stress, is (unequally) 
distributed across the population, and ‘gets under the skin’, through multiple and ‘well understood’ 
psychosocial mechanisms.797 A fact to which people like Stephanie effected by changes to state 
benefits system, and wider social and public attitudes to welfare claimants, so powerfully testify (see 
Introduction and Chapter Four). 
This neoliberal epidemic of insecurity has been exacerbated in Britain and elsewhere by 
political responses to the 2008 global financial crisis. As detailed in Stigma, the British Coalition 
Government (2010-2015) and the subsequent Conservative Government (2015–current) responded 
to this crisis in the banking sector by implementing austerity, ‘an attempt to permanently 
disassemble the protection state’.798 It is not only that austerity-driven reforms have intensified an 
existing neoliberal epidemic of chronic stress, but, as detailed, this programme of cuts to social 
provision has been enacted and legitimated through strategies of (state-sanctioned) welfare stigma-
production.  
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As I have argued throughout Stigma, we require more thoroughly historical and political 
understandings of stigma if we are to address the multiple crises we are in. This necessitates 
supplementing approaches focused primarily on the ameliorating the effects of stigma towards a 
consideration of the social causes and political function of particular modalities of stigma 
production, to ascertain not only where and by whom stigma is crafted, but who profits from stigma 
power.   
 
[A] Following the stigma money 
Alongside the eight charitable partners who are the major beneficiaries of funds raised by Heads 
Together, the campaign has four corporate partners. These include the retail bank Virgin Money, 
Dixons Carphone – ‘Europe's leading specialist electrical and telecommunications retailer and 
services company’, the global corporate giant Unilever, and BlackRock – ‘a global leader in 
investment management, risk management and advisory services for institutional and retail 
client’.799 In short, Heads Together is bankrolled by some of the very corporate and financial 
organisations that are the beneficiaries of neoliberal economic policies (and the austerity reforms) 
that are eroding state welfare and social care, and in doing are exacerbating mental distress 
amongst the poorest and most vulnerable members of our societies.  
To take just one example from among the list of Heads Togethers corporate partners: Virgin 
Money (UK) began life as a personal finance company which primarily sold debt, though credit card 
services. In 2008, the British bank Northern Rock collapsed in the wake of the US sub-prime 
mortgage crisis, and the British government took the bank into national ownership. It then split the 
bank into two parts, Northern Rock plc, and Northern Rock Asset Management, with the bad debt 
(approx. £21bn) parcelled into the later. The government later sold Northern Rock plc to Virgin 
Money at a loss to the taxpayer estimated to be between £400m and £650m. The figures continue 
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to disputed, but what we can say with certainty is that British tax payers not only subsided Virgin 
Money in their acquisition of the salvageable part of this bank, but also absorbed a massive amount 
of private financial sector debt – money which could, of course, have be used to fund mental health 
services.   
Virgin Money is one part of Virgin Group Ltd., a multinational venture capital conglomerate. 
In 2010, Virgin set up a new arm, called Virgin Care, with which it sought to expand its interests into 
the private UK health services market, thus capitalising on the government’s programme to privatise 
state health services, a process rapidly accelerated under the guise of austerity-driven reforms. Gill 
Plimmer notes that ‘the provision of community services and mental healthcare is one of the biggest 
growth areas for healthcare companies and accounts for about half of all NHS outsourcing deals put 
out to tender’. As she writes, ‘according to LaingBuisson, the industry analysts, the market for out-
of-hospital services could be worth £10bn-£20bn a year’.800 At the time of writing, Virgin Care had 
acquired NHS contracts amounting to over £2 billion. Services run by Virgin Care include Primary 
Care (GP services and hospitals), Adult Social Care (including social workers), Community Health, 
Prison Healthcare and Child Mental Health Services. 
 
Several whistle-blowers, among them the Labour MP for Dewsbury, Paula Sherriff, have 
spoken out about unethical practices and misconduct within some of the health services Virgin now 
runs in place of the state, and multiple failures in service have been tracked and documented by 
campaign group such as NHS for Sale.801 In short, Virgin Group has been a key beneficiary of 
government programmes of austerity driven welfare reforms since 2010, profiting from the 
privatisation of social provision. Given this, we might want at least to question the claim of this 
predatory for-profit private health care provider that it shares the mission of Heads Together ‘of 
ending stigma, changing the conversation on mental health and giving people the tools they need to 
help themselves and each other with their mental health’.802  
It was in the immediate context of austerity, the mass and overtly politicised stigma 
production from above which accompanied this political project of the privatisation (enclosure) of 
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public goods and services, and the distress and suffering this created, that I grew frustrated with 
understandings of stigma which are decoupled from power, history, economics and politics.803  When 
I began the research for this book, I started by immersing myself in the social scientific literature on 
stigma, seeking research that spoke to my concern with stigma as a form of power. I found that social 
and political questions, such as ‘how stigma is used by individuals, communities and the state to 
produce and reproduce social inequality’, was either missing from or mutated within much of the 
literature.804  
Stigma is not alone in noticing this gap; there is now a growing body of research that evidences 
how stigma impacts on particular groups and populations cumulatively over time, through, for 
example, the design of discriminatory social policy and laws, and the embedding of stigma in 
institutional practices.805 An inter-disciplinary consensus is emerging on the ways in which ‘stigma 
feeds upon, strengthens and reproduces existing inequalities’.806 What Stigma has sought to 
contribute to this research, is a much more historical and political understanding of stigma as a form 
of classificatory power, and in particular to supplement the focus on individual experience with a 
consideration of stigma from the point of view of its production.  
In Stigma, this shift in perspective has been vertical (looking upwards to sites of stigma 
production) and temporal (taking long views on histories of stigma practices), while focusing 
throughout on developing a new understanding of stigma as a violent practices of exploitation and 
social control. In order to track the history of stigma as a history of practices, I researched the 
etymology of stigma, read classics scholarship, histories of slavery, Imperialism, and colonialism, and 
the history of capitalist enclosures. Then I read Frank Kafka’s short story ‘In the Penal Colony’ (1919) 
and I began to think about stigma as a machine. 
 
[A] Penal Stigma in the Colony  
 ‘In the Penal Colony’ recounts the visit of a European gentleman scholar-explorer to a French colony 
in the tropics. The commandant of the colony has invited the explorer to witness the execution of a 
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native soldier. The story is set at the scene of the execution in a desolate sandy valley on the 
outskirts of the colonial settlement, where the condemned man has been led shackled in thick 
chains which bind him from collared neck, to wrists and ankles. The narrative centres on the 
demonstration of a gruesome machine, used to torture residents of the colony to death by 
repetitively tattooing a sentence into their flesh: ‘whatever commandment the prisoner has 
disobeyed is written upon the body’.807  
The sentence to be inscribed on the bodies of the condemned is programmed into the 
machine by the officer, the penal colony’s sole judge and executioner. As this particular prisoner has 
been condemned to death for disobedience and insulting behaviour to a superior, the officer is 
calibrating the machine to kill him with the words ‘honour thy superiors’. As the officer readies the 
machine, he explains to the explorer that this ‘ingenious device’ was invented by the deceased 
former Commandant of the penal colony, and that this ‘procedure and method of execution’ has 
since fallen out of favour. Indeed, the officer is the only person left in the colony who can operate 
the machine. The officer describes to the explorer how these macabre public executions used to 
attract ‘hundreds of spectators’, but neither the new Commandant of the colony nor any of the 
residents of the colony now feel compelled to attend. Indeed, the officer suspects that the 
Commandant is deliberately withholding the resources required to repair the increasingly 
dilapidated machine in order that he might introduce a more enlightened penal system to the 
colony. Hoping to convince the explorer of the value of this barbaric method of execution, so he 
might later testify to the Commandant on its behalf, the officer details the workings of the machine 
in elaborate detail and ‘with great zeal’.808  
The machine is made up of three parts: the Bed, a coffin-like wooden cot in which the naked 
prisoner is strapped, with a felt gag in his mouth ‘to prevent him screaming and biting his tongue to 
pieces’; the Designer, which hangs above the bed and contains the cogs and mechanisms that drive 
the machine; and the Harrow, a glass armature studded with needles which shuttles between the 
Bed and the Designer on a steel ribbon tattooing the body of the condemned man. As the body is 
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tattooed by the Harrow it is slowly turned over in the Bed ‘to make ‘fresh space for writing’.809 The 
officer explains that those gathered at the execution are able to ‘watch the inscription taking form’, 
the needles ‘writing deeper and deeper’ into the flesh until ‘the Harrow has pierced him quite 
through’.810  
We discover that within the judicial system of this colony, those condemned to die in the 
machine are not informed in advance of their pending execution or even of what crime they are 
alleged to have committed; there is no hearing, and no opportunity to mount a defence. Rather, the 
officer explains that the ‘guiding principle’ of justice in the colony is ‘Guilt is never to be doubted’.811 
As he describes, the prisoner only becomes ‘enlightened’ to the nature of their infraction as the 
sentence is slowly etched into their flesh over a period of twelve hours. As they bleed to death the 
condemned begin ‘to understand the inscription’, deciphering it through their ‘wounds’. The 
execution ends when the corpse is ejected from the machine into a pit in the ground.812 
‘In the Penal Colony’ has inspired many artists and thinkers, and has been widely deployed 
as a metaphor for the ‘machinery’ and ‘mechanics of power’.813 It condenses several of the themes 
central to the reconceptualisation of stigma developed over the course of this book: stigma as penal 
tattoo, stigma as a technology of discipline and punishment, stigma as the machinery of racism, and  
stigma as a mechanism for the operations of colonial capitalism. Indeed, from the ‘colony’ of the 
title onwards, this is a story ‘marked and saturated’ with ‘colonial motifs’.814  
 
[A] This work of civilisation is an enormous and continual butchery 
 
Franz Kafka, a Czech-born German speaking Jew, grew up in a social and cultural context structured 
by European colonial domination of the globe. Indeed, ‘In the Penal Colony’ was drafted in 1914, at 
the apex of the 'Scramble for Africa' (1881–1914), three decades during which European states 
(initially through subsidiary companies and third-party franchises) colonialized 90 per cent of the 
African continent (10 millions square miles or territory, and 110 million subjects), a theft of land, and 
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resources which saw mass indentured labour, enslavement, torture and killings.815 Atrocities 
committed by German colonists, who lynched and enslaved people, raped women and girls, and 
starved entire peoples to death in concentration camps, was widely documented, publicised and 
debated in German-speaking public life while Kafka was writing.  
When Kafka penned ‘In the Penal Colony’, a debate was raging in the European press about 
different colonial methods, which ranged between criticism of civilizing approaches ‘which treated 
the natives with too much leniency’ and criticism of policies which centred on repression, forced 
labour, torture and ‘extermination’.816 Indeed, Kafka would have been familiar with figures such as 
the celebrity explorer and colonialist Carl Peters, an apostle of Rücklosigkeit (ruthless imperialism) 
and advocate of ‘machine-gun diplomacy’ who bragged to readers of journals such as The Society for 
German Colonisation about his use of barbaric and vigorous methods.817 Radical German nationalists 
(the precursors of Nazi fascism) and bellicose racist colonialists like Peters argued that ‘the colonies 
were fundamentally different moral realms’ where it would be disastrous to apply ‘European’ 
standards of morality and justice.818  
We know from the detailed research of Kafka scholars that Kafka was intimately familiar 
with these debates. Indeed, one of Kafka's favourite Uncles, Joseph Löwy worked from 1891–1902 in 
the Congo as chief of commercial sections on a railway built by forced labour.819 The colonisation of 
the Congo, initially an entirely corporate affair led by Belgian King Leopold has been described as 
‘perhaps the most convulsive episode ever to take place in African colonial history, and certainly one 
of the most devastating interventions against a human population on the historic record’.820  
There was a highly organised international campaign against Belgian King Leopold’s 
genocidal activities in ‘the Congo Free State’ (1885–1908) in the first years of the twentieth century, 
leading eventually to a change of government, with the Belgian State eventually taking formal 
control from Leopold (as ‘the Belgian Congo’). This scenario of regime change echoes that which 
frames Kafka’s story, namely from a colonial administration unrestrained in its barbaric use of 
punishments, to a regime which promises to be more ‘enlightened’. Contemporary reports about 
 238 
Leopold’s Congo, compiled by missionaries and activists, describe it as ‘a state of terrorism’, a 
‘death-trap’, a place of ‘bloody barbarities’, killings and mutilations.821 Congo, wrote Mark Twain, is a 
‘land of graves, the Congo free graveyard’.822 A speaker in a debate on Congo in the Belgian 
Parliament in July 1903 concluded that ‘this work of civilisation is an enormous and continual 
butchery’, involving ‘vampire groups of financial associations’ who wring their profits ‘from the 
blood and misery of natives’.823  
It was in the midst of colonial propaganda, native uprisings and growing political unease 
within Europe about bloody methods of torture and oppression in Africa, that Kafka condensed 
colonial violence into the metaphor of his tortuous stigma machine, yet he was not the first to do so. 
Machine technology was, as Edward Baptist notes, a popular metaphor for colonial capitalism, which 
depicted ‘changes as unending progress, change in which machines extracted power from nature 
and yielded it to human beings’.824    
In his letters, Kafka describes being enthralled by two fictionalised memoirs written by 
former German Army Officer and colonial explorer Oskar Weber, Letters of a Coffee Planter: Two 
Decades of German Labour in Central America (1913) and The Sugar Baron: South American 
Adventures of a Former German Officer (1914). In these colonial adventure stories, Weber describes 
the ingenious inventions that lubricated colonial extraction in South America, including the 
mechanical workings of sugar presses designed to twist and turn pieces of sugar cane until they 
expelled their syrup, and a machine that shelled coffee beans by vibrating them inside a metal drum 
lined with cotton wool. 825   
Alongside these new machines devised to process cash crops from colonial plantation, 
Weber also details some of the penal machines innovated to press labour from enslaved and/or 
indentured workers, including stockades and whipping machines.826 Notably, ‘In the Penal Colony’, 
the officer explains that the native man condemned to die in the machine, was initially punished by 
being whipped across the face by his captain for sleeping on duty. The officer explains that it was the 
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man’s insolent response to being lashed -- ‘Throw that whip away or I’ll eat you alive’ – which has 
led to his execution.  
 
In the Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism, Edward Baptist 
examines the myth that innovations in machine-technology (such as the cotton gin) increased 
productivity in Southern US cotton plantations in the nineteenth-century. (Between 1801 to 1862, 
the amount of cotton picked daily by an enslaved person increased 400 percent). Through a detailed 
examination of the changing management techniques employed on cotton plantations, Baptist 
evidences that this increase in cotton production was in fact an outcome of more efficient systems 
for the exploitation and torture of enslaved pickers. In short, it wasn’t ingenious new machines that 
were responsible for the spectacular increase in cotton production, rather a dramatic increase in 
physical violence, combined with meticulous systems of record-keeping, transformed cotton pickers 
into machines. As Baptist notes, ‘For many southwestern whites, whipping was a gateway form of 
violence … in the sources that document the expansion of cotton production, you will find .. every 
instrument of torture used at one time or another: sexual humiliation, mutilation, electric shocks, 
solitary confinement in “stress positions,”, burning, even waterboarding.’827 As Baptist concludes, we 
don’t ordinarily see torture ‘as a factor of production’, but ‘systematised torture was central to the 
industrial revolution, and thus to the birth of the modern world’.828 In the early twentieth century, 
the tortuous management techniques developed to monetize plantation labour in the American 
South were imported into African by European colonialists as they attempted to turn colonised 
people into profit-making machines.  
 
In his research on contemporary sources of ‘In the Penal Colony’, Paul Peters draws our attention to a 
series of cartoons drawn by Thomas Heine in a 1904 edition of the popular German satirical magazine 
Simplicissimus.829 Titled ‘Colonial Powers’, these four illustrations depict the differing techniques 
employed by European powers in the Scrabble for Africa. The second illustration in this series, titled 
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‘That's how the Englishman colonizes’ depicts an English colonialist, dressed in tweed, force-feeding 
an African man whisky. The man is held in a giant vice, operated by a soldier, which squeezes gold 
out of him, while a missionary enlightens him by reading from a Bible. This was Heine’s take on the 
English colonial mantra of ‘Commerce, Christianity and Civilisation’. 
[Insert Figure 7 near here] 
[Caption:] Figure 7: ‘That's how the Englishman colonises’ (So kolonisiert der Engländer). Cartoon 
from a series  of four on ‘Colonial Power’ by Thomas Theodor Heine published in the German 
satirical magazine Simplicissimus, 3 May 1904. 
 
If, like the contraption in this cartoon, Kafka’s stigma machine can read as a metaphor for how 
power is inscribed in bodies, the power in question is colonial power, and the body is the 
condemned body of the colonised subject. Indeed, Kafka’s machine might be read as a condensed 
metaphor for the entire machinery of colonialization. A terrifying, extraneous mechanical force that 
throttles and strangles those caught in its grasp.830 As Silvia Federici notes, it was ‘the human body 
and not the steam engine, and not even the clock, [that] was the first machine developed by 
capitalism’.831 It is stigma machines which are set to work to accomplish to transformation of people 
into non-human work machines, wringing profits from blood and misery.  
 
 
 [A] Stigma machines 
 
Stigma has examined some of the orchestrated alliances of social forces, mediums and technologies 
through which stigma power is crafted and activated to govern populations. It has sought to 
illustrate some of the ways in which stigma power exerts itself, what forms it takes, and how it seeds 
itself across different scales of social life. In recalibrating our understanding of stigma as a form of 
power that is entangled with long histories of colonial capitalism, this book seeks to make stigma a 
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more useful analytic tool, a device for thinking more deeply about how power etches itself people as 
a means of dehumanising and devaluing them.  
The concept of ‘stigma machines’ is intended to open up new ways of thinking about stigma 
as a punitive apparatus, to allow for richer historical understandings of the meaning of stigma as 
marks of disgrace or infamy, signs of severe censure or condemnation, which are impressed upon a 
person. As I imagine them, stigma machines are the mechanisms through which power penetrates 
bodies; machines of inscription set in motion through concerted efforts in order to immobilise, 
wound, humiliate, and/or dehumanise those caught within their grasp. The stigma machine is a 
conceptual device which seeks to directs attention ‘upwards’ and onto processes of stigma 
production. That is, thinking about stigma as a machine, or rather as a series of machines, forces us 
to focus on the mechanisms of stigma production, and the instruments through which stigma is 
impressed upon bodies in order to subjugate them, as stigma is cranked into operation in support of 
extractive capitalist political economies. 
In thinking about stigma as a machinery of inequality, Stigma has sought to trouble 
individualistic understandings of stigma by developing a more structural understanding of stigma as 
a classificatory form of power.  Of course, stigma machines take different forms, depending on the 
governmental and media systems through which they are composed and the specific political and 
economic requirements of those who assemble and operate them. Sites of stigma production that 
coalesce in the formation of these machines today include: the institutional forms of stigma politics 
exercised by states, particularly by politicians, spin-doctors and think-tanks; the stigmacraft engaged 
by media and cultural industries, including public relations, journalism, news media, advertising, 
film, television and digital corporations, digital technologies and platforms; as well as everyday 
stigma interactions, including racist, disablist and misogynistic hate speech in face-to-face and online 
settings. 
 In 2018, the graphic artist Tom Morris and I collaborated to visualise the concept of the 
stigma machine. Drawing on Kafka and Thomas Heine’s colonial machines, we designed a stigma 
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machine in the form of an animated Gif (see Figure 8). Our stigma machine invokes histories of 
colonial capitalism, but connects these histories to the current global authoritarian (re)turn by 
highlighting the pivotal role played by digital technologies in the contemporary production of stigma 
in service of extractive systems of capitalism.   
 
[Insert Figure 8 near here] 
 





As the explorer in Kafka’s ‘In the Penal Colony’ watches the condemned man being strapped into the 
stigma machine, he admits he is perturbed by ‘the injustice of the procedure and the inhumanity of 
the execution’, but he is reluctant to intervene in the abject spectacle unfolding before him. He 
explains that he ‘travelled only as an observer, with no intention at all of altering other people’s 
methods of administering justice’.832 He reminds the reader that this is after all a colony ‘where 
extraordinary measures’ were undoubtedly needed to keep discipline.833 Further, he sees the 
condemned man, ‘a complete stranger, not a fellow countryman’ as a not-fully human, but as ‘a 
stupid-looking wide-mouthed creature with bewildered hair and face’, ‘a submissive dog’ with 
‘blubber lips’.834 However, when pushed by the officer for his views on this barbaric system of 
justice, the explorer states that he cannot support it. In resignation that this marks the end of the 
road for his stigma machine, the officer frees the condemned man, strips naked and climbs inside it 
himself.  However, rather than gradually tattoo its final judgement (‘Be Just’) into the officer’s body, 
the machine breaks down and jolts out of control, unceremoniously stabbing the officer to death, 
leaving his head gouged by a spike hanging over the pit. 
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The gruesome end of Kafka’s story, this image of the machine breaking down and ‘vomiting 
up its own mechanical innards’, reminded me of the long history of machine breaking in England 
(and wider Europe).835 A history that Karl Marx described as ‘the strife between workman and 
machine’ which from the seventeenth-century onwards saw people rise up to destroy shearing 
machines, threshing machines, power looms and more, as they sought to resist the pauperism 
effected by land enclosures and the factory system.836 What people were protesting in breaking 
machines was the destruction of their lives, livelihoods, and health by machine work. The inhuman 
effects of which in England were recorded by men like Fredrick Eden in The State of the Poor (1797), 
and Fredrich Engels in The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845), which describes the 
crippling disabilities caused by factory work in Salford mills. Machine-breaking revolts protested the 
conversion of humans into work-machines or what Silvia Federici describes as ‘the mechanization of 
the proletarian body’ itself.837 People broke machines in protest at their pauperisation and 
dehumanisation by the capitalist machine. 
As historian Peter Linebaugh reminds us, all instances of capitalist enclosure – from ‘the 
open fields of England enclosed by Acts of Parliament’ to ‘the customs of the sikep villagers of Java’ 
– have been ‘accomplished by terrifying machines’:  the man-of-war, the steam engine, the cotton 
gin, threshing machines, plantation whipping machines, and machine guns. 838 For those caught in 
the maul of these machines, they are experienced not as technologies of improvement or progress 
‘but as hell itself’. 839   
The emergence of capitalism as a world system has seen hundreds of years of revolts by 
people against the machine systems which have sought to dehumanise and enclose their lives. From 
the seizing and scuttling of slave ships, to continual acts of resistance to the dehumanisation and 
tortures of plantation labour, enslaved people led machine-breaking struggles for freedom and 
equality. Most pivotal amongst these freedom struggles, but often still untaught in European history 
lessons, was the Haitian Revolution (1791- 1804). This two decade revolt saw the enslaved rise up 
and destroy hundreds of sugar, coffee and indigo plantations, declare freedom from colonial rule, 
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and create a free black state. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot has argued, the Haitian revolution was 
‘unthinkable’ because it so decisively broke with the renaissance world-view upon which the 
stratified hierarchies of human life which underpin the global capitalist world order were built. As 
Trouillot puts it, it was a revolution by those who had been designated positions at ‘the bottom of 
the human world’ against ‘Man (with a capital M)’.840  This revolution overthrew European colonial 
capitalism, and the stigma machines assembled to reproduce it. In doing, it fundamentally and 
irrevocably challenged ‘the ontological order of the West and the global order of colonialism’.841 This 
revolution indelibly shaped the freedom movements of the twentieth century.842  
 
[A] Freedom movements 
In the mid-twentieth century, a dizzying array of grassroots struggles for equality and justice 
exploded across the world. As Virdee puts it: ‘By the late 1960s, large parts of humanity across the 
world were in collective motion in pursuit of that most basic of human aspirations, to make life more 
liveable.’843 Anti-colonial movements, civil rights and black power movements, indigenous rights 
movements, Dalit and Adivasi rights movements, Labour movements, feminist and LGBT 
movements, disabled peoples movements and more, drew on experiential knowledge of 
dehumanisation, oppression and subjugation as a means of radically questioning the systems of 
human stratification that subtend capitalist and colonial societies.  
Alongside concrete demands for equality and justice, what these diverse emancipatory 
movements held in common is that they emerged out of people’s collective demands to be 
recognised as equal, that is as equally human. As Stokely Carmichael put it in 1966, ‘I am black. I 
know that. I also know that while I am black I am a human being.’844At their most radical, these 
movements for equality were abolitionist movements, in that they sought to overthrow Eurocentric 
colonial, patriarchal, white supremacist, heteronormative, classist, and disablist templates of ‘the 
human’ grounded in what Katherine McKittrick terms the manufacture of profitable and brutal 
hierarchies of human difference.845  
 245 
Many of these freedom movements were ‘informed by socialism’, ‘a socialism stretched and 
refashioned to articulate with race, anti-colonialism, gender as well as class’.846 That is, these were 
freedom movements against colonial capitalism, concerned with the redistribution of resources – of 
land, wealth, rights and, crucially ‘person value’.847 Indeed all of these movements were, broadly 
speaking, movements against the capitalist enclosure of communal resources and social relations.848 
These were movements for humanity against the dehumanising violence of the colonial capitalist 
machine. 
Satnam Virdee argues that neoliberalism should be understood as ‘a capitalist counter-
revolution’ against the freedom movements of the twentieth century.849 A capitalist revolution that 
seeks to extract the remaining vestiges of the social, political and economic gains won through 
freedom struggles over the course of the previous century of struggle. The capitalist counter-
revolution of neoliberalism is manifest in the re-emergence of authoritarian politics across the world 
today – in the mainstreaming of ethno-nationalism, in the ascendance of far-right white (and Hindu) 
supremacist politicians, parties and policies, in the cultivation of nostalgia for Empire, in calls for a 
return to ‘traditional’ patriarchal and heteronormative social structures, in the erosion of 
democracy, and access to systems of legal justice and redress, in the deepening of surveillance and 
police powers, in expanding prison populations, and in the marked rise in racist, disablist and 
misogynistic forms of hate speech in public life. Indeed, stigma politics is a leitmotif of the current 
conjuncture tangible in the intensification of everyday racisms and racial violence, in malicious forms 
of welfare stigma and disability hate crimes, and in an upsurge in malevolent misogyny and sexual 
violence. It is insufficient to call this a ‘backlash’ against progressive values and/or liberal democratic 
norms (as we saw in Chapter Two, liberal norms inherited from European enlightenment traditions 
are often precisely mechanisms of oppression). What we are witnessing is much more systematic 
ideological war against the radical humanising anti-capitalist anti-colonial politics that underpinned 
mid-twentieth century social movements for justice and equality. 
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[A] The new machine politics  
Stigma was written a response to the state of emergency in which it was conceived and during which 
it was written, a period of heightened colonial capitalist extraction and enclosure, of displacement 
and dispossession. Indeed, the violence of colonial capitalism is alive and kicking in everything we 
are and do – in the t-shirts we wear made by sweated labour in distant factories, in the books we 
read packed by precarious machine-workers in Amazon warehouses, in wars for oil, in the continued 
pollution and plunder of the Earth’s natural resources. As Silvia Federici notes, ‘Though Marx was 
acutely aware of the murderous character of capitalist development … he viewed it as a necessary 
step in the process of human liberation’ that would create ‘the material conditions for the liberation 
of humanity from scarcity and necessity.’850 She goes on to say that Marx also assumed ‘that the 
violence that had presided over the earliest phases of capitalist expansion would recede with the 
maturing of capitalist relations, when the exploitation and disciplining of labor would be 
accomplished mostly through the workings of economic laws. In this, he was deeply mistaken.’851 
Stigma politics is playing a pivotal role in winning democratic consent for the kinds of social 
decomposition, inequalities and injustices fomented by inhuman forms of governmentality we see 
all around us. Stigma politics functions ‘by dividing, on a continuously renewed basis’ those it seeks 
to govern.852 In the process, it foments electoral and popular consent for deepening inequalities. 
Indeed, stigma is an ‘indispensable weapon in the armoury of the state elites’, amplifying social 
divisions through devaluation, in ways designed to soften the way for further rounds of capitalist 
enclosure and accumulation.853 In short, global corporate capital, which is and has always been 
colonial capitalism, feeds vampire-like on the divisions that stigma politics inculcates.  
Understanding stigma as a mechanism of rule through division allows for new insights into 
how the current authoritarian return has proved effective in securing political power. What I mean 
by this is that stigma power is a governmental technology which functions through the amplification 
of stigmatising forms of difference, which is used in turn to pit people against each other in struggles 
over resources and value. In this way, social solidarities are fractured, and opposition to the anti-
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social, anti-human movement of capital is neutered and neutralised. Stigma politics is a reign of 
terror that is designed to disarm resistance. 
I wrote Stigma during the 2016 US election, the 2016 UK Brexit campaign and the 2019 
Indian election. What is clear from these events is the extent to which the current rise of 
authoritarian neoliberalism is characterised by ‘machine politics’  facilitated by for-profit digital 
technologies (often termed ‘platform capitalism’) .854 Stigma has touched a little upon the role of 
digital stigma power within this new ‘machine politics’, from algorithmic engines of oppression855, 
digital surveillance technologies, ‘digital poor houses’856 and the troll factories of propaganda 
production. These digital stigma machines buttress the current global authoritarian re/turn and pose 
a fundamental challenge to human freedom. These epistemological forms of warfare are pitted 
against liberal democratic forms, seeking to win consent for authoritarian rule.  
However, as I have sought to demonstrate throughout this book, it is a mistake to focus 
exclusively on the novelty of contemporary forms of stigma production and dissemination in political 
propaganda and the manipulation of public opinion. As the historian Timothy Snyder reminds us, in 
the 1930s European fascists also harnessed the ‘new media’ of radio and cinema, ‘to create a 
drumbeat of propaganda’.857 While the mediums and machines through which stigma power 
reverberates to generate divisions within the body politic, are subject to constant innovation; much 
of what we label as ‘new’ – including the content and forms that stigmatising propaganda takes – 
has deep historical roots.  
Governmental orchestrations of stigma aren’t a new phenomenon. On the contrary, the 
increased velocity of stigma has affective purchase because its draws upon engrained histories of 
practice, and established cannons of knowledge. For example, while US presidents may not have 
used Twitter before, the repetition of untruths and the use of rallies to mass the base of supporters 
into frenzied mob violence are tried and tested tactics of fascistic forms of stigma politics. Similarly, 
‘excoriating the behaviour of the poor’ through ‘rituals of public degradation’ has always been 
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central to the government of welfare, even while forms and methods of badging the poor have 
changed (see Chapter Four).858  
The insistence upon the new often serves to obscure earlier atrocities and limits our capacity 
to learn from the past. In Stigma, paying attention to the history of stigma, its figures and cultural 
imaginaries reminds us of the extent to which the contemporary ‘dynamics of naming and valuation’ 
is embedded within much longer practices of discipline and control.859 There is little which is novel 
about neoliberalism, and there is little which is new about stigma power. 
 
[A] Common humanity  
Stigma has focused on continuities and connections in stigma practices across time and place. It has 
detailed the long penal history of stigma as a means of producing a rich, thick account of the social 
and political function of stigmatisation as a constituent mechanism of colonial capitalism. Employing 
genealogical methods and tracing several lines or infrastructures of stigma power, it has argued that 
stigma is designed, crafted and activated to govern populations on multiple scales and in diverse 
sites and, crucially, that stigma production from above accelerates in periods of political and 
economic turmoil, often in response to particular demands of capital (and capitalists).  
It is the argument of Stigma that the knowledge garnered through histories of penal 
stigmatisation is critical for understanding how inequalities are produced and, further, that histories 
of anti-stigma struggles might inform resistance to the authoritarian turn that characterises the 
political present.  
We can track the violence of stigma through particular strands and call it by different names 
– such as racism, classism, disabilism and misogyny – but by focusing on ‘stigma power’, I have 
attempted to forge an intersectional concept that might allow for a tracking of historical 
continuities, connections and commonalities between manifold forms and practices of classificatory 
violence which discipline ‘humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans’.860 To 
adopt a phrase from Yasmin Gunaratnam, stigma ‘can help us to understand the bodily toll of 
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interlocking injustices, while intersectionality can provide a means to think about the social 
complexity of an individual’s suffering’.861 In short, it was in search of common ground that I decided 
to work with stigma or rather rework it. That is, my intention has been to re-conceptualise stigma in 
ways that explicate its function as a dehumanising praxis of subjugation which through the 
dehumanisation and devaluation of people enables the capitalist enclosure of land, resources and 
social life.  
In February, 1982, the American writer, and civil rights activist Audre Lorde gave a lecture 
titled ‘Learning from the 60s’ as part of event to celebrate the life and work of Malcolm X. She 
said: 
Within each one of us there is some piece of humanness that knows we are not being 
served by the machine which orchestrates crisis after crisis and is grinding all our futures 
into dust. If we are to keep the enormity of the forces aligned against us from establishing 
a false hierarchy of oppression, we must school ourselves to recognize that any attack 
against Blacks, any attack against women, is an attack against all of us who recognize that 
our interests are not being served by the systems we support. Each one of us here is a link 
in the connection between anti-poor legislation, gay shootings, the burning of synagogues, 
street harassment, attacks against women, and resurgent violence against Black people.862  
 
Resistance against the stigma machines which characterise the contemporary world, has seen new 
tactics and strategies of machine breaking emerge: the environmental protestors who lock 
themselves into vehicles and  buildings to resist environmental degradation and to protest climate 
crisis; the global movement of disability rights protestors who use their wheelchairs as weapons to 
block government building in ‘die in’ protests against the draconian changes in medical, health and 
social care that have seen a global roll-back in disabled people’s rights; the hackers who expose the 
innards of the machine politics that is seeding white supremacist ideologies across the world.  
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The challenge is how we draw together these ‘intertwined vectors of struggle for freedom’ against 
practices of power intent on the cultivation and exploitation of difference, forging solidarities in 
order to break the machines that orchestrate crisis after crisis, and are grinding our futures into 
dust.863 There are political risks in focusing on commonalities, rather than differences, however the 
humanity-annihilating power of stigma power can only be resisted through solidarity practices, 
precisely because the capitalist counter-revolution we are living through operates by exploiting 
differences, by crafting hierarchies of person-value and exacerbating class, gendered and racialised 
divisions.864  Indeed, speaking, reading and thinking about connected histories of stigma power is 
part of a decolonising process of reparative justice that supports the building of solidarity 
movements; practices which Paul Gilroy describes as the ‘ongoing collective work of salvage’. 865 This 
work is essential if we are to resist the divisive forces of identarian politics, ‘salvage humanity’ and 
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